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1. Knowledge use in road safety policy
1.1. Introduction
In m ore than ten years of research, m y experience in Dutch road safety has 
often filled me w ith w onder, a w onder concerning two related issues. The 
first is the existence of interesting and scientifically sound research, while the 
outcomes thereof apparently are not used by policy-makers. Reports that 
delight scientists, are not always greeted w ith equal enthusiasm  by policy­
makers. Sometimes, there are practical reasons for this, sometimes political 
reasons, and sometimes, to scientists, there is no fathomable reason at all for 
disregarding or rejecting scientific studies. The second issue is that policy­
makers present genuine policy problems, which they encounter on a daily 
basis and try to form ulate the knowledge dem ands behind these, but 
scientists are not always capable of m eeting these knowledge needs. Again, 
there are practical reasons for this, and sometimes it is scientifically 
impossible to find a solution. Occasionally, however, there appears to be no 
valid reason for neglecting these policy questions, even for scientists 
themselves.
The two groups, it seems, have different w orldview s and perceive their roles 
differently. Policy-makers often see a w orld that is complex, full of 
exceptions and unable to be compartmentalised. They have an idealised 
image of science, expect knowledge to be custom made, and do not always 
understand  technical scientific knowledge that does not match their 
experience. They reproach scientists for their 'ivory tower' behaviour in not 
giving their knowledge needs sufficient priority. Scientists, on the other 
hand, often generalise, schematise, and reduce complexities, in order to 
present averages and certainties. They see their role as objective fact-finders 
rather than decision makers, yet at the same time, are frustrated w hen policy­
makers do not adopt their recommendations.
Is it possible to bring these two w orlds closer together, to dim inish the 
distrust that is sometimes expressed and to show w hat both w orlds have to 
offer each other? It is from these observations, certainly somewhat 
caricatured here, that m y curiosity about the subject of this thesis originates.
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1.2. Some key concepts
From the short introduction above, it can be deduced that this is a thesis in 
adm inistrative sciences in the field of road safety and, m ore specifically, 
focussing on the use of (scientific) knowledge in this particular field. Two 
kinds of readers are likely to be interested in this study: readers familiar with 
the road safety field and those familiar w ith adm inistrative sciences. These 
two groups will only partly overlap. That m eans that some readers m ay not 
be familiar w ith concepts in this study, or m ay have a different 
understanding of the m eaning of these concepts. This section, therefore, 
gives a brief definition of some of the basic concepts used throughout this 
study. Some of these concepts will be defined in greater detail in Chapter 2.
The m ost im portant concepts used in the previous section are 'science', 
'knowledge', 'policy', 'use', 'road safety' and 'two worlds'. Science is a concept 
that could cause confusion in readers. In some traditions, science is only used 
as a synonym  for the study of the natural w orld or in physics and for 
fundam ental science. Studies in other disciplines are referred to as research, 
as are applied sciences. In other traditions, the w ord 'science' indicates both 
studies in natural sciences, in social sciences and in the hum anities, and 
includes both fundam ental and applied sciences (Kroes, 1996, p. 13-30). In 
this thesis, the w ord will be used in the latter sense. The w ord research is 
used to indicate specific studies, the w ord science to indicate the activity in 
general. A similar distinction is used for the w ords researcher and scientist. 
Section 1.5 elaborates on the philosophical discussion on the nature of science 
and Chapter 2 on the distinction between fundam ental and applied sciences.
Policy, or m ore specifically public policy, is defined by Dunn (1981, p. 46/47) 
as "long series of m ore or less related choices m ade by governm ental bodies 
and officials". Policies are form ulated in specific issue areas, in this case road 
safety. While the actual policy processes focus on achieving policy ends by 
certain means, for example a decrease in the num ber of road deaths by 
im plem enting road safety measures, D unn stresses that policies do not stand 
alone. They are em bedded in a policy environment, the specific context of 
each issue area, in which events occur and policy stakeholders, individuals 
or groups w ith a stake or interest in the specific policy, try to influence 
policy. Furtherm ore, policy is often based on scientific information. The 
relationships between these components, the public policies, policy 
stakeholders, knowledge organizations and the policy environm ent form an 
institutional pattern nam ed policy system by Dunn. Chapter 2 elaborates on
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the analytical concept of institutional patterns, while Chapter 4 analyses the 
institutional patterns in road safety.
Although the term  'road safety' is not defined officially in the literature, there 
are several organisations that do define road traffic accidents. The definitions 
of the European Union (SafetyNet, 2009), the W orld Health Organization 
(Peden et al., 2004, p. 201; W orld Health Organization, 2010, p. 4) and the 
Dutch Public Prosecution Service (College van procureurs-generaal, 2009) 
display m any similarities, although they differ on details, as the following 
table illustrates. The United Nations (United Nations Economic Commission 
for Europe, 1995) and IRTAD (Bruhning & Berns, 1998) provide similar 
definitions.
Source What Where Consequence With
EU An accident which occurred 
or originated 
on a way or 
street open to 
public traffic
which resulted 
in one or more 
persons being 
killed or injured 
and
in which at 
least one 
moving vehicle 
was involved.
Dutch Public
Prosecution
Service
An incident which occurred 
on a road open 
to public traffic
and which 
resulted in 
damage and/or 
death or injury 
of road users
which is related
to traffic, not
including an
incident
exclusively
involving
pedestrians
WHO A collision on a public or 
private road
that resulted in 
at least one 
person being 
injured or killed
involving at 
least one 
vehicle in 
motion
Table 1.1. Definitions of a road traffic accident.
All of the definitions m ention the (public) road, the occurrence of (personal) 
dam age and the involvem ent of a vehicle. This excludes air, rail and 
w aterw ay accidents and accidents involving people not on roads. The 
definition also excludes accidents on roads not related to traffic, such as 
crime, violence or illness. In this thesis, the definition of the Dutch Public 
Prosecution Service is used.
To sketch an outline of the road safety problem  for readers not acquainted 
w ith this field, it m ight be helpful to m ention that road traffic accidents are
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one of the worlds' m ain causes of death and injuries. Clearly the over 1.2 
million road deaths per year w orldw ide in 2004 (Peden et al., 2004, p. ix), 
34,500 in the EU in 2009 (European Union, 2009) and 640 in the N etherlands 
in 2010 (Minister van Infrastructuur en Milieu, 2011) indicate the need for 
scientific knowledge regarding the causes of accidents and possible 
preventive m easures in road safety policies. Generally, causes and 
preventive m easures are sought in hum an behaviour, road infrastructure and 
vehicle characteristics (SWOV, 2010). Publications other than this thesis 
provide an extensive overview of the causes of accidents and of preventive 
m easures (CROW, 2009; Elvik et al., 2009b; European Union, 2009; SWOV, 
2007a; W egman & Aarts, 2006).
Three concepts are elaborated on in Chapter 2: knowledge, use and the two 
w orlds of science and policy. For a clear understanding of the present 
chapter, it suffices to highlight a few points. The w ord 'knowledge' refers to 
various kinds of knowledge related to road safety in this chapter, including 
articles in scientific journals, research reports, fact sheets, statistics, 
conference papers et cetera. Chapter 2 provides a m ore detailed definition and 
in the various chapters, the exact type of knowledge m eant is stated. The 
same applies to the w ord 'use'. Different kinds of use are referred to in this 
chapter, ranging from reading an article to im plem enting road safety 
m easures based on scientific recommendations. Chapter 2 provides a 
classification of types of knowledge use. The Chapters 4 to 8 each indicate the 
precise type of knowledge use relevant for that chapter. Chapter 2 also 
elaborates on the 'two worlds' concept (Caplan, 1979). For the moment, it 
suffices to m ention that m y own observations in the knowledge and policy 
w orlds have been that policy-makers and scientists regularly refer to 
themselves and the others as 'them  and us' and voice their surprise about 
their different frames of reference.
1.3. Three examples of science and policy disparity: 
processes and patterns
Over the years, I have collected several examples of knowledge provision 
that did not sufficiently address policy questions, and of scientifically sound 
research being ignored by policy-makers. Three examples which shed light 
on the use of knowledge in different circumstances are sketched below. They 
show that reasons for not using knowledge can be found in policy processes, 
bu t also in institutional patterns in which the knowledge and policy worlds 
are embedded.
10
1.3.1. National statistics are not sufficient for local policy
Road safety is commonly m easured in terms of road deaths and serious road 
injuries. In the Netherlands, these figures are presented yearly at national 
level (most recent figures: 640 road deaths in 2010 and m ore than 18,000 
serious road injuries in 2009), per province and per municipality. The figures 
are provided by Statistics N etherlands (CBS) and by the Centre for Transport 
and Navigation (DVS) of the M inistry of Infrastructure and the Environment 
(hereafter: M inistry of Infrastructure).
The statistics, presented on various scale units w ith the municipal level as the 
lowest, are not always helpful. The city of Am sterdam , for instance, 
m entioned three major criticisms of road safety statistics in 2004 and 2005. 
Firstly, that national statistics w ere unreliable, due to under-registration. 
Secondly, that for detailed m anagem ent it was im portant to establish on 
which road section the registered accident took place. Thirdly, that the 
num ber of road deaths and serious road injuries at a local level w ere too 
small to provide a basis for policymaking:
When a check of these figures was carried out, a considerable under-registration was 
discovered. However, AVV (now DVS, CB) is not willing to correct the figures. The City 
Council now uses the accident statistics of the police who made an exception in allowing 
this. Another criticism is the fact that for the last two years, the AVV attributes the 
accidents to the middle of the road sections. With this, it is impossible to distinguish clear 
black spots and accidents near an intersection are not clearly visible. We are considering 
watching and counting at intersections again ourselves. Amsterdam uses the total 
number of injured in policy plans, instead of road deaths and serious road injuries 
because these latter figures are too small for policymaking purposes.
Conversation with Mr. Wolters, municipality of Amsterdam, 15 December 2006
1.3.2. We do not want insight into road safety expenses
Recent SWOV research (Goldenbeld et al., 2010; Jagtman, Wijnen & Bax, 
2010) aim ed to gain insight into the road safety expenses of provinces and 
municipalities. A questionnaire sent to two provinces and municipalities in a 
pilot study, revealed to the researchers that provinces and municipalities did 
not have inform ation on road safety expenses available. They w ere unable to 
present an overview of the total spending on road safety in a particular year. 
Confronted w ith this, the researchers asked for the reasons for such 
omission, expecting to hear complaints of a practical nature such as 
adm inistration problems, lack of time et cetera. Instead, m ost often they
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found a striking disinterest in these statistics, since road safety m easures 
w ere incorporated in the m aintenance and reconstruction policy processes.
One municipality expressed this as follows:
"Statistics on road safety expenses in the municipal budget are not available. The reason 
is that many road safety measures are part of an integral policy. Most road safety 
measures are taken as a part of major reconstructions of roads so the cost of road safety 
measures is not calculated separately. Hence, it is not clear which part of the costs can be 
assigned to road safety and which to traffic flow, for example in the case of a roundabout. 
The alderman is more interested in presenting concrete road safety projects than in the 
financial figures for road safety. No-one in the municipal organisation ever asks for an 
overview of road safety expenses. Besides, the expenses can fluctuate greatly per year. 
Finally, standardised budgets per unit (for example per running metre) are often used for 
major maintenance projects. Minor road safety measures are included in these."
Interview with Mr. Knippenberg and Mr. van Overbeeke, municipality of Bernheze, 8 June 2009
1.3.3. "Draconian measures", that are scientifically sound
In 2001, SWOV form ulated proposals for a speedy reduction of road deaths 
(Wegman, 2001). A series of m easures was presented which, in addition to 
the governm ental draft-National Traffic and Transport Plan, w ould result in 
a reduction in the num ber of road deaths by 700, from 1100 in 2001 to 400 in 
2010. One series of m easures had  been directed at novice drivers, containing 
two controversial measures: a ban on taking passengers and one on driving 
at night. SWOV calculated the benefits of this last m easure at 40 fewer road 
deaths per year (Wegman, 2001, p. 83-84).
SWOV was aware that the m easures w ere controversial, as reflected in a 
sentence in the introduction of the report (Wegman, 2001, p. 18):
"SWOV has not gone into the question of the extent to which 'laws and practical 
objections' stand between 'dreams and deeds'."
SWOV presented the report in the Committee of Transport, Public Works 
and W ater M anagem ent of the Dutch H ouse of Representatives.
The political reactions to these two m easures were destructive. The then 
Minister of Transport, Ms Netelenbos, called the m easures "draconian" (Bax, 
2006, p. 38) and "at the very least prem ature" (Tweede Kamer, 2002, p. 6). In 
an interview  w ith SWOV, she stated the following about the ban on driving 
at night for novice drivers:
"No politician will do it. I will not do it. I think it's nonsense, and the same applies to 
"they are not allowed to take passengers on board". These are ridiculous proposals." 
Interview with minister of Transport, Ms. Netelenbos, 28 February 2002
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There w ere other negative reactions to the proposals. The MP Ms Giskes 
from a liberal party, D66 stated (Tweede Kamer, 2002, p. 5):
"However, bans (...) are not very appealing and for this reason undesirable".
1.3.4. Comparing the three examples
The reasons for the non-use of knowledge in these examples can be 
approached from two levels of analysis: reasons linked to policy processes on 
the one hand, and those linked to the institutional setting of the road safety 
field, in particular to the relationship between know ledge-producing and 
policy-making institutions on the other. Various reasons for non-use related 
to the actual policy processes are m entioned in the examples. In general, the 
knowledge available does not conform to the needs in the policy processes. 
In the first example, the knowledge is not sufficiently detailed to be of use in 
policy processes. In the second, the policy process does not require the 
knowledge, because road safety is integrated into road m aintenance policy. 
In the th ird  example, the knowledge provided did not gain public support, 
and was therefore not used in the policy process.
The examples also highlight reasons that do not lie w ithin the policy process 
itself, bu t in the institutional setting of the knowledge and policy field, the 
fixed patterns of interactions betw een knowledge and policy organisations in 
the road safety field. In the first example, the accident statistics were 
provided by national institutions, possibly not inform ed about the need of 
municipalities for detailed figures. In the second case, the knowledge was 
provided by an organisation aim ed exclusively at researching road safety, 
and possibly not sufficiently recognising the trend of integrating road safety 
into traffic policy at a m unicipal level. The third case showed the different 
w orlds that science and policy inhabit: a scientific w orld w here scientific 
standards and cost-effectiveness are rated highly versus a political world 
oriented tow ards public support.
This thesis assumes that, for a full understanding, an analysis of knowledge 
use by examining both policy processes and institutional patterns is 
necessary. The following sections explain that some chapters in this thesis 
focus on analysing the institutional context and others on analysing policy 
processes, taking the institutional context into account.
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1.4. Processes and patterns: research questions
Several differences between knowledge provided by science and that used in 
policymaking were presented in the examples above. The question is: w hy is 
knowledge sometimes not used? Although these examples suggest a non-use 
of knowledge, it m ust be investigated w hether this, in fact, is the case. 
Therefore, the central research question of this thesis can be form ulated as 
follows:
What are the reasons for possible non-use o f knowledge in Dutch road safety 
policy processes?
To gain insight into this question, the present thesis investigates the use of 
knowledge in policymaking, possible barriers to and ways to im prove 
knowledge utilisation. The central question can be thus unfolded into three 
sub-questions:
• To what extent is knowledge used in Dutch road safety policy?
• Which barriers are there to knowledge use in Dutch road safety policy?
• How can knowledge use in this field be increased?
As stated above, barriers both in policy processes and in the institutional 
setting are considered in this thesis. Chapters 6 to 8 study the use of 
knowledge in provinces and municipalities in concrete road safety policy 
processes. They focus on the extent to which knowledge is used in policy and 
on barriers to knowledge use by examining various policymaking processes 
on road safety. Theories of knowledge utilisation are used to interpret these 
process-related barriers. However, the process-related barriers m ay not be 
the only barriers that hinder the use of knowledge in policy. Some authors 
(see for example Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Kroes, 1996; Rosenberg, 1995; 
Rosenberg, 2007) stress the im portance of the institutional relations between 
knowledge institutions and policy organisations, and the changes over time 
in these relations. Chapter 4 therefore, looks into the institutional setting of 
knowledge and policy institutions in the Dutch road safety field. Theories of 
institutionalisation and changes in institutions over tim e are used to describe 
and interpret the relations betw een knowledge and policy organisations.
1.5. Orientation in scientific approaches
As indicated above, this thesis approaches the topic of road safety from an 
adm inistrative sciences perspective. For readers not familiar w ith this
14
perspective, this section explains the position of the thesis in a broader 
discussion on the philosophy of science.
W ithout em barking on an exhaustive discussion of the various philosophical 
schools (Parsons, 1997, p. 71 and further; Rosenberg, 1995, p. 24-25; Rutgers, 
1993, p. 29 and 201-213; 2004, p. 206-214; Van Vucht Tijssen & Van Reijen, 
1991), two m ainstream  ways of thinking about science can be distinguished. 
The rationalistic, also know n as (post)positivistic or nomothetic paradigm  to 
science has been dom inant in science, especially in the natural sciences, but 
also in other disciplines, such as psychology. In this rationalistic paradigm , 
the existence of one cognisable reality w ith one frame of reference, one 
scientific m ethod and one scientific language in which knowledge is 
com municated are common assumptions. The dem onstration of laws or 
patterns through verification or falsification of causal relations or statistical 
probabilities is its m ost im portant basis. O pponents of this model, often 
indicated as supporters of the hermeneutic, verstehende or interpretative 
paradigm , to be found mainly in the hum anities and the social sciences, state 
that the nom othetic explanation m odel is not appropriate to the study of 
social behaviour. In their view, social behaviour is a fundam entally different 
subject of study to nature. From this, they conclude that the hum anities and 
the social sciences do not have a single, objective reality and they emphasise 
the constructed nature of social phenomena. In addition, they claim a strong 
relationship between everyday language in social behaviour and scientific 
language. Formal definition thus plays a less im portant role than it does in 
the rationalistic tradition. In the herm eneutic vision, social behaviour is 
partly due to the concepts and interpretations of the actors themselves. These 
concepts and interpretations thus partly define the collection of data for 
research. Scientists therefore should understand the observed actions in 
social reality and interpret the actions in the m eaning and the social context 
of the actor, such as his conventions and assum ptions about society (Parsons, 
1997, p. 71 and further; Rosenberg, 1995, p. 24-25; Rutgers, 1993, p. 29 and 
201-213; 2004, p. 206-214; Van Vucht Tijssen & Van Reijen, 1991).
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The two m ain paradigm s can be sum m arised as in Table 1.2.
Rationalistic paradigm Hermeneutic paradigm
Causality Intentionality
Deduction Understanding, interpretation
Explanation and predictions Detailed or 'thick' description
Testing Exploring
Laws in regularly appearing phenomena Analysis of the unique, the distinguishing
Table 1.2. Characteristics of the rationalistic and hermeneutic paradigm.
W hat is the Dutch adm inistrative sciences position on these paradigms? 
A dm inistrative sciences is a broad discipline, in which both supporters of the 
rationalistic (in the Netherlands for example Hoogerwerf, 1993) and of the 
herm eneutic (in the Netherlands for example Kreukels & Simonis, 1988) 
paradigm  can be found. Lehning and Simonis (1987, p. 9-20; see also Van 
Braam, 1989, p. 71) relate the two scientific paradigm s to two approaches in 
the Dutch adm inistrative sciences. These are the actor approach, also called 
the subjective or policy analytical approach and the observer, context- or 
social science approach (Den H oed & Salet, 1987; Van Doorn, 1988). The actor 
approach can be understood as research from the perspective of the policy 
actor. An example is the study of the instrum ental behaviour of the 
governm ent to investigate the relationship between the goal of policy and the 
m eans or policy instrum ent used. This approach has a neo-positivistic 
(rationalistic) interpretation of science. Causal relations, e.g. the effect of a 
policy, laws and em phasis on effectiveness, efficiency and applicability are 
im portant characteristics. This type of research seeks factors that advance or 
hinder the achievement of a certain goal.
The observer approach does not focus on policy itself, bu t studies policy as a 
social phenom enon, as an institutional arrangement. Policy is thus the 
product of an institutional constellation and, as such, em bedded in a social 
and historical context. Not only effectiveness and efficiency considerations 
appear to be im portant in the choice for a policy, but also the balance of 
power, interests and cultural interpretations. In this approach, attention is 
draw n to plurality of values and meanings. A rational or objective paradigm  
is less suitable here, bu t an understanding or verstehende paradigm  is.
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The present thesis addresses both approaches in the adm inistrative sciences. 
As the title of the thesis indicates, both knowledge use in policy processes 
and institutional patterns of knowledge providing and knowledge use are 
investigated. In Chapters 6, 7 and 8 specific policy processes are examined. 
Factors that prom ote and hinder knowledge use from the perspective of the 
policy actors (province, municipality) are sought. These characteristics are 
associated w ith the actor approach in adm inistrative sciences, and the 
underlying scientific paradigm  can be typified as rationalistic. Chapter 4, 
however, is an institutional analysis of the road safety knowledge and policy 
field. The patterns in the knowledge and policy w orld are placed in and 
interpreted from a social and historical context and actors, interests, and 
balance of power are taken into account. These elements are characteristics of 
the observer approach and the chapter thus has a m ore herm eneutic 
underlying perspective. Readers m ay notice the difference is focus, approach 
and language here. Chapter 9 attem pts to bring the rationalistic, policy 
process orientated approach and the m ore herm eneutic, institutional 
orientated approach together.
1.6. Relevance of this thesis
This thesis aims to be both scientifically and practically relevant. From an 
empirical point of view, research into knowledge use in road safety is 
relatively new  territory. Reasons for using or not using road safety 
knowledge in policy processes have been under-explored so far. A better use 
of scientific knowledge m ay bring dow n the num ber of road deaths further. 
From a scientific point of view, this study is relevant because it combines 
research into process barriers from the knowledge utilisation literature w ith 
research into the influence of the institutional context of knowledge use. A 
connection betw een the institutional setting and the process of policymaking 
is m ade by combining an historical analysis in Chapter 4 and empirical 
studies on traditional knowledge utilisation barriers in the Chapters 6 to 8, 
while the literature review in Chapter 5 illustrates to w hat extent this 
combination represents a novel approach.
In practical terms, this thesis aims at providing tools for policy-makers and 
knowledge institutions that will help them  im prove the knowledge-policy 
interface. It includes suggestions for cooperative ventures, and for the 
presentation and circulation of knowledge needs am ong knowledge 
providers and knowledge users.
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1.7. Outline
This thesis contains nine chapters and is set out as follows.
Chapter 2 provides a theoretical framework, using theories on 
institutionalisation and knowledge utilisation to give insight into the 
relationship betw een knowledge providers and knowledge users. This 
chapter also gives an overview of studies that have investigated barriers to 
the use of knowledge in policymaking processes. In the empirical Chapters 4 
to 8, these theories are used to analyse and interpret the results.
Chapter 3 describes the m ethods used in the various empirical studies in the 
Chapters 4 to 8 in general. Detailed methodological accounts are to be found 
in the respective chapters.
Chapter 4 examines the institutional patterns of Dutch road safety policies 
and knowledge production in this field. It highlights consecutive episodes in 
knowledge-policy developm ents and the changes in interaction betw een the 
agencies involved. It also shows how  institutional relations influence 
knowledge use in road safety policy and identifies some im portant 
institutional barriers. The historical institutional analysis runs from 1900, 
especially form 1945, up  to the present.
Chapter 5 presents an overview of existing studies on knowledge use with 
respect to road safety, both in and outside the Netherlands. Barriers to 
knowledge use are investigated at an institutional level and at a concrete 
policy processes level. Furtherm ore, in order to position the present 
endeavour historically the chapter examines how  these two levels were 
connected in the past.
Chapters 6 to 8 provide studies on knowledge use in policy processes and on 
process-related barriers that im pede knowledge use. Chapter 6 focuses on 
knowledge use and barriers to knowledge use in Dutch provinces, especially 
in the policymaking process regarding infrastructural m easures on 80km/h- 
roads. Chapter 7 tests the existence of some specific barriers to provincial 
knowledge use in an experimental setting. Chapter 8 studies the use of 
knowledge and reasons for non-use in Dutch municipalities, especially in 
policymaking processes w ith regard to designing infrastructural m easures 
for 60km/h-roads. These chapters analyse several concrete barriers to
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knowledge use in policymaking processes, taking into account the im pact of 
the institutional setting on knowledge use in provinces and municipalities.
Chapter 9 brings together the theories and study results regarding 
institutional relations between science and policy, and process-related 
barriers to knowledge use in policymaking processes. It also suggests 
possible im provem ents at both institutional and process levels for a better 
understanding betw een knowledge and policy.
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2. Theoretical account
2.1. Introduction
Given the research questions as form ulated in Chapter 1, theories necessary to 
interpret the empirical research in later chapters are centred on one theme: 
the use of knowledge in policy-making. This chapter deals w ith theories 
originating in two distinguishable perspectives. To investigate the process of 
knowledge use in policy-making, theories about barriers to the use of 
knowledge in policy processes are described. To study the context of 
knowledge use, theories about the institutionalisation of the knowledge and 
policy field are examined.
The first section below (Section 2.2) focuses on the process perspective of 
knowledge use. It deals w ith the definition of knowledge and the different 
analytical models for analysing and assessing knowledge use in policy 
processes. It also discusses the knowledge utilisation literature, em phasising 
barriers to using knowledge in policy-making. Section 2.3 examines the 
institutional perspective of knowledge use and the concept of 
institutionalisation, providing a descriptive fram ework for the institutional 
context of knowledge production and use. Section 2.4 concludes w ith the 
relevance of these theories w hen reform ulating the research question 
form ulated in Chapter 1.
2.2. Analysis at process level: theories of knowledge 
utilisation
This section defines knowledge and knowledge use and gives an overview of 
studies that have looked at barriers to knowledge use.
2.2.1. Definitions of knowledge
Prior to reviewing the various types of knowledge utilisation and conditions 
for knowledge use, it is im portant to define the w ord knowledge. It is 
rem arkable that knowledge is often not defined explicitly in the literature on 
knowledge utilisation (Landry, Am ara & Lamari, 2001b; Lester, 1993; Oh & 
Rich, 1996). Moreover, the publications that do define knowledge often use 
very broad ones.
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Edelenbos (2000) has compiled the following list:
• Data: loose, unstructured data
• Information: data ordered in a w ay that m akes sense
• Knowledge: information consolidated in a person or organisation
• Wisdom: a combination of knowledge, experience and intuition
This fits in closely w ith the distinction m ade by Knott and W ildavsky (1980, 
548): "By information we understand data arrayed to make a difference as to 
w hether a decision is m ade and w hat shape it takes. Knowledge specifies the 
relationship betw een variables and consequences; inform ation relates to 
variables to effects bu t the relationship remains hypothetical, untested by the 
results of actual decision. Knowledge is, therefore, a definitive statem ent of 
w hat will happen; inform ation is an educated guess".
W hat these two definitions have in common is that they both refer to 
knowledge as something structured or ordered in a sensible w ay and as 
something m ore or less fixed. Therefore, in this thesis, a combination of these 
definitions will be used by defining knowledge as structured, carefully 
considered information.
Some authors distinguish types of knowledge. Veenman (2008, p. 21), for 
example, differentiates betw een hard  and soft knowledge. The former refers 
to m ore technical knowledge, the latter to ideas, concepts and discourses. A 
m ore common distinction is the difference between scientific knowledge and 
lay knowledge. Scientific knowledge can be defined as knowledge derived 
from empirical scientific research. W hat is classified as such, is determ ined 
by the scientific w orld using concepts as Popper's falsifiability (Gieryn, 1995; 
Kroes, 1996, p. 13-30), and a peer review system to dem arcate the boundary 
betw een science and non-science. In this definition, lay knowledge can be 
defined as all knowledge that is not scientific, since it does not comply w ith 
methodological standards.
A third distinction can be made, nam ely betw een pure scientific knowledge 
and applied scientific knowledge. Several authors define pure science as 
science restricted to theoretical or abstract aspects, not aim ed at practical 
dem ands, and applied science as an application of science, used in practice or 
to solve practical problem s (Gieryn, 1983; Merton, 1949; Sabey, 1991). 
Applied science can be distinguished from pure science by the fact that the 
former is linked to a specific environment. Pure science describes basic 
objects, relations and causes, whereas applied science customises this
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knowledge for a certain knowledge field and stresses the practical 
application of the knowledge. Several authors, however, stress that the 
dem arcation is not as strict as described above (Gieryn, 1983; Merton, 1949; 
Sabey, 1991). Pure scientific knowledge consists of peer reviewed articles in 
scientific journals. Applied scientific knowledge less often consists of peer 
reviewed articles, bu t often of 'grey ' literature, i.e. reports, working papers, 
congress contributions and fact sheets from research organisations, research 
committees or research groups.
W ith respect to the use of knowledge, m ost studies into process barriers do 
not make clear whether they investigate barriers to the use of fundam ental 
scientific knowledge or applied scientific knowledge. Only Oh and Rich 
(1996) m ention this distinction in their article, indicating that it could make a 
difference in knowledge use and in type of barriers that m ight be relevant. 
However, none of the studies excludes applied scientific knowledge, or other 
types of knowledge, from their barrier typologies, which makes it plausible 
that the barriers can also be relevant to the use of applied scientific 
knowledge.
This thesis investigates the use of knowledge in road safety policy in the 
Chapters 4 to 8. The m ere fact that the use of knowledge is studied implies that 
the thesis considers applied scientific knowledge. In addition, Chapter 8 
studies both applied scientific knowledge and lay knowledge.
2.2.2. Definitions of knowledge use
Contrary to the definition of knowledge, the definition of knowledge use has 
been widely discussed in the knowledge utilisation literature. Various 
authors have created classifications of knowledge use, reflecting the different 
views on knowledge of producers and users. This section gives an overview 
of definitions of the term  'knowledge use' and continues w ith a classification 
of knowledge use.
Knowledge use: definitions
'Knowledge use' can be defined and assessed in two ways: as an outcome 
and as a process (Rich, 1997). In the first case, the actual influence of 
knowledge on the outcome of the policy process is looked at. In the latter 
case, the outcome of the process is not relevant to the definition of use, only 
the fact that knowledge has a function in the policy process.
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To assess the extent to which knowledge is actually used in a policy process, 
Knott and W ildavsky (1980) have distinguished an ascending ladder w ith 
seven levels on which knowledge can be used. Knowledge can merely be 
received by decision m akers ('reception', the report lands on the desk), or it 
can be read and understood ('cognition'). Knowledge can also be cited in 
policy reports ('reference'). As soon as decision makers make an effort to 
adopt knowledge in their policy, it is called 'effort'. Knott and W ildavsky use 
the w ord 'adoption' to indicate the influence of knowledge on the policy 
outcomes. Finally, 'im plem entation' is seen as influenced policy that is 
actually executed. The w ord 'impact' is used to denote w hether the executed 
policy has shown the desired effects. The table below illustrates this ladder.
Stage Name Description
1 Reception Practitioners and professionals concerned have received the 
research results
2 Cognition The research reports are read and understood by the 
practitioners and professionals concerned
3 Reference The work is cited as a reference in the reports, studies and 
strategies of action developed by practitioners and 
professionals
4 Effort Efforts are made to adopt the results of the research by 
practitioners and professionals
5 Adoption The research results are adopted within the choices and 
decisions of practitioners and professionals
6 Implementation The policy that has adopted the research findings is 
implemented
7 Impact The policy that has adopted the research findings shows the 
desired effects
Table 2.1. Stages of the ladder of knowledge utilisation based on Landry et al. (2001a), Lester 
(1993) and Knott and Wildavsky (1980).
Rich (1997) favours this process perspective on knowledge use, 
distinguishing three m om ents of knowledge utilisation: on picking up  the 
information, on processing the inform ation and on applying it in a policy­
making process. These three m om ents are distinguishable forms of 
knowledge use.
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The Chapters 4 to 8 investigate the various stages of the ladder of knowledge 
use in concrete road safety policy processes in Dutch provinces and 
municipalities.
Different types of knowledge use
Various authors (see for a recent overview: Blake & Ottoson, 2009; and 
further Engels, Hisschemoller & Von Moltke, 2006; Hisschemoller et al., 1998; 
Hoppe, 2003; Weiss, 1977) have distinguished classifications of different 
types of knowledge use in policy processes. Four m ain types of knowledge 
use can be derived from these studies. Firstly, knowledge can be used 
instrum entally, w ith scientists as problem  solvers. Producers deliver their 
research data routinely; policy-makers use knowledge for m aking concrete, 
often small-scale, decisions and as legitimisation of established policy plans. 
Secondly, knowledge can be used conceptually by signalling new  or 
unsolved policy problems. Scientists influence the policy agenda and 
'enlighten' politicians hereby. In such cases scientists are idea producers or 
problem  spotters. Thirdly, knowledge can be used strategically, to legitimise 
the opinions of policy-makers and politicians. Knowledge producers can 
then be described as am m unition suppliers or advocates. Knowledge is used 
selectively by policy-makers and its only goal is the legitimisation of political 
statements. Fourthly and lastly, knowledge can be used to resolve policy 
conflicts, w ith knowledge producers in the role of mediator. Policy issues 
causing conflicts can be depoliticised by turning a political question into a 
technical one. Observing policy issues in a m ore general and abstract way 
and taking into account long-term perspectives helps scientists to play a 
m ediatory role.
These four types of knowledge use in policy processes can be related to 
another typology, one that characterises policy problem s along two axes 
(Hisschemoller & Hoppe, 1995; Hoppe, 2002a). H oppe distinguishes four 
types of policy problems, classified on two dimensions. Firstly, the consensus 
about the norm s and values concerning policy problems can be strong or 
weak. Secondly, the knowledge necessary to solve the problem  can be certain 
or uncertain. H oppe does not explicitly defines certain and uncertain 
knowledge, bu t it can be assum ed that certain knowledge can be described as 
scientifically tested knowledge, and uncertain knowledge as not (yet) 
scientifically tested knowledge. This results in four groups of problems, as 
the table below presents.
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Certain knowledge Uncertain knowledge
Consensus about values Structured problems Moderately structured 
problems/goals
No consensus about values Moderately structured 
problems/means
Unstructured problems
Table 2.2. Four types of policy problems (based on Hoppe, 2002a).
Structured problems are typified by a consensus about norm s and values, 
and their solution requires certain knowledge. U nstructured problem s are 
the opposite, w ith no consensus about norm s and values, and uncertain 
knowledge available to solve them. In m oderately structured problems, there 
can be consensus about the values and goals, bu t not about knowledge and 
means. Conversely, there can be disagreem ent about values and goals, but 
agreem ent about the knowledge and m eans of solving the problem.
Several authors (Engels, Hisschemoller & Von Moltke, 2006; Hisschemoller et 
al., 1998; Hisschemoller & Hoppe, 1995; In 't Veld, 2000) have m ade a 
connection between the types of problem s and the kind of knowledge use, as 
shown in the table below. They claim that every type of policy problem 
requires a specific type of knowledge use and provides scientists w ith a 
specific role.
Certain knowledge Uncertain knowledge
Consensus about values Structured problems: 
knowledge can be used 
instrumentally, scientists 
are problem solvers
Moderately structured 
problems/goals: knowledge 
can be used strategically, 
scientists are ammunition 
suppliers
No consensus about values Moderately structured 
problems/means: 
knowledge can be used to 
reconcile, scientists are 
mediators
Unstructured problems: 
knowledge can be used 
conceptually, scientists are 
idea producers
Table 2.3. Relationship between types of problems and kinds of knowledge use (based on 
Engels, Hisschemoller & Von Moltke, 2006; Hisschemoller & Hoppe, 1995).
The authors link instrum ental knowledge use to structured problems. These 
problem s have a clear goal, a lim ited knowledge supply, political consensus 
and one responsible actor. In this case, scientific knowledge can be used
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almost linearly to solve a technical problem. A strategic use of knowledge is 
linked to m oderately structured problems w ith agreem ent about their goals, 
bu t not about the effect and efficiency of the means. H oppe calls these 
problem s 'moderately structured/goals'. Therefore, the political contribution 
is substantial and scientific knowledge is used strategically. A third type of 
knowledge use is a pacifying use of knowledge. In m oderately structured 
problems, w here there is disagreem ent about the ethical com ponent of the 
problem  ('moderately structured problems/m eans', according to Hoppe), 
scientific knowledge can resolve conflicts. The input of knowledge 
depoliticises the issue by stressing the technical complexity of the problem. 
Lastly, Hisschemoller et al. distinguish conceptual knowledge use. W hen a 
problem  is unstructured, there is m uch uncertainty and/or disagreem ent 
about values and knowledge of the problem. Scientific knowledge can help 
to structure these problems.
These distinctions are sufficiently operationalised to be applicable to Dutch 
road safety policy processes. The various empirical chapters investigate 
which forms of knowledge use are present in the road safety policy field and 
which role(s) science plays. Furtherm ore, Chapter 9 characterises road safety 
along the lines of the four types of policy problem  discussed above.
2.2.3. Barriers to knowledge use
A large body of publications focuses on the process of knowledge use and 
non-use. Most of these publications concentrate on ways of im proving the 
use of knowledge in policy. Their overall prem ise is the rationalistic idea that 
use of knowledge in policy processes is im portant for im proving the policy. 
Some authors focus on the process side of knowledge use and have 
investigated empirically the specific conditions that have hindered or 
stim ulated knowledge use in concrete policy processes (Irwin, 1995; Kasemir 
et al., 2000; Kasemir et al., 2003; Van Tatenhove & Leroy, 2003). Others 
express a vision on how  patterns of relationships betw een science and policy 
hinder or stim ulate knowledge use, thus em phasizing the institutional side 
of knowledge use (Huberman, 1994; Landry, Am ara & Lamari, 2001b; Weiss 
& Bucuvalas, 1980).
An inventory of the m ost frequently researched conditions for knowledge 
use was made. Although a classification is always m ore or less an arbitrary 
choice, the inventory revealed that the conditions fell into four groups. The 
first two groups focus on concrete policy processes, the other two on 
institutional influences. The first group consists of dissem ination conditions;
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explaining the usefulness of knowledge to policy-makers w ould increase the 
use. The second group of conditions tries to link the knowledge to the needs 
of the knowledge users to im prove the knowledge use. A th ird  group 
suggests that the co-production of knowledge by both the knowledge 
producers and knowledge users will increase use. The last group focuses on 
contextual or institutional conditions that increase or decrease the use of 
scientific knowledge by policy-makers. The following four sub-sections 
discuss these four groups of knowledge use barriers m ore extensively.
Dissemination conditions
This group of barriers stresses the dissem ination of scientific knowledge 
during the policy process. The assum ption here is that scientific knowledge 
is useful to policy-makers. If knowledge is not used, then it is not the 
knowledge that is to blame; the knowledge is simply not distributed or 
explained properly to policy-makers. The possibly som ew hat naive 
assum ption is that policy-makers will be convinced of the usefulness of 
knowledge if m ore dissem ination effort is made. Several authors stress that 
dissem ination efforts are crucial to im proving the use of knowledge in policy 
processes. Dissemination efforts could consist of communication and 
explanation bu t also of the popularisation of research. Both the strategy used 
and the am ount of time spent determ ine the degree of use (Huberman, 1994; 
Landry, Am ara & Lamari, 2001b; Weiss & Bucuvalas, 1980). Interm ediaries 
can be mobilized during the policy process (Dunn, 1980).
The needs of users
The needs of users during the policy process determ ine three criteria which 
knowledge should meet: the form the knowledge is to take, the content of the 
knowledge and the degree of confidence in the knowledge and the scientists.
The first criterion is that the form of the knowledge should correspond to the 
expectations of the users, in m ost cases policy-makers (Dunn, 1980; 
H uberm an, 1994; Landry, Am ara & Lamari, 2001b; Weiss & Bucuvalas, 1980). 
This concerns the presentation of the knowledge, for example, w hether it is 
oral or written; report, website, database or presentation; the readability. It 
also m eans that the scientific inform ation has to arrive on time in the policy 
process, while each stage of the policy cycle has its own knowledge 
dem ands. For example, the structuring of problem  definitions dem ands 
inform ation about the nature and the dim ension of policy problems while the 
evaluation of policy requires knowledge about the effects of the policy 
(Dunn, 1981; Jasanoff, 1994; Landry, Am ara & Lamari, 2001b).
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Furtherm ore, the content of the knowledge has to pertain to the question of 
practice (Jasanoff, 1994). The relevance, usefulness and feasibility of 
im plem enting the knowledge are crucial here. Specific and applicable 
conclusions m ay prom ote an instrum ental use of knowledge (Dunn, 1980; 
Landry, Am ara & Lamari, 2001b; Weiss & Bucuvalas, 1980). Furtherm ore, the 
subject m atter of the study should correspond to the information needs of the 
policy-maker (Huberman, 1994; Landry, Am ara & Lamari, 2001b; Oh & Rich, 
1996; Weiss & Bucuvalas, 1980). The knowledge will be used even m ore if it 
reflects the opinion of the policy-maker (Huberman, 1994).
The third criterion is that the quality of the knowledge provided, in term s of 
its methodological reliability, m ust be guaranteed. The premises of the 
research m ust be clear and testable in practice (Huberman, 1994; Jasanoff, 
1994; Weiss & Bucuvalas, 1980). This provides a basis for trust betw een the 
knowledge user and the knowledge producer. Policy-makers will not use the 
outcomes of research if they do not have confidence in them. The m ain basis 
for trust, the reputation of the scientists (Huberm an, 1994; Oh & Rich, 1996; 
Weiss & Bucuvalas, 1980) can be increased by m eans of external evaluators 
(Dunn, 1980), w ho assess the reputation of the researchers and to vouch for 
the outcomes of research.
Recently, a new  body of literature has focussed on evidence based policy. 
This concept, introduced by the Blair Labour governm ent in the United 
Kingdom in the late 1990's (Productivity Commission, 2010), em phasizes the 
need for scientific knowledge in policy. The Blair government, but 
increasingly also governm ents of other countries (on road safety: Bax, De 
Jong & Koppenjan, 2010; Chapelon & Lassarre, 2010; Hauer, 2007; Schulze & 
Kofimann, 2010), stress that their policy should be based on rigorous 
evidence, in addition to political knowledge and stakeholder opinions. The 
literature on evidence-based policy has a strong focus on the im provem ent of 
the quality of research and knowledge. Furtherm ore, it shares an interest in 
barriers to knowledge use w ith the knowledge utilisation literature. This 
thesis does not use the term  evidence-based policy explicitly throughout the 
following chapters, although aspects of the concept could be recognised in 
descriptions of road safety policy in the Chapters 4 to 8. A broader definition 
of knowledge use is employed, which includes, bu t is not lim ited to 
evidence-based policy. The thesis for examples takes not only rigorous 
evidence into account, bu t also the 'grey literature' and knowledge from lay 
persons in Chapter 8 .
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Unilateral or co-production of knowledge
This group of barriers focuses on existing patterns in the relationships 
betw een scientists and policy-makers. Several authors suggest that the 
w orlds of science and policy are too far apart and should interm ingle to 
increase the use of scientific knowledge in policy processes. They have 
argued for m ore and m ore frequent interaction between science and policy. 
According to Jasanoff (1994), negotiations between scientists and practice are 
im portant for this intermingling. Both have to rem ain in separate worlds 
because the authority of science w ould otherwise be at risk. Nevertheless, 
they have to negotiate the subject of research, the m ethods, the prem ises in 
the research, et cetera (also Hoppe, 2003). Other authors also stress the 
necessity of informal contact between scientists and policy-makers 
(Huberman, 1994; Landry, Am ara & Lamari, 2001b; Lester, 1993). On the 
basis of his empirical research, Edelenbos (2000) (following Jasanoff, 1994) 
recom m ends involving one or two experts in the policy-making process, 
organising the inform ation supply as a process and forging a clearer link 
w ith the policy-making process. The m ain advantage of this is that it offers a 
direct test of science on practice, which can generate new  ideas on both sides, 
thereby leading to a better quality of policy-making.
Gibbons and Now otny (Gibbons et al., 1994; Nowotny, Scott & Gibbons, 
2001) state that scientific knowledge should not only be valid and reliable, 
bu t also socially robust. This m eans that knowledge should be socially 
accepted, relevant to society, and tested and accepted by the users. Also 
Funtowicz and Ravetz (1993) argue for the dem ocratisation of science; an 
interaction process betw een science, society and politics in order to produce 
accepted knowledge as a kind of an extended peer review. These views can 
be seen as forms of co-production of knowledge, a w ay in which users can be 
involved in producing knowledge. De Bruijn et al. refer to this accepted 
knowledge as 'negotiated knowledge'; a form of knowledge in which 
inform ation is no longer seen as facts, but as the outcome of negotiations 
betw een stakeholders and scientists. Knowledge has been negotiated w hen it 
has been accepted by stakeholders and can w ithstand the critique of 
scientists sim ultaneously (De Bruijn & Ten Heuvelhof, 1999; De Bruijn, Ten 
Heuvelhof & In 't  Veld, 1998). If the stakeholders agree about the content of 
the knowledge, but the scientists do not, it will result in negotiated nonsense.
Several authors have argued for co-production in the knowledge process, 
especially in environm ental policy. Irw in (1995) and Kasemir et al. (2000; 
2003) state that stakeholders in a policy process, including m em bers of the
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public, w ant to know how  scientific conclusions have been reached and w hat 
m ethods have been used. Even m ore im portantly, they w ant to be involved 
in the knowledge production (see also Edelenbos & Klijn, 2005; Edwards, 
1999; Hage, Leroy & Petersen, 2010; Leroy, 2007; Van Tatenhove & Leroy, 
2003). Involvement of stakeholders in policy processes and in scientific 
assessments is necessary to accomplish a m ore successful im plem entation of 
the policy. Furtherm ore, for m any policy problems, science is unable to deal 
w ith uncertainty or develop a complete and com prehensive description of 
the subjects involved (Kasemir et al., 2003). The use of local knowledge and 
the participation of m em bers of the public (called 'citizen science' by Irwin, 
1995) can be an extra input in the scientific research process (Pellizzoni, 2001; 
2003), not to solve the intrinsic uncertainty, bu t to accommodate and 
appropriate it.
Contextual factors
Some authors have investigated the effect of contextual factors on the use of 
knowledge empirically. Several authors (Hisschemoller et al., 1998; Lester, 
1993; Oh & Rich, 1996) stress that knowledge should be in line w ith the type 
of policy problem, referring to the m utual dependency of the type of policy 
problems, both structured and unstructured, and the strategic position of 
knowledge and scientists as presented in Table 2.3 (Section 2.2.2). Structured 
problems, for example, dem and m ore instrum ental knowledge; unstructured 
problem s require m ore conceptual knowledge. The authors also state that 
contextual factors can play an im portant role in the policy process. For 
example, the num ber of actors involved in the policy process can hinder or 
stim ulate the use of knowledge. The same applies to the question of whether 
the policy-making is influenced mainly by the formal decision m aker or also 
by other actors. In addition, political consensus or disagreem ent on the 
policy problem  can influence knowledge use.
The above section shows that the use or non-use of knowledge in policy 
processes is determ ined not only by the course of a concrete policy process, 
bu t also by existing patterns in the relationships between science and policy 
in a certain policy field. While the knowledge utilisation perspective regards 
these as contextual factors, other theoretical perspectives, such as the 
governance perspective, view  them  from an institutional perspective and 
w ould speak of institutional patterns. The latter perspective is discussed in 
the section below, thereby elaborating on the contextual or institutional 
factors by defining institutionalism  and describing the institutional context of
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science and policy. To prevent m isunderstandings, the term  institutional 
rather than contextual factors is used henceforth.
W hether the four barrier groups m entioned above are present in road safety 
policy processes and w hat their respective share is, is examined in the 
rem ainder of this thesis. This m ay determ ine w hether they are relevant to the 
present thesis on the use of knowledge in the Dutch road safety field. Most 
studies m entioned above investigate the situation in the United States of 
America. It is clear that the institutional context in the USA differs from the 
Dutch context, and that this could influence the relevance of the barriers in 
the Netherlands. The Dutch road safety institutional context, therefore, is 
described extensively in Chapter 4 and institutional barriers are specified for 
the Dutch road safety context. Furtherm ore, none of the studies m entioned 
above have been specifically applied to road safety. Most have been 
conducted in policy fields such as health (e.g. Oh, 1997; Oh & Rich, 1996), 
environmental policies (e.g. In 't Veld, 2000; Michaels, 1993; Ten Heuvelhof & 
N auta, 1997), welfare, education, hazardous waste m anagem ent, economic 
developm ent (combined in Lester, 1993) and w ater m anagem ent (e.g. 
Boogerd, Groenewegen & Hisschemoller, 1997), or are literature reviews 
w ithout a focus on a specific policy field (e.g. Lester & Wilds, 1990; Neilson, 
2001; Rich, 1997; Webber, 1991). Chapters 5 to 8 examine w hether these four 
barrier groups are also seen in road safety policy.
2.3. Institutional analysis: science-policy interfaces
2.3.1. Institutionalisation
Institutionalisation refers to a process in which social acts find a place and 
settle in institutions (Giddens, 1984; Van Tatenhove, Arts & Leroy, 2000, 18; 
Van Tatenhove & Goverde, 2007, 19). Institutions form a fixed pattern of acts 
and behaviour shown by actors because 'that is how  it's done' (Peper, 1972, 
51). Several authors (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Peters, 2005) distinguish three main 
approaches to institutionalisation. Rational choice institutionalism  attributes 
the rise and decline of institutional arrangem ents to the decisions of actors 
behaving rationally. Sociological or norm ative institutionalism  sees 
institutions ultim ately as norm s and values consolidated in structures, 
procedures and rules. Historical institutionalism  states that developm ents in 
institutions are based on past experiences. The first type focuses on the 
influence of individual actors, whereas the two other types focus m ore on 
structures. This thesis will emphasise the structure-centred types of
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institutionalisation to describe the institutionalisation in road safety policy. 
Furtherm ore, Van Tatenhove and Goverde (2007) distinguish internal and 
external institutionalism  w hen discussing policies and their 
institutionalisation. Internal institutionalisation refers to a relatively fixed 
content and organisation pattern w ithin and am ong governm ental bodies. 
External institutionalisation refers to relatively fixed patterns, concerning not 
only the national government, bu t also local and regional governments, 
social organisations, the private sector, interest groups, citizens and 
knowledge organisations. This thesis examines both forms of 
institutionalisation.
2.3.2. A framework for institutionalisation of policy
Institutionalisation, as described above, is a very broad concept. To recognize 
and describe institutionalisation in practice, in a concrete policy field like 
road safety, it is necessary to use a fram ework to operationalise this concept. 
The present study operationalises institutional patterns by m eans of the 
policy arrangem ent approach. This approach, developed at the D epartm ent 
of Political Sciences of the Environm ent at the Radboud University 
Nijmegen, em phasizes long-term developm ents and institutional relations in 
policy processes. It contains a series of concepts to describe stability and 
change in policy fields. It compels researchers to define clearly the subjects of 
their studies m aking it a particularly appropriate approach for this thesis.
The policy arrangem ent approach contains three central concepts. The first 
concept is the policy arrangem ent itself. A policy arrangem ent describes a 
(temporal) stabilisation of content and organisation in a policy field (Leroy, 
Arts & Van Tatenhove, 2003). By studying the changes in the policy 
arrangem ent, the policy arrangem ent approach offers a fram ework for 
understanding day-to-day policy practices in the context of long time 
changes or stability.
A policy arrangem ent consists of four dimensions (Arts & Leroy, 2006b; Van 
Tatenhove, Arts & Leroy, 2000, 56). The first dim ension describes the actors 
in the arrangem ent and the coalitions they form. These actors can be part of 
the government, the private sector or civil society. In the second dimension, 
the balance of pow er betw een the actors is m apped out, as is the division of 
the resources betw een the actors. Resources can consist of people, budgets, 
competences, knowledge et cetera. The third dim ension of the policy 
arrangem ent concerns the rules of the game upon which actors have agreed. 
Formal and informal rules determ ine the interaction between and the
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prospects of the actors in the policy arrangem ent and the w ay they take 
decisions. These three dim ensions all cover organisational aspects. The 
fourth dim ension describes the discourse in the arrangem ent and is therefore 
not an organisational bu t a content dimension. Policy discourses are the 
opinions and accounts of the actors involved, expressed in problem  
definitions, solutions, norm s and values (Arts & Leroy, 2006b, p. 14; Leroy & 
Wiering, 2007). Two types of discourse are distinguished: the substantial and 
the governance discourse (Crabbe, 2008, p. 40; Liefferink, 2006, p. 58). A 
substantial discourse discusses the problem  definition of the policy and 
possible solutions. The governance discourse focuses on how  to organise the 
policy field, i.e. which actor is responsible for which part of the policy, w hat 
are the strategies to be deployed, and w hat are the instrum ents to be used.
Finally, these four dim ensions cohere: if one dim ension changes, it is likely 
(but yet to be tested empirically) that the others do as well. M oreover, the 
dimensions are equal in principle: the policy arrangem ent approach does not 
appoint a dom inant dimension. Each policy arrangem ent m ay have a 
different dom inant dim ension which can only be determ ined by empirical 
research (Meijerink & Van Tatenhove, 2007). The figure below shows the 
coherence of the four dimensions.
resources/power
Figure 2.1. Four dimensions of a policy arrangement (Liefferink, 2006, p. 48).
The second central concept in the policy arrangem ent approach is 
institutionalisation. As stated previously, institutionalisation refers to the 
settling of m ore or less fixed patterns of interaction and problem  definitions
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w ithin policy processes (Arts & Leroy, 2006b, p.13). At the same time, 
institutionalisation shows that these patterns m ight be fixed for a short 
period, while shifting over longer periods. The policy arrangem ent approach 
does not look solely at day-to-day policy processes, but tries to understand 
them  in the context of long-term processes of stability and change over time. 
It focuses especially on the construction, deconstruction and reconstruction 
of institutions.
Initially, the policy arrangem ent approach used a th ird  central concept: 
political modernisation. This concept concentrates on the context of the 
policy arrangement. Political m odernisation was used as an um brella concept 
for the fact or the assum ption (there is only limited empirical evidence for 
this concept) (Bogaert, 2004; Crabbé, 2008; Padt, 2007; Van der Zouwen, 2006) 
that different political and social trends influence policy. Europeanisation, 
decentralisation, globalisation, individualisation and m arketisation are some 
examples of these comprehensive trends. These trends influence day-to-day 
policy processes, bu t the reverse is also true as day-to-day policy processes 
lay the foundations of these trends (Arts & Van Tatenhove, 2006, p. 21). In 
fact, these trends are linked to a substantial field of literature on governance, 
and can be sum m arised in the term  'shifts in governance'. W iering and 
Crabbé (2006, p. 103-104) distinguish three types of shifts: multi-actor, m ulti­
level and multi-sector governance. The phrase 'multi-actor governance' is 
used for situations whereby not only state institutions develop policy, but 
w here m arket and society are also and increasingly involved in policies. 
'Multi-level governance' indicates a shift from policy-making on one 
governm ental level (usually the national level) to policies on multiple, 
international and subnational, governm ental levels. The phrase 'multi-sector 
governance' is used to describe the growing interaction between the policy 
field and related policy fields. Policy fields, such as road safety, are 
increasingly becoming facets of broader, m ore encompassing policy fields 
and less and less separate dom ains or sectors.
Chapter 4 uses the policy arrangem ent approach to describe the long-term 
policy developm ents in road safety and the changes in knowledge and its 
interaction w ith policy developments. Henceforth, the concept knowledge 
and policy arrangem ent is used since this, and not simply policy 
arrangem ent, is w hat the thesis is concerned with. Chapter 4 shows the 
developm ents in the actors involved, their resources, discourses and the 
rules of the game, in a context of possible shifts in governance trends.
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2.3.3. The institutional context of policy-making, knowledge use and 
knowledge production
Having discussed the policy arrangem ent approach in the previous section, 
knowledge and policy arrangem ents will now  be discussed. This section 
deals w ith the institutional context of knowledge use and production, which 
consists of two m ain components: the scientific and the political world. The 
first subsection discusses the differences betw een these two w orlds and their 
boundaries, starting w ith the 'Two Communities' m etaphor, which focuses 
on the differences between the two worlds. Then the concept of boundary 
w ork is discussed, showing that the boundaries betw een policy and science 
are not strict at all. The second subsection describes new  forms of 
organisation in the changing institutional landscape of knowledge and 
policy, and provides two typologies to describe the relationship between 
science and policy. The new  forms are represented by the concepts M ode 2, 
focussing on new  forms of the organisation of knowledge production, and 
Fifth branch, stressing the increasing role of advisors and experts as 
knowledge providers in policy-making. Two typologies for the relationship 
betw een science and policy are provided by H oppe and Landry et al. 
respectively.
Two Communities
Researchers and policy-makers are sometimes described as inhabiting two 
separate worlds. Caplan (1979; Merton, 1973) sees a substantial difference in 
culture and institutional arrangem ents in the w orld of policy-makers and 
that of researchers. The language as well as the interests and rew ard systems 
differ substantially in these tw o worlds. This vision is called the 'Two 
Communities' m etaphor. Caplan has found empirical evidence for this 
vision, nam ely that contacts between scientists and policy-makers are rare. 
He also adds empirical grounds for the statem ent that this gap is responsible 
for the non-use of inform ation in policy-making processes (Caplan, 1979). A 
good deal of knowledge utilisation literature has been based upon  this 
m etaphor or similar m etaphors such as 'bridging the gap' (for example: 
Dunn, 1980). Leroy (2007) has sum m ed u p  the differences between science 
and politics in slightly different term s w ith regard to ambition, ethical and 
quality standards, information needs and m ethods for quality control in a 
convenient table.
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Science Politics
Looks for Truth Power
Is driven by Non-normative conviction Normative conviction
Wants information with Depth, focus on causes Speed, focus on remedies
Wants information In detail In outline
Looks specifically for Causes Solutions
Quality based on aim for Validity Acceptance
And on aim for Reliability Feasibility
Method for quality control Peer review Public support
Table 2.4. Differences between science and politics (based on Leroy, 2007).
A growing group of authors, however, states that these w orlds have been 
getting closer to each other, both on an ethical standards and organisational 
level since the 1960s. Policies are increasingly influenced by scientific 
findings, while science is losing its value free image. These trends were 
caused by three, m ore or less simultaneous, developments, the first stressing 
the fading boundaries betw een science and policy, the other two stressing 
the loss of the moral and factual infallibility of science.
The first developm ent was the fading of boundaries between science and 
state. After W orld War II, governm ents increasingly attem pted to give 
policies a scientific foundation. Experts in advisory boards and planning 
bureaus were asked to contribute to policy-making, and thus have been able 
to influence policies considerably. On the other hand, scientific organisations, 
such as research organisations, and their research agendas have been 
strongly influenced by state interventions (Driessen, Leroy & Van Vierssen, 
2010; Leroy, 2007). At times, science has been incorporated into state 
institutions, and sometimes, governm ents have directly or indirectly 
financed private institutions. The "military-industrial complex" (Eisenhower, 
1968) is a phrase that indicates a pronounced interm ingling of science, state 
and technology. The w orlds of science and politics are no longer strictly 
separate, bu t have become increasingly interwoven.
The second development, describing the fallibility of science, is the 
awareness of the am orality of science. Since W orld War II, the idea of a value 
free science has diminished. Now otny (1980) notes the developm ent of the 
atomic bomb, H oppe (1999; 2005) the Shoah, the Gulag, the nuclear race and
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the ecological crisis as events that have show n the public that science can be 
used for terrible things and therefore cannot be seen as value free. There has 
been a developing awareness that moral choices have to be m ade in science 
also, and in that sense, the w orld of science has become less different from 
the w orld of policy than was previously thought.
The third developm ent also stressed the fallibility of science. From the 1970s 
onwards, there has been a growing awareness of the limits of knowledge. 
Issues such as nuclear energy and environm ental pollution have proved 
increasingly complex and knowledge increasingly uncertain. Science has 
been and is still unable to resolve several of these societal problems, mainly 
because of the great uncertainties in risk analyses. In their post-normal 
science approach, Funtowicz and Ravetz (1993) state that problem s in the 
present w orld are very complex. Common risk analyses cannot deal w ith the 
incalculably small risks in combination w ith the very considerable 
consequences seen in the policy problem s m entioned above. This 
continuously prevents science from providing useful answers. As a result, 
and combined w ith technological incidents like Chernobyl, both citizens and 
politicians have lost faith in the abilities of science and technology (Collins & 
Evans, 2002; Irwin, 1995; Nowotny, Scott & Gibbons, 2003; Wynne, 1996). It 
has led to the conviction that science does not provide a single truth, and 
therefore, scientific knowledge is not principally different from non-scientific 
knowledge bu t only different in degree.
Due to these three developm ents m entioned above, science is no longer 
regarded as a source of legitimisation for policy, let alone the only one. On 
the one hand, the scientification of politics is evident because the abundance 
of scientific knowledge forces politicians to take decisions about the scientific 
possibilities. On the other hand, politicians dem and knowledge to solve 
problem s and to legitimise their decisions, thereby leading to the 
politicisation of science (Weingart, 1999). Although facts are uncertain and 
values are not shared by all actors (Hessels & Van Lente, 2008), politicians 
still have to take decisions on policy problems. This calls for a new, post­
normal, form of science (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993) and for new  forms of 
knowledge production and quality control.
In contrast to M erton (1973) and Caplan (1979), Guston (2001) and others 
state that no fixed, bu t only perm anently negotiated borders exist between 
the w orlds of science and policy. In the new  forms of knowledge production, 
the w orlds of science and policy mingle and scientists and policy-makers
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cross the boundaries into each other's worlds. This boundary w ork (Gieryn, 
1983; Gieryn, 1995; Halffman, 2003, p. 70; Hoppe, 2007) is a constant 
negotiation betw een science and policy about the borders between them. 
Negotiations can include knowledge questions, scientific assumptions, 
sources used in research or the handling of uncertainty. In this boundary 
zone, citizens and interest groups come together and dem and access to 
knowledge, and m ore openness and transparency in science (Hoppe & 
Halffman, 2004). An interaction process betw een researchers, society and 
politicians is needed to provide accepted bu t still uncertain knowledge and 
to take a socially accepted decision. It is desirable, therefore, that 
stakeholders participate in policy-making and quality control.
Chapter 4 examines in detail these two w orlds in road safety policy, their 
interaction and w hether policy and science indeed refer to themselves as two 
different worlds. The historical developm ents in their relationships are 
shown as well as the institutional patterns form ed throughout the years. The 
historical analysis forms the context for the process analyses in the Chapters 6 
to 8.
New forms of the production of knowledge and its transfer to policy
Mode 1 and 2
Gibbons et al. (1994) state that there has been a change in knowledge 
production due to a changing research environm ent (Nowotny, Scott & 
Gibbons, 2003). In addition to the considerable societal changes m entioned 
above, such as the awareness of the limits of knowledge in terms of m orality 
and tru th  finding, and the negotiable boundaries between science and policy, 
they point out three other changes in the environm ent of knowledge 
production. Firstly, these authors have noted a change in the governance 
research. Universities can no longer decide on their research topics by 
themselves. Instead, finance generating institutes such as ministries and the 
European Union, increasingly either determ ine the conditions for research 
program m es or form ulate program m es themselves. Secondly, Gibbons and 
Now otny see an increase in the commercialisation of research. Universities, 
for example, seek alternative funding alongside public funding, and enter the 
m arket of commercial research and consultancies. Thirdly, they see a shift in 
the quality control system w ithin science. Quality control has changed from a 
professional collegial responsibility to a quality control based on 
organisational and m anagerial competences.
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In answer to this, the production of knowledge has taken on new  forms. 
Knowledge is no longer produced only by disciplinary, hierarchical 
program m es in universities (Mode 1), but m ore and m ore in tem porary, 
horizontal netw orks of universal, governm ental and private organisations, 
which produce applied and m ultidisciplinary knowledge (Mode 2).
Now otny et al. (2001; 2003) define the ideal type of the M ode 2 knowledge 
organisation in term s of the following five characteristics:
1. Knowledge is generated "within a context of application" (Nowotny, 
Scott & Gibbons, 2003, p. 186), which m eans w ith the explicit goal of 
using the results practically. This type of knowledge production should 
decrease the well-known gap between science and practice.
2. Knowledge is produced in trans-disciplinarity whereby a range of 
theories and m ethods are used to investigate a problem. Trans- 
disciplinarity is broader than interdisciplinarity, because it does not 
stem from or is not lim ited to existing research fields, bu t includes non­
scientists.
3. Knowledge is produced at m any different sites and by a great variety of 
organisations.
4. M ode 2 knowledge is m ore reflexive than M ode 1 knowledge. This 
m eans that the research has become a dialogue betw een researchers and 
research subjects. The consequences of research outcomes therefore 
cannot be placed outside science, because scientists influence the choice 
of topics, the design and thereby the use of their knowledge.
5. M ode 2 knowledge uses different forms of quality control. Instead of 
peer review, M ode 2 uses multiple definitions of quality, depending on 
the users of the knowledge.
Hessels & Van Lente (2008) sum m arise the differences betw een M ode 1 and 2 
in the table below:
Mode 1 Mode 2
Academic context Context of application
Disciplinary Trans-disciplinary
Homogeneity Heterogeneity
Autonomy Reflexivity/social accountability
Traditional quality control (peer review) Novel quality control
Table 2.5. Characteristics of Mode 1 and Mode 2.
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Gibbons and Now otny suggest an historical shift from M ode 1 to M ode 2 
that took place gradually. It has been this historical claim, foremost, that has 
attracted m uch criticism over the years, resulting in some cases to an 
adaptation of the concept (Hessels & Van Lente, 2008; Nowotny, Scott & 
Gibbons, 2003). Various authors (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000; Pestre, 
2003; Rip, 2000) have criticized this long-term historical perspective. On the 
basis of historical research they claim that M ode 2 is not a new  phenom enon, 
bu t has always existed, and m ay have been a dom inant school of science in 
the past.
Although the tim e span of the historical institutional analysis in Chapter 4 of 
this thesis is shorter than in the studies m entioned previously, it does assess 
w hether road safety policy research has undergone a change from M ode 1 to 
M ode 2. If this is so, to w hat extent and w ith which outcomes? The latter is 
im portant w hen considering w hat the effect of the existence of these M ode 2 
research on knowledge use m ight be. Now otny et al. (2001; 2003) suggest 
that the latter knowledge is m ore closely related to the practical needs of its 
users, because it is co-produced, and therefore there is m ore interaction 
betw een knowledge users and the research population. Ideally, this w ould 
lead to reducing the differences between science and policy and w ould 
therefore im prove the conditions for the use of scientific knowledge in 
policy.
Fifth Branch
In her book The Fifth Branch, Jasanoff (1994) points out an increased mixing 
of science and policy, a developm ent at odds w ith to the Two Communities 
metaphor. She reports on a growing num ber of increasingly complex tasks 
for governm ent agencies in the USA post 1970. In addition to the idea that 
science is not omniscient and often produces uncertain knowledge, this 
grow th of complex tasks creates an increasing need for specialist knowledge 
in governm ental agencies, a need that these agencies m eet in two ways. 
G overnm ent agencies engage m ore in the production and interpretation of 
knowledge and, thereby cross the policy-science boundary. Furthermore, 
governm ental agencies invite scientists to join advisory boards to advise the 
governm ent on specific issues, and in so doing to cross the border from 
science into the policy world. This has resulted in multifarious cooperation 
betw een scientists and policy-makers, creating not a boundary line, but a 
vast boundary zone between science and policy.
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Consequently, the boundaries between science and policy have faded. That 
m eans that scientists have been forced to move beyond their m ere scientific 
insights, weigh subjective interests in their recom m endations for the 
governm ent and thus make choices that are political in nature. Policy-makers 
on the other hand can no longer take scientific knowledge for granted, but 
have to weigh up  this knowledge, decide on the basis of imperfect 
knowledge and, should there be disagreem ent on knowledge in the scientific 
worlds, they have to decide for themselves which knowledge to trust and 
use. This creates a 'fifth branch' of advisors and experts, in addition to the 
civil service, this being the fourth branch. Jasanoff states that the 
recom m endations of experts are adm inistrative and political rather than 
scientific, as is generally claimed. Experts and advisors are thus, in terms of 
Gieryn (1983; 1995) and Guston (2001), boundary workers, working on the 
boundary between science and policy.
W hat m ight be the effect of this emergence of a fifth branch on the processes 
and patterns of knowledge use? Jasanoff does not deal w ith this issue 
specifically, though, based on her observations, some assum ptions can be 
made. The fifth branch fills the gap between science and policy. It 'translates' 
scientific knowledge for policy-makers and conversely, shows scientists the 
knowledge needs of policy. This w ould bring scientific knowledge and 
policy needs closer together and thus increase the use of knowledge in 
policy-making. However, the emergence of a fifth branch is not solely 
beneficial. A price has to be paid in two respects. Firstly, m oving a part of the 
political policy-making to scientific advisory boards m ight dim inish the 
democratic legitimacy of these decisions. Secondly, perm itting policy-makers 
to take the ultim ate decision about valid and useful knowledge m eans that 
this knowledge is no longer subject to the standard scientific quality control 
systems as such peer reviews. This could dim inish the scientific legitimacy of 
this knowledge.
This thesis examines w hether the new  forms of organising knowledge and 
policy, referred to in the aforem entioned literature, are present in the field of 
Dutch road safety policy. Chapter 4 investigates w hether road safety policy 
contains M ode 2 research, represents a fifth branch and/or boundary work.
2.3.4. Two typologies for the relationship between science and policy
The theories in the previous sections describe the relationship between 
science and policy in a broad, non-operationalised way, which makes it 
difficult to apply them  onto concrete policy fields. Besides these difficulties,
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the theories only mention the institutional side of knowledge use, and do not 
take the process perspective on knowledge use into account.
Several attem pts have been m ade to integrate the process and institutional 
perspectives by describing the relationship betw een science and policy. Two 
approaches are discussed below. The first, presented by Landry et al. (2001b), 
focuses on science and policy as two different worlds, and discusses their 
interactions including their attem pts to optimise knowledge use. The second, 
presented by H oppe (2005), concentrates on types of boundary work, and 
stresses the negotiations that take place between science and policy on tasks 
and responsibilities.
A typology for interaction between science and policy
Since the nineteen seventies, several authors have attem pted to develop a 
well-defined typology for the relationship betw een science and policy. One 
of the first authors who m ade a division was Weiss (1977), followed by other 
authors w ho extended this typology. Landry et al. (2001b) has provided a 
good sum m ary of these. In the course of time, the concepts of M ode 2, 
boundary w ork and the fifth branch have been taken into account w hen 
transform ing the typologies. A compilation of these typologies is given 
below.
Landry et al. (2001b) distinguish betw een four interactive models in the 
knowledge utilisation theory. The 'science push model' conceives of 
knowledge utilisation as the "delivery of objective facts" to policy-makers -  
"speaking tru th  to pow er" (Wildavsky, 1987). Researchers determ ine their 
research issues independently and policy-makers are simply the recipients of 
knowledge. Factors that can influence knowledge use in this m odel are the 
quality of the research, for example, validity, reliability, content attributes, 
and the type of research, for example, abstract or general, quantitative or 
qualitative, fundam ental or applied. According to the 'dem and pull model', 
the users, or policy-makers, play an active role by asking for specific 
knowledge, and utilisation is explained only in term s of the needs of decision 
makers (Rich, 1991; Rich, 1997; Weiss, 1979). This leads to a customer- 
contractor relationship between policy and science. In this model, the use of 
knowledge is determ ined by the degree to which the outcomes of research 
correspond to the organisational interest of knowledge users. A third 
approach, the 'dissem ination model' (Landry, Amara & Lamari, 2001b; 
MacLean, 1996), was developed in reaction to these two models. It 
emphasises the necessity of communicating the knowledge. Useful
42
knowledge should be identified and dissem inated to knowledge users. In 
this model, the type of research results and the dissem ination efforts 
determ ine the knowledge use. However, the knowledge users are involved 
neither in the research nor in the identification of useful knowledge.
The above-mentioned models assum e an organisational separation of science 
and policy in accordance w ith the Two Communities m etaphor, w ith either 
m arket principles (in the first and second model) or communication (in the 
third model) as the vehicles of exchange between them. The fourth model, 
nam ed the 'interaction model', integrates the three models m entioned above 
and counters the criticism of the dissem ination model. It states that 
interaction betw een researchers and users will increase utilisation of 
knowledge produced by the researchers (Dunn, 1980; Huberm an, 1990; 
Jasanoff, 1994) and that this communication process is not linear, bu t rather 
disorderly. Communication should take place in all of the different steps of 
knowledge production, dissem ination and utilisation.
In short, this can be sum m arised in the table below:
Model Characteristics
Science push model Science delivers objective facts to policy-makers
Demand pull model Policy-makers ask science for specific knowledge
Dissemination model Science actively disseminates knowledge to policy
Interaction model Science and policy interact during each stage of the 
knowledge production process
Table 2.6. Four models for interaction between science and policy.
Chapter 4 investigates w hether these four models describing the relationship 
betw een science and policy are recognisable in the various periods in road 
safety policy.
A typology for boundary work
H oppe (2002b; 2005) has developed another typology for the relationship 
betw een science and policy in order to further operationalise the concepts of 
boundary work. To distinguish types of boundary work, he uses two 
dimensions. The first dim ension shows the prim acy of science on the one 
side and the prim acy of policy (or politics) on the other side. Types of 
boundary w ork can thus be ranged from types which let science dom inate
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over policy (the technocratic point of view) to types that let policy rule over 
science (the decisionist point of view). The second dim ension contains 
opinions about the interm ingling of science and politics. H oppe (2005, p. 207) 
calls this the axis of "divergence or convergence betw een the operational 
codes of science and politics" and refers to the "two worlds or cultures or 
communities", a phrase that is reminiscent of Caplan's Two Communities 
metaphor. The divergence leg of the axis states that science and politics are 
two incompatible w orlds w ith clear boundaries. The convergence leg states 
that the boundaries between science and politics are blurred, and, that while 
different, they serve similar functions in society.
Divergent logics
Enlightenm ent
m odel
Prim acy 
for science
Technocracy
m odel
C onvergent logics
Prim acy 
for policy/ 
politics
Figure 2.2. Four models of boundary work (based on Hoppe, 2005).
The four quadrants created by the intersection of the two axes comprise four
models.
1. The enlightenm ent m odel presupposes the prim acy of science and 
em phasizes the divergence between science and policy. Scientists 
operate independently out of pure curiosity. Knowledge is rarely used 
quickly. In a process know n as knowledge creep (Weiss, 1980), scientific 
knowledge slowly trickles dow n into the policy process by influencing 
the thinking of policy-makers, even though policy-makers often do not 
understand  the finer details of the scientific knowledge. Scientists do 
not feel responsible for the use of their knowledge; this is the sole 
responsibility of politicians.
2. The technocracy m odel stresses both the prim acy of science over 
politics, and the convergence between the science and politics worlds.
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Their societal functions are the same and policy-makers have a good 
understanding of scientific knowledge. Therefore, knowledge can be 
m ore easily translated into policies. Taking this to the extreme, 
scientists can take the place of politicians to achieve a m axim um  de­
politicisation of policy-making.
3. The bureaucratic m odel presupposes the primacy of politics over 
science and at the same time stresses the divergence between politics 
and science. In this m odel adm inistrators use scientific knowledge 
according to their ow n understanding of it, and that is not necessarily 
the scientists' understanding. It is the adm inistrator's task to gain an 
objective insight and not to trust scientific findings blindly, and to make 
a selection of the knowledge to use in policy. In this model, state 
institutions are often used for the production of knowledge.
4. The engineering m odel also stresses the prim acy of politics over 
science, bu t here science is not incorporated into state institutions. In 
this model, politicians prescribe their knowledge needs to science and 
design research projects or use existing knowledge to solve policy 
problem s together w ith scientists. The policy-makers have a good 
understanding of the scientific possibilities and therefore can steer the 
research agenda effectively.
W hat m ight be the relevance of these four models to knowledge use? The 
type of knowledge use and the degree to which it is used can be considered 
in the answer to this question.
W ith regard to the first issue, a connection between the four models and the 
extent to which knowledge is used in policy is plausible. The closer the 
w orlds of science and policy, the m ore knowledge is likely to be used. This 
m eans that the m odels w hereby science and policy have a convergent logic 
probably have a higher knowledge use than the models w hereby science and 
policy have a divergent logic. Thus, knowledge is likely to be used m ore in 
the technocratic and engineering models than in the enlightenm ent m odel in 
which science and policy are far apart, and dissem ination does not take 
place.
W ith regard to the second issue, H oppe's four models do not seem to provide 
inform ation about the type (instrumental, strategic, pacifying, conceptual) of 
knowledge use. Although it w ould seem plausible that the enlightenm ent 
m odel w ould have less or no instrum ental knowledge because of the absence 
of dissem ination efforts, instrum ental use can take place in all other three
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models. Strategic, pacifying and conceptual knowledge use do not seem to be 
restricted to one of the models. All in all, although the four models of Hoppe 
can be used to describe the knowledge-policy arrangem ent in a given policy 
field, they can predict the am ount and type of knowledge use to a far lesser 
extent.
Since the two typologies of Landry et al. and H oppe describe institutional 
settings w ithin all kinds of knowledge organisations, it is plausible that the 
typologies can also be used to describe the institutional setting of the road 
safety field, wherein organisations for applied scientific knowledge play an 
im portant role. Therefore, the rem ainder of this thesis researches w hether the 
new  forms of organising knowledge and policy are identifiable in road safety 
policy. Chapter 4 investigates w hether road safety policy contains M ode 2 
organisations, a fifth branch and/or boundary work. It also examines 
w hether road safety policy and its scientific underpinning fit into the types of 
the knowledge-policy typologies from Landry and H oppe and w hether its 
types develop over time.
2.4. Research questions theoretically informed
In Chapter 1, the general research question for this thesis was form ulated as 
follows:
What are the reasons for possible non-use o f knowledge in Dutch road safety 
policy processes?
This question was unfolded in three sub-questions:
• To what extent is knowledge used in Dutch road safety policy?
• Which barriers are there to knowledge use in Dutch road safety policy?
• How can knowledge use be increased?
The theories presented in this chapter help to answer these research 
questions. To answer the first question and the sub-questions, two paths will 
be taken.
The first path  sets out the institutional point of view. Chapter 4 gives an 
overview of the institutionalised patterns in knowledge and policy in road 
safety in the Netherlands. The present state of the knowledge and policy 
arrangem ent is described, as are the developm ents in the knowledge and 
policy arrangem ent over the years. The chapter analyses whether
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institutionalised patterns in the relationships between knowledge providers 
and knowledge users can be determ ined; whether developm ents showing an 
interm ingling of science and policy are present and w hether the boundary 
betw een science and policy can be defined as a fixed line or as a boundary 
zone wherein policy and science negotiate the role division. The chapter will 
show w hether M ode 2 organisations can be observed in the road safety field, 
w hether the fifth branch is of considerable influence and w hether the 
relationship betw een the road safety policy and the road safety knowledge 
organisations can be described in term s of H oppe's and Landry et al.'s 
typologies. Changes over time in the relationship between the knowledge 
and the policy actors can point to shifts in governance, possibly showing 
evidence of multi-actor, multi-level and multi-sector developments. Chapter 4 
thus sketches the relevant institutional setting in the road safety policy field 
for the Chapters 5 to 8. Furtherm ore, the institutional patterns in the road 
safety knowledge and policy arrangem ent could reveal barriers for 
knowledge use in policy.
The second path focuses on the process point of view. Chapter 5 gives an 
overview of the existing literature on use of road safety knowledge in the 
N etherlands and internationally. The chapter will examine which of the four 
groups of process-founded barriers (dissemination conditions, the needs o f users, 
unilateral or co-production of knowledge or institutional factors) are present in this 
literature and w hat kind of knowledge use (instrumental, conceptual, 
strategic or pacifying) can be seen. Chapters 6 to 8 provide case studies on 
processes of knowledge use. The classifications discussed in this chapter are 
used to describe the am ount and type of knowledge use in the case studies. 
In each case, several process-related barriers are studied, both exploratory 
and in an experimental setting. The inform ation brought together in these 
chapters and in Chapter 4, helps to answer the research questions and to 
integrate the process related and institutional point of view in the concluding 
Chapter 9.
47
3. Methodological account
This chapter discusses the large variety of m ethods and techniques used in 
this thesis. It does so in general terms, as specific techniques used in 
particular chapters are accounted for in the respective chapters themselves. 
The first section discusses this deliberate choice for a variety of research 
methods. The second section considers the research m ethods used. The third 
section explains the selection of the cases studied in Chapters 6, 7 and 8. The 
final section reflects on the research techniques used in the respective 
empirical studies reported on in the Chapters 4 to 8 .
3.1. A deliberate quest for a diversity of research methods
The m ain research question posed in this thesis and the three sub-questions 
w ere presented in Chapter 1 . They are concerned w ith the degree to which 
knowledge is used in Dutch road safety policy, barriers for possible non-use, 
and options for improvement.
These research questions call for the understanding of both policy processes 
and institutional patterns. The scope of the research questions enables a 
viewing of the subject from different angles, using a variety of methods. As 
the subject of the thesis is a well-defined and rather specific field, this creates 
an opportunity to explore the subject in depth and in great detail from 
several perspectives.
Using different research m ethods makes it possible to view the subject from 
various angles and to shed light on several aspects of knowledge use. This 
can be considered a kind of methodological triangulation. Wester (1995) 
defines triangulation as "combining various m ethods strategically to 
sim ultaneously highlight and relate m ore facets of reality". Triangulation 
enables a check on research findings by repeating them  w ith different 
techniques. This is especially useful under circumstances in which it is not 
possible to replicate the exact observations in a study, due to either the small 
num ber of cases or to historically unique events. As such, triangulation acts 
as a kind of quality control, as it im proves the internal validity of a study. 
Yin (1994) distinguishes several types of triangulation, such as triangulation 
of data sources, of investigators, of theories and of methods. This thesis uses 
a triangulation of research m ethods, bu t also, as is discussed in the sections
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below, triangulation of techniques. Both forms of triangulation should 
increase the internal validity of the research.
The selected research m ethods are discussed in the following section. These 
include an historical review, a systematic literature review, m ultiple case 
studies and an experimental setting.
3.2. Selected research methods
3.2.1. Historical review
In Chapter 4 a review in historical perspective has been chosen as a research 
m ethod to describe the institutional developm ents in road safety over the last 
century, w ith special emphasis on the period 1945-2010. This chapter can be 
considered an historical review, since it sum m arises knowledge of one 
phenom enon over a long time period. This phenom enon comprises the study 
of the road safety field, its past, its developm ent and, in particular, its 
relationship to knowledge producers and the use of that knowledge for road 
safety. The study does not go into detail, but summarises the main 
knowledge in order to discuss the knowledge and policy field. The review 
goes beyond a mere literature review as it uses a num ber of interviews and 
m any prim ary and secondary historical sources, such as policy documents, 
parliam entary debates, reports of the different agencies involved and 
overview studies. Viewed in this way, it has more in common with historical 
studies.
An historical study cannot be considered a separate m ethod (Schmidt, 1993, 
p. 58 and 70-71) (although Elton, 2002 speaks of a "historical method", p. 59); 
rather it uses m ethods from social sciences. However, historical studies do 
have some common rationales that distinguish history from other sciences. 
Historians often struggle to define their branch of science, and do so broadly 
as "concerned with all those hum an sayings, thoughts, deeds and sufferings 
which occurred in the past and have left present deposits; and it deals with 
them  from the point of view  of happening, change and the particular" (Elton, 
2002, p. 11).
Some shared characteristics can be derived from this definition. Firstly, 
historians agree about the fact that history is about studying objects in the 
past, contrary to m any social sciences, that w ant their studies to be as up  to 
date as possible. Secondly, historians use prim ary and secondary sources to
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describe history varying from earthenw are pots to diaries. Thirdly, m any 
historians agree that historical studies should not only m ention historical 
facts, but also try to analyse or interpret these facts w ithin a larger conceptual 
fram ework (Schmidt, 1993, p. 55 and 58). H istorians do this by focussing on 
events or a chain of events and on understanding change, rather than on 
describing the state of things (Elton, 2002, p. 10). Moreover, historical studies 
tend to use probable explanations over causal relationships. Historical 
studies often investigate unique events (Elton, 2002, p. 10; Jordanova, 2000, p. 
55), in which there is more than one cause underlying the consequences. It is 
not always possible to retrieve all these potential causes, or the relationship 
between them. Historical studies often try to 'understand' the outcome of 
previous events in an herm eneutic w ay (Lorenz, 1990). Of course, this 
herm eneutic understanding limits the possibility of generalising the 
conclusions to other circumstances or time spans, and thereby its external 
validity. Yet an historical study helps us understand the influence of history 
and of choices in the past on possibilities for the present. The school of 
historical institutionalism  m entioned in Chapter 2 calls this history-matters- 
perspective 'path  dependency' (Hall & Taylor, 1996).
The historical review in Chapter 4 fulfils the criteria of an historical study as 
m entioned above. It studies the history of the road safety field and uses 
various types of prim ary and secondary sources to do so. More im portantly, 
it analyses the chain of events in the road safety field and focuses on changes 
over time in policy and knowledge production and the relationships between 
them, and interprets them  in the conceptual fram ework of Chapter 2 .
Criteria for a reliable historical review have been identified by Jordanova, 
(2000, from p. 172) who describes three skills im portant for historians. Firstly, 
technical skills, such as the ability to use appropriate techniques to interpret 
sources are required. For studies in Roman history, for example, these skills 
could include a knowledge of Latin. To study the history of Dutch road 
safety, the researcher m ust have knowledge of that field and of the Dutch 
and English language since sources are em bedded in that field and are 
now adays all in Dutch or English. Secondly, Jordanova refers to source- 
based skills, such as identifying relevant sources and reading them 
accurately. To conduct the present study, knowledge about how  to find 
sources from governmental and other archives was essential. It is im portant 
too to bear in m ind the time of writing as well as the writer of the source. 
Interviewing can complement data gathering in an historical review and 
dem ands good interviewing skills. Thirdly, Jordanova focuses attention on
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interpretation skills. These include using the sources to build a plausible 
argum entation, showing the significance of the sources and considering 
dissenting argumentations. The argum entation could be based on a 
analytical framework. In the present study, this analytical fram ework is 
given in Chapter 2 .
3.2.2. Literature review
A literature review is carried out on the topic of knowledge use in road 
safety policies in Chapter 5 . A literature study is defined here as a systematic 
study within scientific literature, which lists, identifies and analyses the 
available scientific literature on a well-specified topic, both substantially and 
methodologically. Generally, two types of literature reviews can be 
distinguished: systematic reviews and narrative reviews (Bryman, 2001, p. 8­
111). A systematic review meets a num ber of criteria to make the review as 
replicable, scientific and transparent as possible. A narrative review on the 
other hand, gives a more subjective picture of the literature and has a more 
explorative nature. In some fields (such as medicine, Bryman, 2001, p. 85 and 
94), the distinction draw n between these two forms is strict. However, in 
other fields, such as in the social sciences, this distinction is not m ade so 
clearly. In the social sciences, narrative reviews can incorporate elements of 
the systematic approach. The review in Chapter 5 is also a narrative review 
with a num ber of elements of a systematic review.
A systematic literature review should have a clear purpose and well-defined 
inclusion and exclusion criteria. It should also strive for completeness in the 
literature search. The review in this thesis fulfils these requirements. 
However, a systematic review also calls for a strict selection of the literature, 
by only including high-quality research and tries to produce a synthesis of 
the literature by integrating all results, for example into sum m arising tables. 
This thesis does not to fulfil these last two requirements. It does not m aintain 
a strict literature selection. Since the num ber of studies on this specific topic 
(knowledge use in road safety policy) was very small, so-called 'grey 
literature', such as conference papers and research organisation reports, were 
included together w ith peer-review articles. Furthermore, the literature was 
too diverse to integrate into sum m arising tables, and therefore a textual 
sum m ary of the results of the studies included was given. The research 
question, nature and quality of the studies are too diverse to make a true 
synthesis. Despite this limitation, it is possible to identify common features in 
the selected studies.
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The goal of the literature review is twofold. The review tries to acquire an 
overview of research on the topic of knowledge use in road safety that is as 
complete as possible so as to be able to position the outcomes of this study in 
the existing literature. In addition, this overview serves as an interm ediary 
between studies of other authors and the empirical Chapters 6, 7 and 8, either 
by pointing out knowledge gaps in research or by identifying topics for 
which an easy and/or interesting comparison could be m ade in these 
chapters. Chapter 5 explicitly identifies these knowledge gaps or interesting 
possibilities for comparisons and points out how  these influenced the 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 . The literature review has an explorative character due to 
the aims of the chapter.
3.2.3. Multiple case studies
In Chapters 6 and 8, two m ultiple case studies were carried out to collect and 
analyse empirical data on knowledge use in Dutch provincial and municipal 
road safety policy. This created an opportunity to conduct in-depth research 
as well as to research m ultiple cases. According to Yin (1994, p. 13), a case 
study is "an empirical inquiry that investigates a contem porary phenom enon 
within its real-life context, especially w hen the boundaries between 
phenom enon and context are not clearly evident". A case study researches 
something in the present, which distinguishes it from historical studies. 
Contrary to experiments, it studies something in a real-life context. And, 
contrary to surveys, case studies take into account all contextual conditions, 
as they m ight be relevant for the case.
Yin also m entions criteria for a sound case study (Yin, 1994, p. 32 and 
further). In the design of a case study, the external validity m ust be ensured, 
for example by using m ultiple cases as in this thesis, or by using theories as a 
criterion for choosing a case study. To increase internal validity, m ultiple 
sources of evidence are used (triangulation) to prevent subjective data 
collection, and prelim inary results are reviewed by key informants. 
Furthermore, a case study protocol and database should be used to enable 
replication of the same case by another researcher. Lastly, internal validity 
can be enhanced by analysing the data in a systematic and reproducible way.
Case studies are especially useful for explorative research. M ultiple case 
studies are used here to explore in depth the knowledge use in provincial 
and m unicipal road safety policy processes. The strength of a case study is 
also its weakness: in-depth studies are very time consuming, putting a limit 
on the num ber of cases that can be studied. Furthermore, case studies have
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the same shortcoming as historical analyses: they only provide plausible 
causes, and external validation of causes is very limited (Swanborn, 2000). 
So, although the internal validity is strong, external validity can be a problem 
(Dul & Hak, 2008; Yin, 1994).
The use of m ultiple instead of single case studies im proves the external 
validity. However, even then, one has to define very precisely to which 
population the results can be transferred. In the provincial studies, it was 
possible to investigate all of the Dutch provinces (see Chapter 6). This 
effectively overcomes the external validity problem  for generalising the 
outcomes to the Dutch provincial context. In Chapter 8 this was not possible, 
obviously, due to the large num ber of municipalities in the Netherlands. In 
that study, different precautions are m ade to select municipalities from a 
well-defined population. Herewith, the characteristics of the cases were as 
m uch alike as possible, which makes it possible to generalise the results to a 
population with the same features.
3.2.4. Experimental setting
An experimental setting was chosen to validate the outcomes of the m ultiple 
case studies on provincial road safety policy in Chapter 7. A 'true' experiment 
is a study in which the researchers control the research conditions and give a 
stim ulus to a person or a group of people to m easure their response 
(Meerling, 1989, p. 230 and further). The design of an experim ent should 
enable unam biguous conclusions and the comparison between the stim ulus 
and non-stim ulus situation should be statistically tested. To make sure that 
the stim ulus is the only intervening element, as m any variables as possible 
m ust be controlled, for example by assigning respondents at random  to the 
conditions. This study attem pted to design the experimental setting as 
systematically as possible. However, a large num ber of variables had to be 
taken into account w hen designing the stim ulus (a road safety policy 
question). Therefore, complete control of all possible variables could not be 
achieved. Furthermore, the num ber of respondents was too low to conduct 
serious statistical testing. So although the experimental setting cannot be 
counted as a true experiment, as m any experimental requirem ents as 
possible were taken into account. The research design chosen was a 'within- 
subjects-design', an experimental design in which each respondent is given 
two versions of the three simulation cases. A 'learning' effect is prevented by 
varying the order of the simulation cases between respondents.
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A part from the possibility of validating causes of behaviour, another 
advantage of an experim ent is the opportunity to influence the research 
situation by systematically varying the stim ulus and context. Furtherm ore, it 
is possible to m easure the response of the subjects immediately, thus 
preventing m em ory biasing the outcomes. The disadvantage of experiments 
is their limited external validity; experimental results cannot always be 
applied to other environments (Swanborn, 1987, p. 245). In Chapter 7 this is 
balanced to some extent by the fact that, although a limited num ber of 
subjects were studied, these subjects represented nearly all provinces in the 
Netherlands. Furthermore, a reality check for the questions in the experiment 
was carried out by the respondents.
3.2.5. Overview
The m ain characteristics of the various m ethods used in the following 
chapters are sum m arised in the table below:
Chapter Method Main characteristics
Chapter 4 Historical review Investigates the past, using primary and secondary 
sources, probable explanations, and hopes to 
understand the influence of history
Chapter 5 Literature review Systematic overview, explorative nature, guidance 
for empirical studies
Chapters 6 
and 8
Multiple case studies In-depth, comparison possible, explorative nature, 
plausible causes, weak external validity
Chapter 7 Experimental setting Validating causes, control over research situation, 
immediate measurement of response, little external 
validity
Table 3.1. Characteristics of methods used in this thesis.
3.3. Further rationales for the chapters
This section gives a further justification for the selection of the empirical 
studies in Chapters 4 to 8. To a certain extent, these chapters are based on 
previous research (Bax, 2007; Bax & Jagtman, 2008; 2009; Bax et al., 2004; Bax 
et al., 2007; Bax et al., 2008; Bax, Propper & Litjens, 2003). While this m ay 
reflect some arbitrariness, these previous studies clearly have a common 
rationale: to identify barriers to knowledge use in road safety policies, each 
study from two different perspectives. Therefore, they can be said to 
complement each other.
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The Chapters 6, 7 and 8 all concentrate on the present situation (2005-2008) 
and on concrete policy processes in road safety. In this, they tend to 
underexpose the institutional setting of knowledge production, knowledge 
use and policy-making in road safety. They do, however, belong to the same 
institutional environm ent -  and therefore are constrained by that context. For 
that reason, in Chapter 4 it was decided to conduct an institutional analysis of 
the road safety policy field that focuses on the history of road safety, 
including the organisation of its knowledge production. Chapter 5 takes the 
two perspectives on timing (present and history) into account as well as the 
concrete policy-making processes and institutionalisation processes in the 
road safety policy field.
A lthough all three studies reported on in the Chapters 6, 7 and 8 focus on the 
local and regional governmental level, they offer different perspectives on it. 
Chapters 6 and 7 study the twelve provinces while Chapter 8 deals with 
fourteen municipalities. The reason for this focus on the local and regional 
level is that provinces and municipalities play an increasingly im portant role 
in Dutch road safety policies. A lthough the fram ework for road safety policy 
is set on a national level, over time, provinces have become the directors of 
the gradually decentralised road safety policies. M unicipalities are 
im portant, because they own the largest stretches of road in kilometres. In 
addition to the provincial and city-regional level, this is the level of actual 
im plem entation of infrastructural road safety measures.
The chapters also complement each other w ith regard to the issue of w hether 
road safety should be seen as a separate, sectoral, policy field or as a topic 
that has to be integrated in other policies. In two empirical studies (Chapter 7 
and 8), public authorities were interviewed about how  they weighed up  road 
safety against other interests to achieve an integral traffic policy. In contrast, 
Chapter 6 questions public authorities about road safety as a sectoral subject.
Furthermore, the chapters complement each other w ith respect to different 
types of knowledge. W hereas the two provincial cases focus on knowledge 
about costs and the effects of road safety measures, the municipal case 
concentrates on knowledge of other governmental and non-governm ental 
actors in the policy process about their own interests. This diversity reflects a 
continuum  between fundam ental scientific knowledge on the one hand, and 
applied policy oriented knowledge on the other hand, a contrast elaborated 
upon in Chapter 1 and 2.
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3.4. Research techniques
In the various chapters, a num ber of different techniques are used to collect 
data. The choice of technique stems from the general research m ethod 
selected, constrained by practical circumstances. The thesis strived for an as 
diverse as possible range of m ethods and techniques, to apply the 
triangulation concept as m entioned above. Techniques used in the various 
chapters are docum ent analysis (Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 8), sem i-structured 
interviews (Chapters 4, 6, 7 and 8), telephone surveys (Chapters 6 and 8) and 
visual inspection (Chapter 8). The choice and the details of each technique are 
comprehensively discussed and accounted for in the respective chapters.
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4. An historical institutional analysis of road 
safety policy and knowledge
4.1. Introduction
The present chapter gives an historical description and analysis of road 
safety policy, road safety knowledge and the relationship between them  from 
1900 onwards. Road safety knowledge and policy are described in analytical 
concepts as discussed in Chapter 2, including the four dimensions of the 
policy arrangem ent approach, the concepts Modes 1 and 2, the fifth branch, 
the typologies developed by Landry et al. and Hoppe, and the Knott and 
W ildavsky ladder of knowledge utilisation.
Chapter 4 serves two purposes: it outlines the institutional context and 
changes in the road safety knowledge and the policy field within that 
context. In addition, the chapter has a purpose within the broader fram ework 
of this thesis. The description of the present knowledge-policy arrangem ent 
serves as a background to Chapters 5 to 8 in which the use of knowledge in 
policy processes is investigated and barriers to knowledge use are discussed.
The research questions for this chapter can be form ulated as follows:
• W hich developments can be observed in the institutionalisation o f D utch  
road safety knowledge and policy, and in their relations?
• How can these developments be characterised using the concepts described 
in Chapter 2?
4.2. Concepts and methods
4.2.1. Analytical concepts used in this chapter
This chapter uses concepts concerning institutionalisation to describe the 
patterns in the relationship between knowledge and policy. The following 
concepts were discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2 . The knowledge-policy 
arrangem ent is described in term s of the policy arrangem ent approach, using 
concepts such as actors, resources, discourses and rules. Two kinds of 
discourses are distinguished. Substantial discourses discuss problem  
definitions and solutions for policy issues. Governance discourses focus on
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the organisation of policy and knowledge. The present chapter also describes 
road safety as a policy problem  in term s of structured, unstructured and 
sem i-structured (with consensus on means or on goals) problems.
The knowledge-policy arrangem ent is interpreted first in Caplan's terms, 
(1979) in which science and policy are two w orlds w ith separate values and 
practices. It is then described using the typologies p u t forw ard by H oppe 
and Landry et al. H oppe (2005) distinguishes four types of boundary w ork in 
science and policy. See also Chapter 2 for an extensive presentation of the 
figure below.
Divergent logics
Enlightenm ent
model
Prim acy 
for science
Technocracy
m odel
Convergent logics
Prim acy 
for policy/ 
politics
Figure 4.1. Four models of boundary work (based on Hoppe, 2005).
Landry et al. (2001b) discuss four m odels for interaction between science and
policy. Their characteristics can be sum m arised as follows:
• The science push model: science delivers objective facts to policy­
makers
• The dem and pull model: policy-makers ask science for specific 
knowledge
• The dissem ination model: science actively disseminates knowledge 
among policy-makers
• The interaction model: science and policy interact during each stage of 
the knowledge production process
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Lastly, the changes in the knowledge-policy arrangem ent over time are 
described in term s of shifts in governance, such as multi-actor, multi-level or 
multi-sector trends.
4.2.2. Methodological account 
Limitations
There is a vast am ount of literature on the topic of road safety from 1900 to 
the present day. Demarcation of the subject is therefore necessary. The 
present study has been dem arcated in geographic scope and in time.
The first demarcation involves a geographic restriction. The analysis is 
restricted to the N etherlands and includes the influence of European 
legislation on the Netherlands. The availability of prim ary and secondary 
sources has been decisive here, as is the fact that this chapter sketches the 
institutional context for the Chapters 5 to 8, which investigate knowledge use 
in Dutch road safety policy. A second demarcation concerns the time span. 
The period chosen to study institutionalisation in road safety is from 1900 
onwards. An im portant reason for this choice was the rise of the passenger 
car in traffic after 1900, leading to an increase in road traffic accidents. The 
year 1900 was thus a natural starting point for analyses.
The time span was subdivided into four units, based on four im portant 
developments:
• 1900 -  1945: This period shows the rise of the passenger car as a m ode 
of transport and the consequent increase in the num ber of traffic 
fatalities. Road safety became a social phenomenon.
• 1945 -  1975: In this period policy and knowledge organisations 
emerged and road safety developed into a subject of policy and 
knowledge production.
• 1975 -  1995: This period represents the flourishing of 
institutionalisation at a national level; a strong, national, policy 
organisation and several more knowledge organisations arose, and 
patterns were established in their interactions.
• 1995 -  2010: In the fourth period, the competences and im plem entation 
of the road safety policy shifted from national to local governments.
It was decided not to describe each period at equal length. The period from 
1900 to 1945 is described only briefly, while subsequent periods have been 
described more extensively because of the rapid  increase in the num ber of 
accidents and the accompanying attention for road safety in that period.
59
Another reason for this choice was the greater availability of sources, 
including the registration of accidents in the latter periods.
Methods
The most im portant research m ethod in this historical study is docum ent 
analysis. An exploratory phase involved a study of secondary sources such 
as previous historical analyses (Bogaarts, Haans & W eyers-de Ruiter, 2003; 
Quist, 1981) and jubilee publications of road safety organisations (CROW, 
2007a; M ulder & Ederveen, 2002). Guided by these secondary sources, a 
num ber of prim ary sources were selected for investigation and for 
verification of the facts in the secondary sources. Also it was hoped that 
relevant details could be found to increase the reliability of the historical 
data. The sources used are included in the references.
Supplem entary to the docum ent analysis, four open interviews were held 
w ith key figures within policy and science. The following persons were 
interviewed:
• E. Asmussen, Director of SWOV 1962-1986; Professor Traffic Safety TU 
Delft 1982-1989
• P.B. van Gurp, Director Directorate-General Road Safety, M inistry of 
Transport, 1983-1990
• B. Quist, H ead Division Road safety, M inistry of Transport, 1963-1974; 
Assistant-Director Directorate-General Road Safety, Ministry of 
Transport 1974-1980; Associated Professor TU Delft, 1980-1987
• F.C.M. W egman, Director of SWOV 1999-at present; Professor Traffic 
Safety TU Delft 2009-at present
The interviews dem onstrated, as they generally do, the limitations of hum an 
memory, especially in rem embering decade old facts (Baddeley, 1999). The 
respondents tended to remember anecdotes and events which had m ade a 
deep impression, often due to the personal relationships involved. The exact 
dates of events were often lacking. This, and the emphasis on personal 
relationships, were the reasons for not using the interviews for collecting 
facts, but for obtaining an overall im pression of a specific period. That was 
also why only four interviews were conducted. However, as the interviews 
were carried out at the beginning of the study, they proved very inspiring for 
directing the data collection and for the analysis and interpretation of the 
historical facts.
This thesis does not profess to present a detailed history of Dutch road 
safety. The limited availability of sources and time resulted in frequent
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recourse to sources available w ithin SWOV and its library. Although 
obviously, the SWOV library contains m any more than its own publications, 
disproportionate attention to SWOV in certain parts of this text was 
unavoidable. This disproportionate attention may even have been increased 
by the fact that this thesis is being w ritten by a SWOV employee. However, 
although the position of SWOV m ay be overexposed in relation to other 
organisations, the various sources including non-SWOV sources in this 
chapter refer to SWOV as an im portant knowledge organisation in the road 
safety field. Therefore, it can be claimed that the greater focus on SWOV is 
not only due to the origin of the writer or the main lim itation to merely one 
library, but also a reasonably justified overexposure.
As stated in Section 1.5 and Chapter 3, historical reviews tend to use a 
herm eneutic approach to 'understand' the influence history and the choices 
m ade in the past have on opportunities in the present. In so doing, they place 
relevant historical facts in a larger interpretative framework. This approach 
brings w ith it a different language to that used in a m ore rationalistic 
approach, since it claims a strong connection between everyday language in 
social behaviour and scientific language, w ith formal definitions playing a 
less im portant role. Readers will notice this language difference in the 
present chapter com pared to subsequent chapters.
The graphs
Each subsection in Section 4.3 covers a period of time and is preceded by a 
graph. The graphs consist of two im portant indicators: the num ber of traffic 
fatalities and the expenditure on road safety by the Dutch M inistry of 
Transport, Public Works and W ater M anagem ent (hereafter: the M inistry of 
Transport) which, combined, provide a general im pression of the period. 
These indicators have been chosen deliberatively as they roughly indicate the 
relative im portance of the issue and of the policy response to it. Note that the 
M inistry of Transport is the predecessor of the M inistry of Infrastructure and 
that the change in nam e took place in October 2010. W hen referring to the 
time period before October 2010, the term  M inistry of Transport is used in 
this chapter, while w hen referring to the present time, the term  M inistry of 
Infrastructure is used.
The num ber of road traffic fatalities, derived from Statistics Netherlands 
(CBS), denotes the developm ent of the policy issue. Official CBS statistics on 
road accidents date from 1926, but for unknow n reasons, they are available 
only from 1934 onwards. Therefore, the figures from 1926 to 1934, were
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derived from the thesis of Leerink (1938) who quoted the CBS statistics in 
this period. The figures from 1996 onw ards are called the 'real' num bers of 
traffic fatalities. 'Real' num bers of traffic fatalities are statistics draw n up 
from a variety of sources where traffic fatalities are registered, but none of 
which are complete. Each year, CBS together w ith the M inistry of 
Infrastructure calculate the 'real' num ber of traffic fatalities based on CBS 
statistics, judicial data and police registrations (SWOV, 2010). Between 1996, 
w hen calculations for 'real' num bers were introduced, and 2010, the 
estimated 'real' num ber of traffic fatalities is higher than the policy 
registration by between 6 and 11%, with 10.7% as an average (Stipdonk, 
2005).
The M inistry of Transport's road safety expenditure gives a rudim entary 
im pression of road safety policy efforts. Only the Ministry of Transport's 
expenditure has been included, because local data were unavailable. On the 
national level, the M inistry of Transport is considered to be the responsible 
m inistry for policy-making on road safety, although the M inistry of Interior 
and Kingdom relations and the M inistry of Justice both have large 
expenditures on enforcement of traffic rules. Other Ministries, such as the 
M inistry of Health, Welfare and Sport, spend considerably less on road 
safety. As Wijnen and Stroeker (2009) point out, expenses for road safety are 
som ewhat scattered over the M inistry of Transport's Budget. Since this is not 
a thesis in economics, and the accounts of road safety expenditure are merely 
illustrative, only budget items clearly labelled as road safety were included 
in the overview. Furthermore, the budgets in Dutch guilders, before the 
introduction of the euro in 2002, have been converted to euros using the 
official, rounded off, exchange rate of 1 euro to 2,20 NLG, not using a 
discount rate to compensate for inflation. Because of changes in the budget 
system of the Ministry, the figures from 1975 onw ards include the cost of 
personnel, whereas the figures previous to that year exclude these costs. 
Public expenditure on road safety has been registered as such only since 
1949.
The choice of these tw o indicators does not suggest a direct link between 
policy efforts and the developm ent of the policy issue, in this case the 
num ber of traffic fatalities. A lthough a connection is plausible, it is difficult 
to find empirical evidence to support it (Wegman et al., 2006; W egman, Van 
Selm & Herweijer, 1991; Weijermars & Van Schagen, 2009). A connection in 
the reverse direction is also plausible: the developm ent of the policy issue
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could influence policy efforts. However, here again quantitative empirical 
evidence is equally elusive.
Reading guide
Section 4.3 below presents an historical description and analysis of the road 
safety knowledge and policy field from 1900 onwards. Four subsections 
discuss the four time periods, including a graph and an analysis of the 
content and organisation of the knowledge-policy arrangement. This 
historical analysis is followed by a description of the present relationship 
between knowledge and policy in Section 4.4 . The chapter concludes in 
Section 4.5 on some typical institutional features of the road safety policy and 
knowledge field.
4.3. Historical institutional analysis 1900 -  2010
The graph below displays an overview of the traffic fatalities and the 
expenses of the Ministry of Transport for the entire period between 1900 and 
2010.
Figure 4.2. Numbers of traffic fatalities and road safety expenditure of the Ministry of 
Transport between 1900 and 2010. Sources: Ministry of Transport, CBS and Leerink, 1938.
The graph shows a steep increase in the num ber of traffic fatalities up  to 
approximately 1970, followed by a slower decrease. No accident statistics are
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available for the period from 1942 to 1945, due to the Second W orld War. 
Government expenditure was m arked as a separate entry from 1949 onward. 
The graph shows an increase in public expenditure between 1960 and 1980, 
followed by a period of stability, and a large, but fluctuating increase from 
2000. In the subsequent sections, the relevant parts of this graph are resum ed 
for each of the periods concerned.
4.3.1. 1900 to 1945: The introduction of car travel and road safety as 
social phenomena 
Time line
Figure 4.3. Numbers of traffic fatalities between 1900 and 1945. Sources: CBS and Leerink, 
1938.
The graph dem onstrates that the num ber of traffic fatalities was registered 
from 1926 onwards. During the Second W orld War, the registration of traffic 
fatalities had stopped after 1942. No data on expenses were found in this 
period, which means that the Ministry of Transport either did not spend 
m oney on road safety or did not register these expenses separately.
Content of knowledge and policy
Several developments, in particular the emergence of the car as a m ode of 
transport, im ply the rise of road safety as a social phenom enon from
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approximately 1900 onw ards (Mom & Filarski, 2008, p. 55-81; Quist, 1981, p. 
12). Cars enabled travel at higher speeds, which led to m ore and more 
serious accidents. The figures in the above graph indicate an increase in the 
num ber of fatalities from the m iddle of the 1920s onwards, from 518 in 1926 
to 828 in 1939. Initially, the road safety problem  was seen in term s of guilt 
and culpability, and car drivers in particular were blam ed for it (OECD, 1997, 
p. 17; Wegman, 2009, p. 227-230). The Royal Dutch Touring Club ANWB, 
which grew out of regional Penny Farthing clubs in 1883 and represented 
cyclists rather than car drivers at that moment, m ay have played a role in this 
problem  definition, but its origin is not entirely clear (Staal, 2005). 
Descriptions of drivers as 'wild, inconsiderate, and irresponsible' (Quist, 
1981, p. 10) illustrate this. The focus on guilt and culpability (Quist, 1967, p.
1) is apparent in the fact that the two Dutch PhD theses on road safety in the 
late thirties were published by the Law Faculties of the Universities of 
A m sterdam  and Leiden (Leerink, 1938; Sannes, 1939). When, from the 1920s 
and 1930s onwards, the num ber of cars on the road increased (Quist, 1981, p. 
20) the governm ent set speed limits and dem anded a driving test (Tweede 
Kamer, 1924).
In this first period, it was not the governm ent that pu t road safety on the 
agenda, but civil society organisations and mainly the ANWB. The national 
governm ent stated that road safety was a local problem  not requiring central 
coordination (Quist, 1981). It was not until after the ANWB had urged them 
to do so (Quist, 1981, p. 13), that the governm ent first passed traffic 
regulations in the Motorcycle and Bicycle Law of 1905. This law  comprised 
regulations on the m axim um  speed in urban areas, right of w ay at 
intersections, driving on the right-hand side of the road, and some vehicle 
requirements. The hosting of the First International Safety Conference by the 
Dutch M inistry of Transport in 1937 illustrates the increasing im portance of 
road safety for policy-makers (S.N., 1937).
A literature study in national and international databases revealed that little 
scientific research was carried out in the N etherlands in this period. Leerink 
(1938) and Sannes (1939) m ay have been the only ones to carry out an 
extensive study on road safety in the Netherlands. Literature in other 
countries has given som ewhat more attention to road safety. For instance, 
Hagenzieker et al. (forthcoming) counted 40 to 75 international publications 
in scientific journals in total between 1900 and 1945.
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Organisation of knowledge and policy
Several events indicate that organisations w ithin the state, civil society and 
the knowledge field developed an increasing interest in road safety 
knowledge.
In the first half of the 20th century, a num ber of interest groups representing 
different groups of road users were founded. The ANWB, an interest group 
for cyclists at that time, and the Dutch Traffic Safety Association VVN 
(Verbond van Vereenigingen voor Veilig Verkeer, founded in 1932) 
represented groups of vulnerable road users, such as cyclists and 
pedestrians. KNAC, the Royal Dutch Automobile Club has represented 
drivers since 1898. The Association for the Protection of Pedestrians was 
founded in 1953.
From 1926 onward, accidents became the subject of statistics. CBS has nam ed 
road traffic accidents as a specific cause of death and has m aintained 
separate road traffic accident statistics since 1926 (Leerink, 1938). Civil 
society organisations, such as ANWB and KNAC, initiated the first 
opportunity for professional knowledge exchange in the N etherlands Road 
Congress in 1920 (Quist, 1981), an annual congress prom oting im provem ent 
in the road network.
The first indication of some organised policy was the establishment of an 
advisory board, on road and road safety policy in 1929 (Quist, 1981, p. 24). 
National, provincial and local governments together w ith several interest 
groups, amongst which ANWB and KNAC, sat on this board.
The Road Tax Law in 1927 (Tweede Kamer, 1926), introduced at the 
insistence of ANWB (Quist, 1981, p. 23), generated extra funds for roads and 
road safety. The law provided a legal basis for the financing, construction 
and m aintenance of roads at a national level.
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4.3.2. 1945 to 1975: Road safety as a policy field 
Time line
Figure 4.4. Numbers of traffic fatalities and road safety expenditure of the Ministry of 
Transport between 1946 and 1975. Sources: Ministry of Transport and CBS.
The figure illustrates a rapid increase, indeed a tripling of traffic fatalities 
from 1949 to 1972 and the start of a decrease after 1972. The costs of road 
safety for the M inistry of Transport were registered separately from 1949 
onwards: from very tiny at first -even  not visible in Figure 4.4-, the budget 
gradually increases from the late 1950s onwards.
Content of the knowledge-policy arrangement
The Dutch Parliam ent was seriously w orried about the steadily increasing 
num ber of traffic casualties from 1950 onw ards (Tweede Kamer, 1951a), a 
w orry that is illustrated by separate subheadings for road safety in the 
register of Parliam entary Documents starting in 1956. In 1963, 1964 and 1968 
the subject was included in the Queen's Speech.
Two legal m easures were taken in the early 1950s. The Road Traffic 
Regulations, containing traffic rules, vehicle requirements, and requirem ents 
and provisions for driving tests and driving licences were passed in 1950. A
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year later, the provincial adm inistration of vehicle registrations was 
centralised in a national system.
The road safety discourse changed tow ards the end of this period. While the 
question of guilt was initially the central topic, the emphasis shifted tow ards 
a more cause-oriented approach to road safety. This approach aimed at 
determ ining the cause of road traffic danger, first from a mono-causal 
perspective, after approximately 1970 to a multi-causal perspective 
(Asmussen, 1983; H addon, 1972; Hakkert, 2008; Koornstra, 1986, p. 7; Kraay, 
1989, p. 268). In 1951, for example, the Dutch Parliam ent requested an 
integral road safety m em orandum  (Tweede Kamer, 1951b). Parliament 
believed a substantial num ber of accidents to be caused by spatial aspects 
such as road features. The Minister of Transport considered it impossible to 
comply w ith Parliament's request, believing that drivers are responsible for 
their own safety. The m any causes for the road traffic danger w ould 
transform  the m em orandum  into a long list of separate m easures to be 
im plem ented by different ministries (Tweede Kamer, 1960). It is remarkable 
that the Minister considered road safety too complex a problem  for 
intervention, but de facto attributed road safety to a single cause: drivers.
The mono-causal approach also led to a need for more road safety 
knowledge in the national governm ent and the ANWB (Mulder & Ederveen,
2002. p. 5). In response, the research organisation SWOV (Institute for Road 
Safety Research) was founded in 1962. The section below discusses its 
establishment in m ore detail. Soon after its founding, SWOV argued that 
road traffic accidents were complex incidents (Quist, 1967, p. 2) and 
supported the multi-causal approach. It proposed a new  fram ework for 
analysing road safety, in which the traffic system consists of the components 
man, vehicle, and road. The SWOV analysis had an im m ediate effect on the 
M inistry of Transport's policy and was added as an appendix to the Road 
Safety M em orandum  in 1967 (Ministerie van Verkeer en W aterstaat, 1967; 
SWOV, 1967).
The organisation of the knowledge-policy arrangement
Parliam entary docum ents illustrate that the ANWB was the first to propose 
the foundation of a knowledge-policy organisation (Tweede Kamer, 1953). 
They set themselves the task of establishing an advisory body comprised of 
engineering, enforcement and education experts. The Dutch Parliam ent 
supported this proposal and in 1953 a Perm anent Committee for Road Traffic 
Safety was founded (Tweede Kamer, 1953). This committee consisted of
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representatives of seven different ministries, regional and local governments 
and interest groups (Eerste Kamer, 1956). The Perm anent Committee 
coordinated safety policy. The broad representation in the Perm anent 
Committee indicates that the road safety issue covered m any different policy 
areas at that time, but also shows the early involvem ent of different 
stakeholders.
A num ber of ANWB activities dem onstrate its initiatives in the road safety 
knowledge field. The ANWB has organised annual road safety oriented 
congresses such as the N etherlands Roads Congress (Wegencongres) since 
1920 and the Traffic Engineering Congress (Verkeerstechnische Leergangen) 
since 1952. Furthermore, the ANWB has published traffic m em oranda 
containing guidelines for traffic engineering since 1951 (Quist, 1981, p. 39).
W hen the ANWB advocated the establishment of a separate study centre for 
road safety in 1960 (Mulder & Ederveen, 2002, p. 5), the Dutch Parliament 
adopted the proposal (Tweede Kamer, 1960). Also, although the Minister had 
dismissed the suggestion initially, he did  decide to set up  the SWOV in 
cooperation with the ANWB in 1962. The organisation was expected to 
coordinate and stimulate scientific road safety research (Tweede Kamer, 
1962). In its early years, the organisation carried out research that provided a 
scientific basis for the Road Safety m em orandum  (Mulder & Ederveen, 2002).
In 1973, following years of campaigning by the Dutch labour party, PvdA, 
the Directorate-General for Road Safety (DVV) was established within the 
M inistry of Transport (Quist, 1981, p. 47). The Minister of Transport was 
appointed road safety policy coordinator. Two bodies coordinated the 
departm ents involved in road safety policy. These were the Central 
Committee for Road Safety (CCVV) for senior civil servants in the various 
ministries, and the Interdepartm ental Steering Committee for Road Safety 
(ISVV) for junior civil servants. The Perm anent Contact Group Road Safety 
(PCGV), an advisory body for regional and local governments and interest 
groups, was also established. This body replaced the previous Perm anent 
Committee Road Traffic Safety, which was probably dissolved, although no 
confirmative sources could be found. A clearly increased budget can be 
observed from 1974 onw ards (see Figure 4.4 and next paragraph). Moreover, 
this developm ent coincided w ith a considerable increase in policy 
production; in the early 1970s a large num ber of legal m easures was 
introduced to im prove road safety, for example the compulsory use of seat 
belts for drivers and helmets for m oped riders (SWOV, 2009).
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Several developm ents in the road safety knowledge field suggest that the 
SWOV struggled to define its precise role. At first, the M inistry of Transport 
had a clear need for knowledge as the basis for the Road Safety 
M em orandum  (SWOV, 1967, p. 5). However, w ith its first analyses and a 
more scientific definition of road safety, SWOV appeared to be presenting 
itself as a professional and independent research organisation and not 
merely acquiescing to the dem ands of Parliam ent and the M inistry of 
Transport. During the late 1960s, in consultation w ith the M inistry of 
Transport, SWOV's role shifted from one conducting its own research to a 
knowledge broker's role, focussing on the coordination of knowledge 
production (Mulder & Ederveen, 2002, p. 17). In addition to SWOV, the 
Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research TNO in Delft, 
Soesterberg and Leiden amongst other places (founded in the mid1960s), also 
studied road safety. In particular, TNO carried out research into injury 
prevention, and epidemiological research (De Haas, Bonte & De Haas- 
Posthum a, 1967; Techniek in N ederland, 2009).
4.3.3. 1975-1995: The flourishing of institutionalisation at a national 
level 
Time line
Figure 4.5. Numbers of traffic fatalities and road safety expenditure of the Ministry of 
Transport between 1975 and 1995. Sources: Ministry of Transport and CBS.
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The figure shows a slow yet steady decrease of the num ber of traffic fatalities 
and a rise in the expenses of the M inistry of Transport up  to the early 
eighties, after which the expenses show a slower rate of increase, and then 
more or less stabilise.
Content of the knowledge-policy arrangement
A considerable increase in policy production in this period is illustrated by 
the large num ber of policy plans (Ministerie van Verkeer en W aterstaat, 1983; 
1987; 1989; 1991; 1996b; Tweede Kamer, 1976). Several organisations, such as 
SWOV, the new  Road Safety Board (founded in 1977) and (new) interest 
groups, developed and pu t forw ard a definition of the road safety problem. 
SWOV p u t road safety on the agenda as an increasingly less structured 
problem; the simple m easures sufficient in the past, were no longer so in the 
seventies (Asmussen, 1983; SWOV, 1974; 1976). Road safety was no longer 
seen as mono-causal, but rather as multi-conditional, and thus required a 
system-oriented approach. The M inistry of Transport used this discourse 
refinement in the Policy Plan for Road Safety 1975 (Tweede Kamer, 1976) and 
in the Policy Plan for Road Safety 1983 (Ministerie van Verkeer en 
W aterstaat, 1983). The policy plans reflected a further elaborated system- 
oriented approach to road safety w ith structural measures, such as a safe 
infrastructure, expected to im prove the entire traffic system. This system- 
oriented approach can be observed even more clearly in the Sustainable 
Safety concept developed by SWOV, in cooperation with other knowledge 
organisations such as TNO, the Traffic Research Centre VSC and the VU 
University Amsterdam, in 1992 (Koornstra et al., 1992). This approach states 
that not individual measures, but rather a coherent package of measures is 
required for an effective road safety policy. In addition, measures had to be 
preventive instead of curative. The Ministry of Transport included the 
Sustainable Safety vision in the M ulti-year Road Safety Plan 3 (Ministerie van 
Verkeer en W aterstaat, 1991), even before the official publication of the 
Sustainable Safety vision.
Another organisation that brought about an im portant discourse refinement 
was the Road Safety Board (discussed m ore extensively below). In 1984, it 
proposed a quantitative target for road safety to make intended policy less 
noncommittal (Raad voor de Verkeersveiligheid, 1984). Furtherm ore, it 
argued for the objectification of policy-making by considering the cost- 
effectiveness of road safety measures. The M inistry of Transport followed up 
both suggestions by including quantitative targets in the Multi-year Road 
Safety Plan 1 (Ministerie van Verkeer en W aterstaat, 1987) and including an
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addendum  on the costs of accidents to the National Plan Road Safety 2 
(Tweede Kamer, 1985, p. 153-162). The quantitative road safety targets were 
also m entioned in the Second Structure Scheme Traffic and Transport (SVV2) 
(Ministerie van Verkeer en W aterstaat, 1988).
In this period, from 1975 onwards, the Ministry of Transport focussed 
attention on the position of road safety in traffic and transport policy. The 
Policy Plan for Road Safety 1975 (Tweede Kamer, 1976) m entions explicitly 
the relationship between road safety policy and traffic and transport policy, 
and road safety is incorporated in the general traffic m em orandum  Structure 
Scheme Traffic and Transport (SVV1) (Tweede Kamer, 1977), although no 
practical integration w ith the traffic and transport policy was reported in the 
m em orandum . Road safety was cited as a precondition for traffic and 
transport policy.
The organisation of the knowledge-policy arrangement
From the 1970s onwards, the num ber of knowledge organisations involved 
in road safety increased rapidly. In 1977, the (provisional, until 1981) Road 
Safety Board was established, chaired by Pieter van Vollenhoven (Quist, 
1981, p. 48). The Board replaced the Committee Road Traffic Safety, which 
had been founded in 1953 and had provided policy advice to the national 
governm ent based on scientific research. In addition, several universities 
started road safety research. From 1978 onward, Delft University of 
Technology (Technische Hogeschool Delft, 1978) carried out research into 
road safety and in 1983 it appointed the SWOV's then m anaging director Eric 
Asmussen as extraordinary professor. In 1971, the University of Groningen 
established a chair in experimental psychology and traffic sciences and in 
1977 founded the interdisciplinary research group for road safety VSC, 
focussing on education and public information (Michon, 1988; Mom & 
Filarski, 2008, p. 337). Leiden University has conducted research on 
enforcement of traffic rules since the mid1980s (Gundy & Verschuur, 1986). 
Furtherm ore, Twente University of Technology and Eindhoven University of 
Technology (Faculty of Mechanical Engineering) (Techniek in Nederland,
2009) have carried out road safety research since the early 1990s. The 
Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research TNO has carried 
out road safety research, often commissioned by SWOV, since the late 1960s 
and early 1970s. The private consultancy firm Traffic Test, specialising in 
road safety and in hum an behaviour in traffic, was established in 1985. Most 
knowledge organisations collaborated in various arrangements. SWOV and 
The Road Safety Board, for example, entered into an agreem ent in 1979 to
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share knowledge (Mulder & Ederveen, 2002), the ANWB together w ith 
SWOV organised the National Road Safety Congress in 1978 (Wegman et al., 
1979) and in 1992, several knowledge organisations, instigated by SWOV, 
developed the Sustainable Safety vision.
The relationship between SWOV and the M inistry of Transport changed over 
the years. The policy plan for 1975, (Tweede Kamer, 1976, p. 55 and 57) for 
example, assigned responsibility for the coordination of the knowledge 
requirem ents to the (relatively new) Directorate-General for Road Safety 
(DVV) instead of to SWOV. In addition, the M inistry of Transport had a 
program m ing meeting with SWOV to determine research relevant to policy 
support in 1982, and SWOV seconded some of its employees to DVV for a 
short period of time (Mulder & Ederveen, 2002, p.23). This w ould seem to 
pu t SWOV in more of a coordinating role rather than one of a provider of 
research (Asmussen, 1976, p. 42-43; Ministerie van Verkeer en W aterstaat,
1993, p. 10). In 1983 the M inistry of Transport asked SWOV explicitly to 
provide a basis for the Policy Plan for Road Safety, but, contrary to previous 
policy plans, only in as far as the quantitative part was concerned (Mulder & 
Ederveen, 2002, p. 28).
Furtherm ore, in subsequent years, the national governm ent itself adopted 
the role of knowledge broker. This was partly due to a reorganisation of the 
M inistry of Transport in 1987. The DVV became part of the Directorate- 
General for Transport, Public Works and W ater M anagem ent instead of an 
independent Directorate-General (Bogaarts, Haans & W eyers-de Ruiter, 2003, 
p. 21). The Directorate-General had its own knowledge division, the Centre 
for Traffic Knowledge which, together w ith the Centre for Traffic Accidents, 
was later incorporated into the Transport Research Centre AVV. This 
enabled the M inistry of Transport to provide its own knowledge, w ith DVV 
coordinating the research (Ministerie van Verkeer en W aterstaat, 1991, p. 39 
and further). Between 1988 and 1990, the Ministry restricted the funding of 
and opportunities for SWOV (Mulder & Ederveen, 2002). According to the 
M inistry of Transport, SWOV needed to m aintain m ore of a distance and to 
provide more applied knowledge. Moreover, SWOV was expected to obtain 
a large part of its financing from assignments.
The above description of the considerable growth in the num ber of 
knowledge organisations researching road safety indicates that the 
knowledge netw ork had expanded. However, the policy netw ork rem ained 
more or less stable, although some new  interest groups were founded in this
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period. The activities of the action group Stop Child M urder, established as 
early as 1972, and from 1993 onw ards called the Council for Child Priority, 
and the Cyclist's Union founded in 1975, drew  attention to vulnerable road 
users in the National Plan for Road Safety of 1983 (Mulder & Ederveen,
2002). In addition to these two action groups, the Association for Traffic 
Victims was founded in 1995 as a contact platform  for fellow-sufferers.
The M inistry's ideas about the im plem entation of policy changed in this 
period. The M inistry of Transport em phasised the involvem ent of other 
levels of governm ent and interest groups in policy-making and 
im plem entation (Ministerie van Verkeer en W aterstaat, 1983, p. 5; 1991, p. 11 
and further). Several governmental levels and private organisations, mainly 
members of the Perm anent Contact Group Road Safety (PCGV), joined the 
realisation of the National Plan for Road Safety 1 (Ministerie van Verkeer en 
W aterstaat, 1983, p. 1 and 5). This PCGV became the Consultative Body Road 
Safety (OVV) in 1992, which was part of the Consultative Bodies of Traffic, 
Public Works and Water M anagem ent (OVW) (Bogaarts, Haans & Weyers-de 
Ruiter, 2003, p. 17). The Multi-year Road Safety Plans 1 and 2 (respectively 
Ministerie van Verkeer en W aterstaat, 1987, p. 5; Ministerie van Verkeer en 
W aterstaat, 1989, p. 8-11 and 35) indicated explicitly that policy m ust be 
im plem ented by all levels of government, interest groups, and trade and 
industry. The M inistry of Transport also included the same group of 
organisations, such as local governments, other ministries, VVN, ANWB, 
trade and industry, in the policy-making of the M ulti-year Road Safety 
Program me 4 (Ministerie van Verkeer en W aterstaat, 1996b, p. 5).
The national governm ent created conditions to enable the involvem ent of 
various actors in local policy-making. An example of this is the Regional 
Road Traffic Safety Authorities (ROVs) founded in each province in the 
Netherlands and focussing on road safety education, public information and 
enforcement (Ministerie van Verkeer en W aterstaat, 1987, p. 7). The ROVs 
consisted of delegates from the province, municipalities, police, the Public 
Prosecutor, VVN and on occasion, the Dutch Cyclists' Union. In addition, the 
M inistry developed a subsidy arrangem ent to make municipalities co-owner 
of the road safety problem  (Ministerie van Verkeer en W aterstaat, 1987, p. 9­
11). A subsidy was included in the MPV 1 (1987) as an elaboration of the 
quantitative target, of 25% fewer fatalities in 2000, set out in 1986. The 
subsidy arrangement, consisting of a starting prem ium  and a result 
prem ium , was intended for municipalities who complied w ith this target. 
The operation turned out to be very successful w ith 98% of the municipalities
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participating. It was, however, not possible to establish the effects of this 
subsidy on the road safety figures scientifically (Wegman, Van Selm & 
Herweijer, 1991).
4.3.4. 1995-2010: The decentralisation of authority and implementation 
Time line
Figure 4.6. Numbers of traffic fatalities and road safety expenditure of the Ministry of 
Transport between 1995 and 2010. Sources: Ministry of Transport and CBS.
The figure shows a slow but steady decrease in the num ber of traffic fatalities 
to about 750 over recent years. The num ber of traffic fatalities for the year 
2010 was not yet available at the m om ent of writing. Up to 2002, the expenses 
of the Ministry of Transport on road safety rem ained stable, while in 2003 a 
sudden increase in expenses occurred. The budget did not reveal the exact 
reason of this increase, other than the fact that the increase was spent on 
subsidies to road safety organisations. The increase in expenses for road 
safety from 2007 onw ards was caused by two changes. Firstly, the M inistry's 
Inspection expenses were booked onto the road safety budget from this year 
onwards, whereas they had been booked onto a separate budget previously. 
Secondly, education and information expenses increased.
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Content of the knowledge-policy arrangement
Several developm ents revealed that road safety as an integral part of traffic 
and transport policy had become more im portant during this period. Road 
safety for example was a prom inent issue in the draft National Traffic and 
Transport Plan (Ministerie van Verkeer en W aterstaat, 2001) and in the 
Mobility Policy Document (Ministerie van Verkeer en W aterstaat, 2005b). 
The M inistry of Transport also extended the definition of road safety to 
safety in general by combining the road safety texts w ith texts on rail, tram, 
metro, m arine transport, inland navigation, air traffic, tunnels, transport of 
dangerous substances and the protection of vital traffic and transport (safety 
issues) (Ministerie van Verkeer en W aterstaat, 2005b, p. 85 and further). Road 
safety seemed to have almost disappeared within this broad definition. A 
separate Strategic Plan Road Safety, which nevertheless designated 
integrality as one of the basic ideas of the plan and also looked at how  road 
safety was tackled in other areas, was draw n up  in 2008 (Ministerie van 
Verkeer en W aterstaat, 2008, p. 10, 40, 46 and further). As in previous 
national road safety plans, SWOV and other knowledge was used in the 
Strategic Plan, although this time with the help of Parliament. A m onth 
before the submission of the Strategic plan to Parliament, Parliam ent asked 
the Minister to adjust the quantitative target for road safety from a m aximum 
of 580 to 500 road deaths in 2020, on the basis of SWOV research, claiming 
that this was possible within the given policy (Aarts et al., 2008; Tweede 
Kamer, 2008b). The Minister agreed and was supported by a study from the 
M inistry itself (Schepers et al., 2008; Tweede Kamer, 2008a).
In 2005, SWOV published Advancing Sustainable Safety: National Road 
Safety Outlook for 2005-2020 (Wegman & Aarts, 2006; W egman & Aarts, 
2005). This update  of the Sustainable Safety vision attracted attention at a 
national (Aarts, 2005) and regional (Slinger, 2006) level. A lthough it is 
unknow n w hether this was its purpose, the publication probably helped to 
keep road safety (and Sustainable Safety in particular) on the agenda as a 
separate subject.
In the late 1990s, besides the usual system-oriented discussions, the topic of 
'guilt' and accident proneness obtained renewed attention in the road safety 
discourse. This was expressed by an increasing num ber of publications on 
aggression in traffic. In the 1970s few Dutch research reports were published 
on this subject, com pared with approximately 20 from the late 1990s 
onwards. The subject was m entioned in the draft National Traffic and 
Transport Plan, probably on the initiative of the ANWB that called for
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attention to traffic ethics (Bax, 2001, p. 46 en 56; 2006, p. 29 en 50). This 
indicates a return to the doctrine of the driver as causal factor within the road 
safety system, but is also reminiscent of the discourse around the time of the 
Second W orld War w hen drivers were considered unsafe and aggressive. In 
more m odern terms these drivers are called 'traffic louts'; a simple Google 
search renders 32.000 hits on this term  (in Dutch: verkeershufters, search on 
31/01/2010), and there is even a website bearing that name.
Organisation of the knowledge-policy arrangement
W ithin road safety policy, from the mid-1990s onwards, there has been 
serious interest in decentralisation, the transfer of road safety tasks and 
competencies to lower levels of governments, as the developm ents below 
illustrate. In 1994 the national and lower levels of governm ent signed the 
Decentralisation Agreem ent (Ministerie van Verkeer en W aterstaat, 
Interprovinciaal Overleg IPO & Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten 
VNG, 1994), in which the decentralisation of road safety policy was laid 
down. This agreem ent stipulates that national, regional and local 
governments share responsibility for road safety and provinces are prim arily 
responsible for the coordination of road safety policy in their province by 
initiating adm inistrative consultations. At about the same time, in 1996, the 
so-called VERDI Agreement (Ministerie van Verkeer en W aterstaat, 1996a) 
was signed. The VERDI Agreement defined the responsibilities of the various 
levels of governm ent in traffic and transport policy and stressed the 
decentralisation trend. Another new  decentralised rule was the introduction 
of the 'M ulder Law' (officially the Law on Legal Adm inistrative Enforcement 
of Traffic Regulations, WAHV) in 1992. Municipalities could settle small 
traffic offences adm inistratively by issuing an adm inistrative fine. The 
revenue, however, w ent to the national government, yet it d id  give 
municipalities an instrum ent to set priorities in traffic enforcement. Finally, a 
covenant Start-up Program m e Sustainable Safety (Ministerie van Verkeer en 
W aterstaat, 1997) was draw n up  for the im plem entation of Sustainable Safety 
in 1996. In this covenant it was agreed that local governments w ould receive 
funds earm arked for specific Sustainable Safety measures. A lthough this 
Program me stim ulated the im plem entation of road safety, the earm arking of 
funds still m ade this a fairly centralised policy. In general, all of these 
agreements, laws and covenants stressed the transfer of responsibilities for 
policy to provinces and city regions and for im plem entation to municipalities 
and regional w ater authorities, although it is questionable w hether the Start­
up  Program me should be regarded as a form of decentralisation. Evaluations
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of these agreements show that this decentralisation took some time to 
become effective (Berndsen et al., 1997; Terlouw et al., 2001).
Another change in this period was the allocation of subsidies. Between 1997 
and 2002 the Ministry of Transport aw arded specific subsidies for the 
im plem entation of a num ber of specific (infrastructural) m easures into the 
fram ework of Sustainable Safety. In 2005 these earm arked road safety funds 
were transferred and completely em bedded in the Broad Goal-oriented 
Grant for traffic and transport (BDU) (Ministerie van Verkeer en W aterstaat, 
2005a), a manifest incorporation of road safety into traffic and transport 
policy. The new  financial arrangem ent gave provinces and city regions more 
policy discretion in their spending. Furthermore, the arrangem ent m ade 
provinces and city regions responsible for the possible passing on of 
subsidies to municipalities and regional w ater authorities and thus 
constituted a decentralisation of responsibilities.
In the previous period, the involvem ent of different actors in the making of 
road safety policy at national and provincial level had already been 
discussed and practiced. In 1998, this existing practice was formally laid 
dow n in the Traffic and Transport Planning Law (S.N., 1998). This law 
stipulated that in draw ing up  a traffic and transport plan (e.g. the National 
Traffic and Transport Plan and the Mobility Policy Document) local 
governments m ust be consulted in any case. W hat is more, the Planning Law 
suddenly drew  attention to a long 'forgotten' road authority, the regional 
w ater authorities. The Ministry of Transport also consulted the public as well 
as the knowledge field (Bax, 2001; 2006). Also, the cooperation between the 
different layers of government, interest groups and m arket agencies was 
taken as a starting point in the im plem entation of the National Traffic and 
Transport Plan and the Mobility Policy Document (e.g. in the Strategic Plan 
Road Safety) (Ministerie van Verkeer en W aterstaat, 2005b, p. 89; 2006b, p. 19 
and further; 2008, p. 8, 40-46, 61-62). A new  actor involved in policy-making 
was Team Alert, a small group of young people brought together in 2000 on 
the initiative of the Minister of Transport. Team Alert represents the interests 
of young people in policy processes and initiates public information 
campaigns for this age group.
The European Union, too, has been engaged in road safety policy since 2001. 
In previous years, the EU focussed m ainly on vehicle requirem ents and 
professional driving time legislation. In 2001, it set a quantitative task onto 
road safety. In the W hite Book (European Commission, 2001), the European
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Commission expressed its ambition to reduce the num ber of casualties by 
50% by 2010. The Commission emphasised that the member states were 
reluctant to introduce m easures at communal level. It saw only opportunities 
for the exchange of best practices. Furthermore, research on road safety was 
stimulated, usually as part of research projects on traffic and transport. In
2003, the Action Program m e (Commissie van de Europese Gemeenschappen,
2003) containing specific road safety measures was published.
Not only the granting of subsidies, but also the organisation of the 
knowledge field indicates that road safety was integrated into the broader 
traffic and transport policy. In 1997, the Road Safety Board was dissolved 
(S.N., 1997) and policy recomm endations were assigned to the broader 
Advisory Council for Transport, Public Works and Water M anagement 
(Ministerie van Verkeer en W aterstaat, 1996b). In 1999, a new  Transportation 
Safety Board was set up  (S.N., 1999a). This Board not only investigated road 
traffic accidents, but also railway accidents, air accidents, and inland 
navigation accidents. In 2005 the nam e Transportation Safety Board was 
changed to the Dutch Safety Board and in addition to accidents, its field of 
activity was extended to disasters and to policy fields other than transport, 
such as construction, industry, health care, defence and crisis coordination 
(S.N., 2004). In addition, the Consultative Body Road Safety (OVV) was 
integrated into the Consultative Body Passenger Transport, which advised 
not only on road safety, but on passenger transport in general (S.N., 2005a).
The integration of the knowledge interm ediaries into traffic and transport 
became visible som ewhat later than in the road safety policy field. As the 
developm ents discussed below show, some knowledge interm ediaries 
continued to focus on road safety as a separate issue. Two knowledge 
organisations, em bedded in the traffic and transport field, were the 
knowledge platform CROW, for infrastructure, traffic, transport, and public 
space, founded in 1987 (CROW, 2007a, p. 7) and the knowledge platform 
VERDI (Ministerie van Verkeer en W aterstaat, 1996a), founded in 1997 for 
the im plem entation of the VERDI Agreement. Also in this period, there were 
two organisations that focussed on road safety: KEVER (Knowledge 
Infrastructure Road Safety), founded in 1996 (Methorst & Hofman, 2001, p. 
4), and the Infopoint Sustainable Safety, founded in 1998.
KEVER and the Infopoint Sustainable Safety were a result of the 
Decentralisation Agreement. KEVER fulfilled the national governm ent's 
facilitating role in knowledge dissemination and targeted municipalities and
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provinces, for gathering and spreading (local) road safety knowledge. 
Evaluations showed that KEVER was not very well-known nor supported by 
the regional and local governments (Methorst & Hofman, 2001; Terlouw et 
al., 2001, p. 55). The Infopoint Sustainable Safety, on the contrary, served as a 
centre for queries for road safety professionals (Ministerie van Verkeer en 
W aterstaat, 1997) and was well-known by regional and local governments 
(Terlouw et al., 2001, p. 55).
However, soon afterwards these knowledge interm ediaries were integrated 
into broader knowledge organisations. KEVER and the Infopoint Sustainable 
Safety were abandoned in 2000 (Methorst & Hofman, 2001, p. 1) and 
incorporated into the broader CROW in 2004 respectively (CROW, 2010). 
Also in 2004, the knowledge platform VERDI was given the new  nam e KpVV 
(Transport Knowledge Resource Centre) (Weijermars & Van Schagen, 2009, 
p. 33) and joined CROW in 2009 (KpVV, 2010a).
As of the mid1990s, the M inistry of Transport became increasingly critical of 
how  the knowledge infrastructure tied in w ith policy. The knowledge 
infrastructure was organised at a national level w hereas policy was 
decentralised to a considerable extent (Ministerie van Verkeer en W aterstaat, 
1996b, p. 11 and 38). In 1996, the M ulti-year Road Safety Program m e 4 w ent 
as far as to describe this fragm entation in the knowledge infrastructure as a 
serious road safety bottleneck (Ministerie van Verkeer en W aterstaat, 1996b, 
p. 9 and 11). Among other things, this dissatisfaction was responsible for a 
repositioning of SWOV in the knowledge field and for new  rules of play 
from 1999 onwards. The organisation dow nsized and no longer accepted 
commercial commissions because of EU regulation (S.N., 1999b). At the 
request of the M inistry of Transport the organisation focussed on 
fundam ental, innovative and strategic research and on the dissem ination of 
the information among professionals (Mulder & Ederveen, 2002, p. 37). 
However, the M inistry of Transport did not m aintain this detached role and 
asked SWOV almost immediately, in 2000, to calculate the costs of the draft 
National Traffic and Transport Plan (Schoon, W esemann & Roszbach, 2000).
4.4. The present knowledge-policy arrangement
This section discusses the present Dutch knowledge-policy arrangement. It 
provides a context for subsequent chapters on the use of knowledge, and 
presents possible barriers to knowledge use. The knowledge-policy 
arrangem ent is described using the four dimensions of the policy
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arrangem ent approach: actors, rules, resources and discourse. The role of 
road safety knowledge providers and policy actors, as well as current 
discourses among knowledge and policy actors are discussed. The rules of 
interaction, the dem ands, possibilities and budgets of policy actors are also 
covered.
The information used in this section is derived from annual reports, websites 
and overview publications (such as Bogaarts, Haans & W eyers-de Ruiter, 
2003; Heijkamp & Kraay, 2001) from the organisations discussed below. 
A lthough an information search of websites and reports was conducted into 
the nature and resources of each actor, these references were not included in 
the text for two reasons. The first reason is that the text in this section is not a 
literal reproduction of the sources, but an interpretation based on the 
referred sources and on research experience. Secondly, including the 
reference w ould affect the readability of the text, since at least one reference 
w ould appear in each sentence. Therefore, explicit references have been 
included in the text only w hen the source is not obvious.
4.4.1. Actors
Five main groups of actors involved in road safety can be distinguished: 
governments, knowledge organisations, interest groups, m arket agencies and 
the general public.
There are several levels of governm ent responsible for road safety policies. 
Next to their role as policy-makers, national government, provinces, 
municipalities and some regional w ater authorities are also responsible for 
the construction and m aintenance of roads within their boundaries. Chapters 
6 to 8 discuss provinces and municipalities in their role of road authority and 
investigate how  they use knowledge in decisions about infrastructure. At 
different levels, governm ent determines the frameworks for road safety 
policy. The European Union outlines the policy of its member states on some 
subjects, e.g. vehicle requirem ents and driving time legislation. The Dutch 
M inistry of Infrastructure determines national policy fram eworks for traffic 
and transport policy and for road safety in particular, for example the target 
for 2020 being a m axim um  of 500 fatalities. Provinces and city regions are 
responsible for their own provincial and regional policy, but also have a 
directive role in m unicipal road safety policy and m unicipal coordination. 
One of their instrum ents employed in this directive role is the distribution of 
BDU among municipalities and regional w ater authorities. City regions 
themselves do not own roads. Municipalities make their own municipal
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policy and can subsidise local road safety projects. This also applies to the six 
road owning regional w ater authorities.
Furthermore, the M inistry of Infrastructure is responsible for the financing of 
national campaigns and for granting driving licenses through the Dutch 
Driving Test Organisation (CBR). The M inistry of Security and Justice is 
responsible for enforcing traffic rules and imposing fines, among other 
things. The enforcement is carried out by the Bureau Traffic Enforcement of 
the Public Prosecution Service (BVOM), police enforcement being the 
responsibility of the M inistry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations.
Many different organisations develop and disseminate road safety 
knowledge. The Centre for Transport and Navigation (DVS) of the Ministry 
of Infrastructure carries out policy related road safety research. SWOV 
provides scientific road safety research on all sorts of road safety topics, for a 
large part on road user behaviour, infrastructure and accident statistics, and 
provides for the dissemination among road safety professionals. The Dutch 
Safety Board occasionally investigates traffic accidents and their causes. 
Universities carry out road safety studies from a psychological, behavioural 
or infrastructural perspective on a regular basis. Various sections of TNO 
conduct research into road safety w ith respect to infrastructure, vehicle 
technology and hum an behaviour.
Two organisations convert research into practice and disseminate 
knowledge. Together w ith local, provincial and national government, 
interest groups and consultancies, CROW develops, controls and 
disseminates practical guidelines for road safety measures on roads. KpVV, 
an independent division of CROW, is responsible for disseminating, amongst 
others, road safety knowledge to local governments. In addition to the 
above-mentioned knowledge organisations, several private consultancies 
w ork in the road safety field, although according to their websites, m ost are 
not aimed at road safety exclusively, but focus on traffic and transport- 
related policy in general.
The nam es of the various interest groups indicate clear specialisations. The 
best-known general road safety interest group is VVN, which, w ith its 
regional and local departm ents, organises public information campaigns, 
education and consultation with governm ent at all levels. The ANWB 
supports road safety on a regular basis, mostly in consultative bodies at a 
national level. The Association for Traffic Victims prom otes the interests of
82
people involved in a traffic accident and their families and is a platform  for 
contact between fellow-sufferers. Im proving road safety is one of its 
objectives and its Accident Causes Committee investigates traffic dangers. 
Team Alert represents the interests of young people and provides them  with 
information. Occasionally, the Cyclist's Union, the union for the elderly 
ANBO and the transport interest groups TLN and EVO devote attention to 
road safety in relation to their own specific interests.
In the Netherlands, the m ain m arket agencies consist of owners of driving 
schools, transport businesses, bicycle and m oped m anufacturers and sellers, 
car sellers organised in BOVAG and RAI, and insurance companies 
organised in the Dutch Association of Insurers. At the EU level, car 
manufacturers, as well as m anufacturers of traffic safety systems, such as 
navigation systems, advanced cruise control and alcolock devices, are part of 
the road safety field.
Finally, the general public is involved in road safety policy. They can 
influence policy through formal and informal opportunities for public 
comment. At a local level, they are sometimes organised in area or 
neighbourhood committees.
4.4.2. Rules
In the Traffic and Transport Planning Law, some explicit rules are laid dow n 
for interaction between the governments in the road safety field. This Law 
determines that the 'essential parts' of the National Traffic and Transport 
Plan m ust be included in the provincial and regional traffic and transport 
plans. For road safety, these are texts on road safety targets in particular 
(Ministerie van Verkeer en W aterstaat, 2005b, p. 20). The Provincial and 
Regional Traffic and Transport Plans can, in return, dictate binding 
conditions w ith respect to m unicipal traffic and transport policy. 
Furthermore, it is a statuary regulation (Roads Law (Wegenwet), S.N., 1930, 
art. 15) that each road authority is responsible for the maintenance of its own 
roads, which implies that the State cannot tell a province, nor can a province 
tell a m unicipality which measures are to be taken on provincial or municipal 
roads respectively.
The Mobility Policy Document (Ministerie van Verkeer en W aterstaat, 2005b) 
provides a rule of thum b for the relationship between the various 
governm ent levels: local if possible, central if necessary. In principle, this 
represents a far-reaching decentralisation, although there are regularly
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discussions about the issue of 'possible and necessary'. The Mobility Policy 
Document safety target for 2020 has been form ulated quantitatively, but not 
reaching the target has no consequences, either at a national, or at a local 
level.
Finally, there are some rules for arranging fixed times for consultation in 
addition to the consultations m entioned in the Traffic and Transport 
Planning Law. Various interest groups confer on the Ministry of 
Infrastructure's policy in the Consultative Body Passenger Transport. Road 
safety is one of the issues. At a provincial level, the standard consultation 
structures differ between provinces. Some have a Regional Road Traffic 
Safety Authority, which mainly discusses education and enforcement. In 
addition to the province, VVN, the D epartm ent of Public Prosecutions, the 
police executive and municipalities are members of this authority. Other 
provinces have a broader Traffic and Transport Consultation w ith road 
safety as one of several subjects. Yet others m eet to discuss the distribution of 
the BDU subsidies among sub-regions. The associations of Dutch provinces 
and city regions organise meetings about road safety for their members. The 
m unicipal level often has a traffic committee to discuss road and road safety 
problem s w ith police, VVN and the Cyclists' Union. Governments are 
obliged by law to involve citizens in their policy-making. It is a legal 
requirem ent that traffic decisions be m ade public to enable objections and 
appeals to be lodged. Most governments try to prevent objections by 
informing or involving citizens before the policy-making process is closed.
Rules for interaction between knowledge organisations, on the contrary, 
seem to be lacking, or at the very least, are not formalised. For example, few 
rules exist for the dem arcation between different organisations. However, 
there are general rules for subsidising the knowledge producing 
organisations (S.N., 1985; 1986; 1999b; 2005b), for instance those prohibiting 
the deploym ent of m arket activities for those organisations financed largely 
by subsidies (e.g. SWOV and KpVV). These subsidy conditions also grant the 
subsidiser (the national governm ent for SWOV and TNO, and the regional 
and local governments for KVPP) a say in the research topics. In fact, the 
above formal and informal rules have resulted in a more or less spontaneous 
division of tasks and specialisations among the knowledge organisations.
4.4.3. Resources
Each governm ent can use its own financial resources to realise road safety 
policy, and indeed this is done in practice. However, the actual am ount of
84
spending involved is unclear. Funds for traffic and transport are passed from 
national to provincial and regional governments through the BDU. The 
provinces and city regions can distribute this subsidy among their 
municipalities. The subsidy, or a part of it, can be spent on road safety, but 
this is not compulsory. Furthermore, the M inistry of Infrastructure subsidises 
several road safety organisations, for example VVN, Team Alert, the 
Association for Traffic Victims, the Cyclist's Union and knowledge 
organisations such as SWOV and TNO. KpVV is financed through the BDU. 
The Dutch Safety Board is supported by the M inistry of the Interior and 
Kingdom Relations. CROW is funded entirely through externally financed 
projects and book sales. ANWB is also not subsidised and receives its funds 
from mem bership dues, commercial activities and semi-commercial activities 
such as placing road signs and m aintaining them.
In addition to financial means, other resources, such as m anpow er and 
knowledge or expertise, are available to the actors. It is not easy to indicate 
how  m any people w ithin the various levels of governm ent w ork with road 
safety. At a national and provincial level some positions are exclusively 
aimed at road safety, but in addition there are m any positions in which road 
safety is only part of the job. Exact num bers are therefore not available. It can 
generally be said that the national governm ent has the largest num ber of 
posts requiring specialist expertise in road safety, approximately 60 fte (full­
time equivalent) including the executive body Rijkswaterstaat, at a provincial 
level som ewhat fewer, and very few to none at all at a municipal level and in 
regional water authorities. Road safety is m entioned in none of the 
organisation charts of the M inistry of Infrastructure, the provinces or city 
regions, indicating that road safety is not a separate division. The same is 
true of municipalities.
The sizes of the interest groups differ a great deal. The ANWB is by far the 
largest professional organisation w ith approximately 4000 fte, but the vast 
majority of these posts do not focus on road safety. As is the case at the 
various levels of government, road safety is not m entioned in its organisation 
chart. VVN has 70 employees and a large num ber of volunteers (4500). The 
Cyclist's Union has 30 employees and 1500 volunteers and, like the ANWB, 
does not focus on road safety alone. As far as could be detected, Team Alert 
and the Association for Traffic Victims consist exclusively of volunteers.
The knowledge organisations are not of equal size either. SWOV has 
approximately 60 employees who are concerned exclusively w ith road safety
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research. Only a small num ber of those employed by the knowledge 
organisations TNO, KpVV, the Dutch Safety Board and CROW, and by 
several universities, work on road safety, and sometimes even then for only a 
part of their working hours. Road safety is not m entioned in the organisation 
charts of KpVV and CROW. The Dutch Safety Board has a separate division 
for road transport, whose rem it is studying road accidents. A lthough TNO 
has a separate subdivision for Transport Safety that concentrates on freight 
transport, road safety is not specifically m entioned in its organisational chart.
The am ount and kind of expertise each of the above organisations has 
available is difficult to express numerically. Generally, it can be assum ed that 
the more employees within an organisation are occupied w ith road safety 
exclusively or for a substantial part of their time, the more expertise the 
organisation will have. Consequently, the national governm ent will generally 
have more road safety expertise than a small m unicipality and SWOV will 
have more road safety expertise than KpVV. Not only the am ount of 
expertise is im portant, but also the kind of expertise. An impression of the 
expertise of the different knowledge organisations was given above (see 
Section 4.4.2 on Rules).
4.4.4. Discourses
W hen reviewing road safety literature, three im portant debates can be 
distinguished. Two of these discuss the content of the policy, the substantial 
discourse. The third theme concerns the governance discourse, a debate 
about the division of the tasks and authorities among the different 
governments, the m arket and civil society. The three debates are concerned 
with:
1. Strategic interventions such as infrastructural, behavioural and vehicle 
measures, and their costs and effects.
2. The dem arcation between road safety and other policy issues e.g. traffic 
flow and environment, and w hether or not to use an integral approach 
in m aking a particular choice.
3. The organisation of the policy, such as the directive role of provinces.
These them es are also present in the recent national Strategic Plan Road 
Safety (2008) and the Mobility Policy Document (2005). The three most 
im portant pillars of the Strategic Plan are Sustainable Safety, an integral 
approach, and cooperation between the various levels of governm ent and 
with civil society and the m arket (Ministerie van Verkeer en W aterstaat, 
2008, p. 10). The Mobility Policy Document cites the 'integral approach' as the
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m ost im portant strategy (Ministerie van Verkeer en W aterstaat, 2005b, p. 87). 
Mainly as a result of the Planning Law, the discourse is uniform  within 
different levels of government: the provinces and city regions include the 
m ain ideas from the Mobility Policy Document and the Strategic Plan in their 
Provincial and Regional Traffic and Transport Plans respectively.
In the first debate, that on road safety strategies, there is consensus between 
the knowledge and policy w orlds on the relative im portance of issues. It 
appears there has always been wide consensus about using the term  road 
safety to denote the safety of road traffic, and about the objective of the 
policy: the reduction of the num ber of fatalities and serious road injuries. The 
system-oriented approach dom inates road safety measures, at least in policy 
documents, and is aim ed at making the traffic system as a whole (road, 
vehicle, man) safer. However the moralising, expressed in term s such as 
'traffic louts', 'own fault', 'own responsibility' and 'multiple offenders', 
surfaces frequently, in policy discourse rather than in road safety knowledge 
discourse. The consensus on the relative im portance of issues does not only 
exist between the governmental layers, which is illustrated by the adoption 
of the discourse of the Mobility Policy Document in Provincial and Regional 
Road Safety Plans (for instance Provincie Gelderland, 2005, p. 10; Provincie 
Limburg, 2006, p. 5 and 2-1). It also seems to be present among governm ent 
and knowledge organisations. This is illustrated by the fact that the Strategic 
Plan Road Safety 2008-2020 nam es Sustainable Safety explicitly as one of the 
three pillars of policy (Ministerie van Verkeer en W aterstaat, 2008, p. 10).
Contrary to the consensus described above, there is disagreem ent on 
im portant details, particularly w ith regard to im plem entation and the 
opportunities for custom-made solutions. Each actor has his own preferred 
discourse and strategy. Governments often consider infrastructural measures 
expensive and prefer to adapt m easures to their own conditions (Bax & 
Jagtman, 2008; Boer, Grimmius & Schoenmakers, 2008; Mesken, Aarts & Vis, 
2010, p. 16). Interest groups generally concentrate on m easures such as public 
information and education. Members of the public generally dislike speed 
reducing m easures such as speed hum ps and the noise from rum ble strips 
(Bax et al., 2008). Knowledge organisations therefore, research all of these 
m easures and often also study the costs and effects. A lthough both national 
and regional levels are interested in this approach, regional and local 
governments have their doubts about the validity of the effect estimates, 
especially for local purposes (Bax, Elvik & Veisten, 2009). These differences
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in discourse between the provincial government, knowledge field and the 
general public are discussed in detail in Chapters 6 and 7.
The second debate, on the dem arcation between road safety and other policy 
issues such as traffic flow and environment, has been conducted largely in 
the policy world, but not only among road safety actors. On the contrary, the 
debates take place in those other arenas where accessibility, environment, 
spatial planning and urban developm ent are discussed. This has led to road 
safety increasingly being integrated into the subject of traffic and transport, 
w ithin the discourse and policy at different governm ent levels (see for 
instance Ministerie van Verkeer en W aterstaat, 2001; 2005b; Provincie 
Flevoland, 2006, p. 9; Provincie Gelderland, 2005; Provincie Groningen, 2005, 
p. 7). As yet, it is not clear w hether or not this is advantageous to road safety. 
Unlike governments, knowledge organisations and interest groups often 
rem ain specialised in road safety, or, if they are m ore broadly oriented, 
consider road safety as a separate subject among their activities (see for 
instance the CROW, 2010 site; and the KpVV, 2010b site). To illustrate this, a 
search was carried out on the topic of integration of road safety into traffic 
and transport policy in the SWOV library. The search was conducted using 
variations on the w ord integration (integratie / integra* / integreren / 
geintegreerd) in combination with the w ords road safety and traffic 
(verkeersveiligheid and verkeer) in all search fields. This revealed very few 
studies. In Chapter 7, an experimental setting is used to observe how  
provinces conduct this debate about balancing road safety w ith other 
interests.
The third debate concentrates on which actors make and im plem ent road 
safety policy. The recent shift in steering road safety policy-making from a 
national to a regional governmental level has introduced discussions about 
the exact interpretation of the directive role of the provinces (Mesken, Aarts 
& Vis, 2010). A num ber of issues arise, for example the extent to which 
provinces should or can design a typical provincial road safety policy and 
w hether they should stick to national priorities. Furtherm ore, provinces and 
municipalities discuss the possibility and desirability of a directive versus a 
facilitating role for provinces tow ards municipalities. Part of this discussion, 
especially on the regional and local level, is how  to involve actors in the 
policy-making process to gain their support and to minimise the 
inconveniences of road safety measures w ithout losing out on the effect. 
Chapter 8 investigates w hether and how  municipalities involve different 
interested parties such as neighbouring municipalities, emergency services,
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public transport and people living and w orking in the area in their road 
safety policy-making.
4.5. Analysis and conclusions
In this section, the historical analysis of road safety knowledge and policy, 
set out in the previous section, is followed by an analysis of the historical 
developm ents in the knowledge-policy arrangement. The chapter concludes 
w ith three possible institutional barriers to knowledge use in road safety 
policy.
4.5.1. Historical developments in the four dimensions of the 
knowledge-policy arrangement
Actors
Three developm ents are discussed: developm ents in the num ber and in the 
kind of actors involved in different periods, and the diversity of knowledge 
organisations.
Development w ith regard to the num ber of actors involved is fairly linear; 
there is an increase over time, especially up  to the year 2000, after which a 
small num ber of interest groups m erged w ith one another, as did some 
knowledge organisations.
Secondly, during each of the four periods, different actors played a 
prom inent role. Besides the government, these were organisations from civil 
society and the knowledge field. In the first period, from 1900 to 1945, civil 
society organisations, the ANWB in particular, were responsible for the 
developm ent of road safety knowledge and policy. The second period, 
particularly from 1965 to 1975, was characterised by the primacy of science 
and an extensive use of science in policy. Knowledge organisations such as 
SWOV and the Dutch Road Safety Board had a great deal of influence on 
policy. From 1975 to 1995, the M inistry of Transport determ ined the road 
safety agenda producing huge quantities of policy documents. In the fourth 
period, from 1995 to 2010, the regional and local governments have been the 
m ost prom inent actors, w ith increased responsibilities and powers.
Thirdly, this chapter shows a great diversity in knowledge organisations. The 
position of a num ber of knowledge organisations requires further 
explanation. The Dutch Road Safety Board provided the governm ent w ith
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science-based policy advice. This type of organisation, in which governments 
ask scientists to advise them  on specific issues by participating in advisory 
groups, is characterised by Jasanoff (1994) as 'Fifth branch' organisations. 
SWOV is an organisation that focuses on applicable scientific knowledge on 
road safety issues. It is a m ulti-disciplinary organisation employing, for 
example, psychologists and civil engineers as well as statisticians. Users, 
particularly the M inistry of Transport, test the usefulness of the knowledge 
regularly. W ith its focus on applicable knowledge, m ulti-disciplinarity and 
testing for usefulness, the organisation can be characterised to some extent as 
a Mode 2 organisation (Nowotny, Scott & Gibbons, 2001). However, SWOV 
operates only partly in the kind of horizontal netw ork of private and 
government-related knowledge organisations that Nowotny et al. envisage. 
Due to the subsidy regulations, SWOV's agenda is partly  determ ined by the 
M inistry of Transport. These characteristics are more in line w ith the 
dem and-pull m odel designed by Landry et al. and w ith H oppe's engineering 
model.
Finally, several universities, for example in Groningen, Delft, Twente and 
Eindhoven, carry out road safety research. Their academic context and their 
high degree of specialisation in specific disciplines of road safety research are 
clear features of Mode 1 organisations.
As far as the relationship between the knowledge organisations themselves is 
concerned, some conclusions can be drawn. The first conclusion is that the 
collaboration between knowledge organisations such as the ANWB, SWOV, 
TNO and the Road Safety Board in forming m utual agreements and in the 
organisation of congresses presupposes frequent contacts between them. 
Furtherm ore, the frequent involvem ent of these organisations in policy­
m aking processes points to close contacts between knowledge institutions 
and policy-makers. Moreover, there appears to be an extensive use of 
knowledge in policy documents. A lthough it is impossible to investigate all 
of the steps on the Knott and W ildavsky (1980) ladder of knowledge use in 
the analysis, this requiring an extensive process analysis of specific policy 
processes, the reference to information in policy plans ('reference') is 
manifest. Examples abound:
• The use of a SWOV report in the first Road Safety M em orandum  in 
1967;
• The use of SWOV's definition of road safety as multi-conditional in the 
Policy Plans for Road Safety 1975 and 1983;
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• The use of SWOV's quantitative basis for road safety m easures in the 
Policy Plan for Road Safety in 1983;
• The call by the Road Safety Board to consider the cost-effectiveness of 
road safety measures, used in the National Plan Road Safety 2 in 1985;
• The use of quantitative targets recom m ended by the Road Safety Board 
in the Multi-year Road Safety Plan 1 in 1987;
• The use of the concept Sustainable Safety (developed by SWOV and 
others) in the Multi-year Road Safety Plan 3 in 1991;
• The use of cost-effectiveness data calculated by SWOV, of the 
Advancing Sustainable Safety vision and of the adaptation of the road 
safety target for 2020 in the Mobility Policy Document in 2006 and the 
Strategic Plan Road Safety in 2008.
Furtherm ore, the above-mentioned policy plans m ade occasional reference to 
reports from TNO, private consultancies such as McKinsey, Traffic Test and 
Berenschot, and to international organisations such as the W orld Health 
Organization (WHO) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD).
Rules
Two types of rules can be observed. In the first place, there are rules for the 
participation of interest groups and regional and local governments in 
national policy-making. In the fifties and sixties, the early days of policy­
making, participation was possible through the Perm anent Committee Road 
Traffic Safety. In the seventies and eighties, participation occurred through 
the Perm anent Contact Group Road Safety (PCGV), in the nineties through 
the Consultative Body Road Safety (OVV) and recently, since 2005, through 
the Consultative Body Passenger Transport (OPV). Through these bodies, the 
national governm ent has involved interest groups in the m aking of road 
safety plans since the first National Plan Road Safety in 1983. Since the 
developm ent of the concept National Traffic and Transport Plan in 2001, the 
involvem ent of interest groups has been further intensified, w ith m arket and 
civil society also involved in the policy.
The second type of rule that can be observed concerns financial rulings, 
initially, in relation to the national road safety budget. Since the mid1980s, 
specific subsidies for regional and local governments were added, at first 
occasionally and connected to projects such as the Action -25%, but later on a 
more structural basis as part of the Bundled Goal-oriented Grant (GDU). 
From 2005 onwards, the financial rules changed drastically w hen earm arked 
funds were abolished and provinces and city regions received the traffic and
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transport-oriented BDU, and road safety budgets were integrated into the 
traffic and transport budgets.
Resources
Resources are defined as the availability of funding, m anpow er and 
knowledge. Two developm ents are discussed: the am ount of resources and 
the allocation of resources among the actors.
The am ount of resources for road safety has increased greatly since the 1960s. 
In this study, the national road safety budgets of the Ministry of Transport 
received the m ost attention (see Figures 4.2-4.6). It can be assum ed justifiably 
that these budgets do not only reflect the am ount of m oney spent on road 
safety, but are also an indication of the am ount of energy, m anpower, and 
policy efforts expended. Regarding the increase in road safety knowledge, a 
study of international publications on road safety in reputable journals 
shows an uninterrupted  and steep increase in knowledge production, from 
approximately 50 publications in total in the period 1900-1945 to about 1500 
annually in 2009 (Hagenzieker, Bijleveld & Comm andeur, forthcoming).
The second developm ent shows a shift in the allocation of these resources. 
From the 1980s, but particularly from 1995, the regional and local 
governments were given wider powers. Due to the Start-up Programme 
Sustainable Safety and later through the BDU, the regional and local 
governments gained access to an increased road safety budget. A shift in 
m anpow er on a decentralised level has not been investigated, but would 
seem to be evident. With the arrival of knowledge brokers such as KEVER, 
Infopoint Sustainable Safety and KVPP, decentralised and operational 
translations of centrally developed knowledge became available to regional 
and local governments.
Discourse
Shifts in substantial discourses, w ith respect to policy content, and to 
governance discourses, and as to which actors are involved in making and 
im plem enting policy, are discussed below.
Over the decades, the substantial road safety discourse has shown a num ber 
of shifts (OECD, 1997). Discussions about road safety were no longer single 
cause-oriented but system-oriented. Prior to W orld War II, road traffic 
accidents were generally considered to be one's own fault, the consequence 
of carelessness and inattention, and the cause assum ed to lie in hum an error
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and in particular accident prone personalities. After 1950, this changed to a 
single cause oriented, and from 1970 a multi-causal and system approach 
tow ards traffic accidents, in which man, vehicle and road each play 
im portant roles (Koornstra, 1986, p. 7; Kraay, 1989, p. 268). The developm ent 
of the Sustainable Safety vision can be seen as the climax of the system 
oriented approach. However, the 'own fault' theory and the accompanying 
'accident-proneness' theory have never really disappeared.
The governance discourse, too, changed over time. In the first half of the 20th 
century, civil society, represented by the ANWB, pu t road safety on the 
agenda. A road safety policy scarcely existed until the mid1960s. Then, the 
M inistry of Transport, on behalf of the national government, took the 
initiative in policy-making, using road safety concepts developed by, for 
example, SWOV and the Dutch Road Safety Board. Regional and local 
government, other ministries, civil society and the m arket were involved in 
this policy-making, but not in the implementation. From the mid1980s, the 
im plem entation of road safety policy became one of the tasks of provinces 
and municipalities. This was set out in the Decentralisation Agreem ent in
1994, the Traffic and Transport Planning Law in 1998 and the BDU in 2005. 
These laws granted regional and local governments authority and budgets 
for decentralised road safety policy. Furtherm ore, the involvem ent of the 
m arket and civil society has increased from the late 1990s to the present. This 
approach is seen in the developm ent of the Mobility Policy Document, the 
Road Safety Strategic Plan and the subsequent Action Programme. Market 
and interest groups have been involved in the developm ent of policy, often 
in lengthy initial phases, and in the plans, the im plem entation of part of the 
policy is attributed to companies and associations.
4.5.2. Historical developments further typified
In previous chapters some observations have been m ade about the relation 
between knowledge and policy. Various theories describing these relations 
were expounded in Chapter 2. The present section analyses the relations 
between knowledge and policy organisations by characterising the 
consecutive periods w ith the help of the typologies by Landry et al. and 
H oppe respectively. The typologies are not static labels, but heuristic 
instrum ents to indicate shifts, contradictions, strategic behaviour and 
institutional changes.
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1900-1945
In this period, very few activities in either road safety science or policy could 
be detected. Based on the absence of sources that indicate contact, it w ould 
appear that road safety science and policy operated separately (Kraay, 1989, 
p. 267). The typologies by H oppe and Landry et al. therefore are not 
applicable to the characterisation of this period.
1945-1975
This period is characterised by an increasing activity in science. Although the 
governm ent requested knowledge for the various policy plans, it seemed to 
be the knowledge organisations themselves that determ ined the actual 
research subjects. However, policy and knowledge organisations did  seem to 
share the same ideas about objectives and measures. This is indicated, for 
example, by the fact that SWOV's scientific ideas were adopted by policy in 
the first Road Safety M em orandum . These characteristics correspond to 
H oppe's technocratic model, in which there is no significant discrepancy 
between the worlds of science and policy, and science plays the prim ary role. 
The characteristics also correspond to the science push model by Landry et 
al., as science fulfils the role of objective knowledge provider, and policy that 
of knowledge consumer.
1975-1995
The situation sketched above appeared to continue in this period. By 
defining road safety as multi-conditional, calling for quantitative targets and 
the introduction of cost-effectiveness, and by developing the Sustainable 
Safety vision, SWOV and the Road Safety Board determ ined their own 
research agendas. These ideas were readily accepted in the national policy 
plans of 1975, 1983, 1985, 1987 and 1991. Furtherm ore, the knowledge field 
grew steadily and universities and consultancies also investigated road 
safety, resulting in the joint vision Sustainable Safety. These developm ents 
still contain characteristics of H oppe's technocratic model or the science push 
model by Landry et al., as they indicate the primacy of science to determine 
research subjects and stress the convergence between science and politics 
through the easy incorporation of research findings into policy plans.
At the same time, the national government, it w ould seem, attem pted to get 
to grips w ith the coordination of the knowledge production. To do so, the 
Policy Plan for Road Safety 1975 transferred the responsibility for the 
coordination of the knowledge production from SWOV to the Directorate- 
General for Road Safety DVV. From the 1990s onwards, the m inistry had its
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own knowledge departm ent, the Transport Research Centre AVV. 
Knowledge organisations had to conduct research by assignment. These 
efforts on the part of the national governm ent to obtain guidance and 
transfer knowledge tasks to a governm ent body point tow ards H oppe's 
bureaucratic model, as they show a primacy of politics over science. They 
also point tow ards the dem and pull model by Landry et al., as the national 
governm ent determ ined the research coordination. One characteristic of this 
period that does not fit into H oppe's bureaucratic model, however, is the fact 
that the national governm ent does not provide for all knowledge activities. 
Research is also perform ed by universities and consultancies. The 
governm ent supervises all applied knowledge tasks, such as research 
specifically intended for policy processes and specialist knowledge not 
conducted by m arket agencies. Other knowledge tasks, for which 
independent research organisations existed, continued to be perform ed 
externally (Ministerie van Verkeer en W aterstaat, 1993, p. 13-14).
1995-2010
A remarkable observation in this period, and parallel to the decentralisation 
of policy responsibilities to regional and local governments, is the rise of 
knowledge intermediaries, organisations such as CROW, KEVER, 
Knowledge Platform Verdi, Infopoint Sustainable Safety and KpVV. These 
organisations aimed, and some continue to aim, at communicating and 
translating knowledge to policy-makers. These are known as dissemination 
activities. The organisations do not directly aim at involving policy-makers 
in the different phases of the research process or vice versa, but at identifying 
applicable knowledge and translating it into a practical policy context. The 
dissemination m odel by Landry et al. describes a similar situation.
In general, the M inistry of Transport w as not satisfied w ith the knowledge- 
policy infrastructure, claiming that the decentralised policy no longer 
m atched the national knowledge infrastructure (Ministerie van Verkeer en 
W aterstaat, 1996b). Furthermore, since road safety increasingly became 
integrated into the traffic and transport policy, there hardly seemed to be a 
separate road safety knowledge policy (Ministerie van Verkeer en 
W aterstaat, 2006b). Also the Strategic Plan Road Safety (Ministry of 
Transport, 2008) stressed the broadening of the road safety policy to other 
policies. The constellation has some of the characteristics of H oppe's 
engineering model, such as the government's need for steering research and 
the absence of governmental bodies for knowledge production.
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4.5.3. Historical developments described in governance trends
Chapter 2 discussed three governance trends, i.e. changes in policy 
arrangem ents that took place in m any policy fields in the last 15 years. This 
section investigates w hether these multi-actor, multi-level and multi-sector 
trends have been observed in road safety too. Previous sections have shown 
evidence of all three m ain governance trends, although not equally in timing 
or size.
The historical overview showed the road safety policy field to be a m ulti­
actor field from the start. Several interests groups such as the ANWB and 
VVN have been present in the road safety field since the first half of the 20th 
century, as have car and bicycle m anufacturing and sales companies. Since 
the 1970's, the num ber and the variety of actors even increased.
The growing trend tow ards multi-level governance is visible in road safety 
through the greater role of the regional and local governments from the mid- 
1980's onw ards and through the growing involvem ent of the EU from 2001 
onwards. Until then, road safety policy was mainly m ade by the national 
governm ent w ith regional and local governments playing a merely executive 
role. This gradually changed around the second half of the 1980's. 
Throughout the last 20 years, regional and local governments have become 
increasingly responsible for regional and local road safety policies.
Lastly, a very recent developm ent in the road safety policy field is the m ulti­
sector governance trend. This trend is illustrated in the recent integration of 
road safety into other policy fields such as the traffic and transport policy, a 
trend that continues to develop. Although road safety was spread out among 
different departm ents in the 1950's, it was seen as a separate policy field from 
the 1960's to the 1990's. However, in 2001 road safety was integrated into 
traffic and transport policy in the National Traffic and Transport Plan and 
this has not changed since. Even the Strategic Plan Road Safety 2008, 
although a single-sector document, stressed the im portance of integrality. 
The following chapters will show w hether this trend represents mere lip 
service tow ards integration in policy docum ents or w hether the integration 
has consequences for policy in practice too.
Although these three trends seem to be present in the policy world, the same 
cannot be said for the knowledge world. The present chapter illustrated that 
knowledge organisations fall apart in several categories such as
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organisations exclusively focussed on road safety and those w ith a broader 
orientation, but also consultancies versus not for profit organisations. 
However, a multi-actor trend cannot be found, since knowledge 
organisations, by definition, can only be typified as one kind of actor. 
Furthermore, m ultiple levels do not seem to be present as m uch as in the 
policy world. In comparison to the policy world, knowledge organisations 
have been m ore organised at, and oriented tow ards the national level. 
A lthough this trend has undergone slight changes recently (see for example: 
Mesken, Aarts & Vis, 2010), it is still mostly dissemination activities, as 
opposed to research activities, that are explicitly directed tow ards the local 
and regional level. Lastly, m ore than the policy world, the knowledge w orld 
is focussed on the road safety field as a single sector. Their websites (see for 
instance the sites CROW, 2010; KpVV, 2010b), but also their publications (see 
the library search on the w ord integration in Section 4.4.4.) reveal a limited 
interest in the integration of road safety into traffic and transport policy. This 
results in little knowledge production being tailored for use at regional and 
local governmental levels, and for sectors other than road safety.
The differences between the knowledge and the policy w orld w ith respect to 
these three governance trends can be characterised as three possible 
institutional barriers to knowledge use, as discussed in the section below.
4.5.4. Institutional barriers for knowledge use in the present 
knowledge-policy arrangement
Above, the historical developm ents in the knowledge-policy arrangem ent 
were examined by means of the analytical concepts m entioned in Chapter 2. 
Below, these concepts are used to analyse the present knowledge-policy 
arrangement. Chapter 2 not only discussed concepts to describe the 
knowledge-policy arrangem ent, it also discussed institutional barriers to 
knowledge use in policy.
The historical overview and description of the present knowledge-policy 
arrangem ent indicate that, over the whole period and w ith regard to 
different aspects, knowledge and policy are well attuned to one another. 
Much of the knowledge is used in several ways in policy, and policy-makers 
seem to know how  to communicate their knowledge needs to scientists and 
knowledge organisations and vice versa.
However, as both Chapter 1 and the present chapter indicate, regularly 
situations occur in which knowledge is not used in policy and knowledge
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desires are not m et by knowledge organisations. Based on the historical 
analysis and the description of the present knowledge arrangem ent and the 
governance trends, there are three possible reasons for knowledge not 
always used in policy.
The first possible reason is linked to the multi-level governance trend in the 
policy w orld and the absence of this trend in the knowledge world. Policy 
and the im plem entation of road safety policy have been decentralised for a 
num ber of years, but knowledge production has not so m uch (see also 
M ethorst & Hofman, 2001, p. 29; Ruhl, 1995). The decentralisation of policy 
and im plem entation is apparent from texts in the Mobility Policy Document 
and the Strategic Plan Road Safety and from the financing of road safety in 
which, through the BDU, a large proportion of the funds ends up  with 
regional and local governments. However, this decentralisation did not 
provide for the founding of decentralised knowledge organisations. This is 
illustrated by the fact that knowledge organisations focussing on road safety, 
such as SWOV, TNO and some universities function as 'national' 
organisations. There are, however, knowledge interm ediaries such as KpVV 
and consultancies who translate knowledge into the regional or local 
situation. Not only is the knowledge organised on a national level, it has a 
national focus as well. This is the case for the costs and effects of road safety 
measures, for example. Often only national figures on costs and effects are 
available w ithout attention to local variety (Janssen, 2005; Schoon, 
W esemann & Roszbach, 2000; Wijnen, Mesken & Vis, 2010, p. 16-19). The 
decentralised level, however, has a need of decentralised knowledge. 
National figures cannot always be translated into provincial figures, not to 
m ention municipal figures. In Chapters 6 and 7, this problem  is elaborated on.
A second possible reason for a lack of knowledge use in policy is related to 
the multi-sector governance trend in the policy w orld and the relative 
absence of it in the knowledge w orld (see also M ethorst & Hofman, 2001, p. 
30). Several developm ents show that the policy w orld increasingly considers 
road safety as an integral part of traffic and transport policy. This can be 
observed, for example in the incorporation of road safety into the Mobility 
Policy Document, in the im portance that the Strategic Plan Road Safety in 
spite of it being a single sector policy plan, attaches to the concept integrality, 
and in the integration of the funding of Sustainable Safety in the BDU. 
However, the knowledge w orld still has, for the m ost part, a sectoral 
orientation, whereby road safety is considered a separate policy sector. This 
is apparent from their websites and publications.
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The third  possible reason for the less than optimal relationship between 
knowledge and policy is not linked to governance trends, but to the Two 
Communities m etaphor described by Caplan (1979). This is especially 
apparent in the discourse on road safety. Whereas the discourse is of a 
mainly technical nature in the field of knowledge, the discourse in the policy 
field has a more political nature (see also Elvik, 2010; Haight, 1994). The field 
of knowledge, for instance, uses mainly terms from the technical system 
approach of which Sustainable Safety is an example. The policy w orld also 
pays frequent heed to the guilt and punishm ent of traffic offenders, as 
observed in the recent discussions about the so-called 'traffic louts' (habitual 
traffic offenders). Furtherm ore, the knowledge organisations are, for 
example, interested in cost-benefit and cost-effect analyses (for instance 
ECORYS, 2004; SWOV, 2008b; Wijnen, W esemann & Blaeij, 2009), but policy­
m akers have several objections to these. In addition to the doubts about 
effect analyses, these objections are also the consequence of an aversion to 
the m onetisation of hum an lives and the desire to make their own political 
assessment instead of using apparently technical calculations (Bax, Elvik & 
Veisten, 2009). Finally, although knowledge organisations are regularly 
m indful of public support (for instance Brouwer, 2003), they sometimes 
propose m easures that form technically a good solution to an unsafe traffic 
situation, but appear to lack public and-or political support. This lack of 
support causes policy-makers to decide not to introduce m easures (in 
general: Goldenbeld, 2002; on ISA: Goldenbeld, 2004; on novice drivers: 
W egman, 2001; in general: Zandvliet, 2009). Chapter 5, but also Chapters 7 and 
8 highlight these and other differences between political and scientific 
rationality.
These three reasons can be considered the interim  hypotheses and 
conclusions which are to be further investigated in the following empirical 
chapters. Chapters 6 to 8 discuss provinces and municipalities and m ay 
therefore establish w hether there is indeed a discrepancy between national 
knowledge production and decentralised governm ent policy. Some 
questions discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, but more specifically the research 
questions in Chapter 8 are expected to provide insight into the existence of a 
discrepancy between sectoral knowledge (production) and integral policy. 
Chapter 7 discusses the contrast between technical information such as cost- 
benefit analysis and the political discourse in the policy area by requiring 
provincial policy-makers to translate this technical information into 
recomm endations for the representatives of the provincial governm ent in an
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experimental setting. The following chapters will show w hether the analyses 
of the policy process in these empirical chapters also indicate institutional 
barriers similar to the three discussed above in addition to process barriers 
for knowledge use.
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5. Knowledge use in road safety policies: a 
literature review
5.1. Introduction
Before investigating knowledge use and barriers to it on regional and local 
levels in the following chapters, the literature review in the present chapter 
examines existing studies on road safety knowledge use, on barriers to 
knowledge use and on the role of institutional factors therein. This review 
answers the research question from a national and international perspective. 
Furthermore, this chapter identifies gaps in the internationally available 
knowledge on (barriers to) knowledge use. These serve as a source of 
inspiration for the focus of the chapters that follow.
The literature review in this chapter considers barriers to knowledge use on 
the process and the institutional level of road safety policy, found in studies 
conducted within and outside the Netherlands. The analytical concepts set 
out in Chapter 2 forms the basis for reviewing the literature. The studies in 
the present chapter were reviewed with two sub-questions in mind:
• To what extent is knowledge used in road safety policy?
• W hich barriers are there to knowledge use in policy?
The first question, discussed in Section 5.3, is operationalised as follows: 
which parts of Knott and W ildavsky's (1980) ladder have been used? This 
section also discusses w hether types of knowledge use, such as instrum ental, 
strategic, conceptual or pacifying use have been distinguished. The second 
question is discussed in Sections 5.4 and 5.5. Section 5.4 examines w hether the 
studies mention some or all of the four groups of barriers, thus focussing on 
process related barriers. Section 5.5 evaluates barriers for knowledge use 
from an institutional perspective.
5.2. Concepts and methods
5.2.1. Analytical concepts
The following analytical concepts are used as a fram ework for the literature 
review in the present chapter. To investigate the extent to which the studies
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address various levels of knowledge use, the studies reviewed in the present 
chapter are interpreted in terms of Knott and W ildavsky's ladder of 
knowledge use (1980). This ladder contains seven stages: reception, 
cognition, reference, effort, adoption, im plem entation and impact. 
Furthermore, this chapter examines w hether the national and international 
literature reviewed here investigates the four groups of barriers to 
knowledge use as distinguished in Chapter 2:
1. Dissemination conditions
2. The needs of users
3. Unilateral or co-production of knowledge
4. Institutional factors
The first three barriers are process related and are discussed in Section 5.4, 
the last barrier describes institutional barriers and is discussed in Section 5.5.
5.2.2. Methods
As stated in Chapter 3, this chapter aims at a narrative literature review with 
a num ber of elements of a systematic review. One of the elements of the 
latter is a well-defined list of inclusion and exclusion criteria.
A literature search was carried out by using the following terms.
• In Dutch: beleid, wetenschap, kennis, onderzoek, gebruik, in 
combinations w ith the w ord verkeersveiligheid
• In English: policy, science, knowledge, research, use, utilisation, in 
combination with the w ord road safety
After some exploration, it appeared m ost practical to search for the term s in 
the 'titles' field of the catalogues only. There were two reasons for this. 
Firstly, m any publications did  not have keywords, which m eans that these 
publications w ould not be found w hen searching w ith keywords. Secondly, 
m any publications did  not meet the inclusion criteria m entioned below when 
using the term s in the 'all words', 'keywords' or 'abstracts' fields.
Inclusion criteria for selecting publications were:
• The publication should refer to research publications or should be 
published by a research organisation or university.
• The publication should focus on the use of knowledge or contain 
empirical information about the relationship between knowledge and 
policy.
Publications that merely state opinions or focus exclusively on policy or 
knowledge organisations rather than on the relationship between them  were 
excluded.
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The sources used for the literature were the SWOV library, university 
libraries including Radboud University, Utrecht University and the m eta­
catalogue Picarta which contains references to m ost Dutch libraries. 
Furthermore, the international databases specialised in transport research, 
ITRD (International Transport Research Documentation) and TRIS 
(Transportation Research Information Services) were searched.
5.3. Studies on knowledge use
5.3.1. Dutch studies
Few Dutch studies examine knowledge use in road safety policy exclusively. 
Some studies devote only a m inor rem ark to knowledge use in Dutch road 
safety policy processes, noting the lack of use of a specific knowledge form, 
such as books, circulars, courses or personal contacts (Wijnolst, 1995). Others 
focus on knowledge needs rather than examining the actual use of existing 
knowledge (Brouwer & M ulder, 1997) or evaluate the functioning of a 
knowledge organisation (Methorst & Hofman, 2001).
Three reports specifically focus on knowledge use in road safety policy. One 
is a recent publication on the use of CROW guidelines by regional and local 
governments (Boer, Grimmius & Schoenmakers, 2008). Provinces, 
municipalities and regional w ater authorities were asked w hether they use 
CROW guidelines w hen deciding upon their road safety policies. Using an 
internet survey, the response was 65% (N= 443 municipalities, 6 regional 
w ater authorities, 12 provinces). In only 5% of the cases did regional and 
local governments not use the guidelines in their policy at all. A third  of the 
respondents always used the guidelines and two thirds used them  m ost of 
the time.
In a second report, Bax (2001; 2006) examined the policy-making process of 
the National Traffic and Transport Plan (NVVP) between 1999 and 2002 by 
means of a case study, w ith 35 interviews in total. Among other things, she 
looked at the use of knowledge in this process. Interviews were conducted 
among interest groups for traffic and road safety related topics, various 
levels of government, including the Ministry of Transport, and knowledge 
organisations. It was rem arkable that in the orientation phase of the policy­
m aking process, well-known knowledge was used for the m ost part, with 
colleagues being a m ore im portant source of knowledge than literature 
searches. The final phase of the policy-making process offered more
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opportunities to look at a broader range of knowledge, for example by 
requesting advice from several advisory boards.
The third  report, by Davidse and Brouwer (1998), examined the use of 
knowledge in the province of Zuid-Holland. In a survey, the authors asked 
68 respondents, including road authorities, police and interest groups, about 
the im portance of various kinds of knowledge for the execution of road 
safety tasks. The respondents found accident statistics very im portant (81%), 
but rated complaints by the general public even higher (90%). Furthermore, 
statistics on vehicle speed (cars, 81% and m opeds 52%) and other kinds of 
dangerous driving behaviour (52%) were found to be very im portant for the 
respondents. Risk statistics, the cost of dangerous driving behaviour, 
statistics on driving under the influence of alcohol, and the use of safety 
devices such as seat belts and helmets were regarded as less im portant by the 
respondents. It is remarkable that half (54%) of the respondents who had 
experience in creating a policy plan, claimed to employ a consultancy to 
write it and that only 25% reported evaluating their own policy.
Although not stated explicitly, the three studies m entioned above examined 
knowledge use on the 'cognition', 'reference', 'effort' or 'implementation' level 
of the Knott and W ildavsky ladder. Boer et al. (2008) studied the use of 
CROW guidelines on both the 'effort' level, by asking w hether respondents 
use guidelines w hen form ulating their policies, and the 'implementation' 
level, by asking w hether respondents im plem ented road safety m easures in 
accordance w ith the guidelines (Boer, Grimmius & Schoenmakers, 2008, p. 48 
and further). Bax also (2001; 2006) examined use at the 'effort' level, by 
studying the knowledge used to determine national road safety policy. 
Davidse and Brouwer (1998) investigate the 'implementation' level by asking 
respondents how  im portant knowledge is for the execution of road safety 
tasks. None of the studies interpreted the use of knowledge in term s of 
instrum ental, strategic, pacifying or conceptual knowledge use explicitly, but 
implicitly, the studies seem to consider 'use' as instrum ental knowledge use 
for the m ost part.
Overall, Dutch studies on the use of knowledge in road safety policy are 
limited in num ber, and they deal w ith a limited num ber of knowledge types, 
a limited num ber of governmental levels or a limited part of the Netherlands. 
In addition, they seem to lack a firm theoretical basis, as none of them  refers 
to any common knowledge use theories. A lthough these studies are useful in
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specific situations, it is hard  to draw  general, or empirical conclusions from 
them.
5.3.2. Studies conducted outside the Netherlands
Outside the Netherlands, in the United Kingdom, Sweden and on the 
European level, a limited num ber of scientific studies on the use of road 
safety research have been commissioned. As m entioned above, studies on 
knowledge needs rather than knowledge use (such as M uhlrad & Dupont,
2010) are not discussed in this thesis.
In the UK, the British Departm ent for Transport has carried out a study on 
the commissioning, dissemination and use of road safety research 
(Department for Transport, 2008). An online survey consisting of 530 
respondents, 6 focus groups and 11 interviews was used to study the 
opinions of the respondents. The respondents included road safety officers, 
road engineers, researchers, safety engineers, police officers and campaign 
groups. The study revealed that over 50% of the respondents used road 
safety knowledge at least once a month, and half of this group weekly. This 
knowledge consisted mainly of statistical analyses, causes of accidents and 
policy monitoring, but knowledge of vulnerable road users, about driver 
behaviour, road engineering and speed m anagem ent was also mentioned.
The Swedish Transport Research Council (VINNOVA) initiated a case study 
on the benefits to Swedish society of their road safety research in Sweden in 
the period 1971-2004 (Elvik et al., 2009a; Kolbenstvedt et al., 2007). The study 
comprised the selection of five cases and a review of their m ost im portant 
publications. The cases included research into urban safety management, 
child restraints, neck injury protection and side im pact protection, police 
enforcement and research conducted in a driving simulator. The cases were 
selected using three criteria. Firstly, the cases had to have peer reviewed 
publications. Secondly, they had to have led to the developm ent of increased 
use of road safety measures, thus have been 'implemented' in Knott and 
W ildavsky terms. Lastly, it had  to be possible to evaluate the effects of these 
measures, thus to have an 'impact' in Knott and W ildavsky language. The 
researchers defined the cases and estimated the safety effects of four of them 
(in retrospect, one case did not lead to road safety measures). These four 
cases were shown to be, at least to some extent, based on VINNOVA research 
in the period 1971-2004. Elvik et al. also conducted a cost-benefit analysis, 
weighing up  the costs of research and im plem entation against the casualties 
prevented. The research projects seem to have contributed considerably to
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reducing road deaths in Sweden, saving up  to 450 lives in total since 1970, 
and their benefits seem to have greatly outw eighed their costs. The authors, 
therefore, claim that road safety research has had a positive influence on 
Swedish society. However, the researchers themselves adm it that their 
calculations are very complicated and can be problematic, as it is difficult, if 
not impossible, to determine the exact effects of specific road safety 
measures. Therefore, the analyses are to some degree qualified guesses, and a 
causal relationship cannot be proved.
In addition to the limitations m entioned by the authors, two further remarks 
can be m ade on the external and internal validity of this study, more 
precisely on the m ethodology and the presum ed causality. As the authors 
themselves acknowledge, only a few cases were selected. Due to the selection 
criteria, these were probably not only rather straightforw ard to evaluate, but 
were also the m ost successful in terms of either knowledge applied to road 
safety measures, the prevention of casualties or cost-benefits balance. The 
cases therefore, m ay not be representative of all Swedish research and its 
im pact on policies and casualties. That means that possibly m any other cases 
were not successful, that a good deal of knowledge could have led to 
m easures that did not prevent m any casualties, or did not lead to road safety 
m easures at all. Therefore, the outcomes should be viewed as the absolute 
m axim um  achievable. As far as the external validity is concerned, the study 
only proves that the knowledge that led to these cases has m ade a positive 
contribution to Swedish society.
W ith regard to the internal validity, the authors do not make clear how  they 
assessed that the road safety m easures were indeed based on road safety 
research and if so, to w hat extent. For example, it can be called into question 
w hether more effective police enforcement is based solely on research or 
w hether it also stems from a change in political culture over time, whereby 
the current political culture dem ands stricter enforcement (not only in road 
safety) than in the seventies. A pproached from the 'knowledge use' 
perspective, this is a critical question, given that variables other than 
knowledge m ay be crucial.
A consortium funded by the European Union conducted a study on barriers 
to the use of cost-benefit analyses (CBA) and cost-effectiveness analyses 
(CEA) (Rosebud, 2006). In face-to-face structured interviews in 7 countries, 
83 respondents on national and regional and/or local levels were asked to 
describe the use of CEAs and CBAs in their country (Elvik & Veisten, 2005).
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The respondents were road safety policy-makers and researchers. Almost a 
third of the respondents claimed to base their policy priorities on CBAs or 
CEAs, on both local and national level. The use of these analyses appeared to 
be m uch greater in the N orthern European countries than in the Southern or 
Central European countries (60% versus 15%) (Elvik & Veisten, 2005, p. 73).
Interpreted in terms of the Knott and W ildavsky ladder, the British study 
investigated the 'reception', 'cognition', and 'effort' level of the ladder by 
asking about the accessibility, the readability and the relevance of research. 
The EU study looked at the 'adoption' and 'implementation' level by asking 
for barriers to actually include cost-benefit knowledge in policy plans or 
barriers to the im plem entation of road safety m easures based on this 
knowledge. The Swedish study even tried to cover the 'impact' level of the 
ladder, by m easuring the indirect im pact of knowledge on the num ber of 
road casualties. None of the studies explicitly m entioned the use of 
knowledge in instrum ental, strategic, pacifying or conceptual terms. 
Nevertheless, the studies seem, for the m ost part, to consider knowledge use 
in an instrum ental way.
Overall, as regards the Dutch studies, the conclusion can be draw n that the 
literature on knowledge use in road safety policies is limited in num ber and 
in range. One study only m entions a specific type of knowledge, nam ely that 
of CBA and CEA (Elvik & Veisten, 2005). Another study (Elvik et al., 2009a) 
has several limitations regarding its internal and external validity. Two out 
of three studies (Department for Transport, 2008; Elvik et al., 2009a) examine 
knowledge use only in one country. All three studies seem to lack a 
theoretical base, as none apply theories of knowledge use as a fram ework for 
their results. Overall, it is not easy to paint a clear and theoretically 
underpinned picture of knowledge use in road safety policy out of these 
publications.
All in all, the Dutch studies and the studies conducted outside the 
N etherlands provide a small empirical basis, both in num ber and in terms of 
the samples they use. Most of them  also seem to lack a strong theoretical 
basis. Nevertheless, taken together, they seem to cover m ost of the levels of 
the Knott and W ildavsky knowledge use ladder. The following table 
provides an overview of the levels covered in the studies.
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Stage Description Reference Dutch or 
international
Method and N
1 Reception Practitioners and 
professionals concerned 
have received the 
research results
D epartm ent for 
Transport, 2008
International Survey, 
interviews, 
focus groups, 
N  = 582
2 Cognition The research reports have 
been read and 
understood by the 
practitioners and 
professionals concerned
D epartm ent for 
Transport, 2008
International Survey, 
interviews, 
focus groups, 
N  = 582
3 Reference The w ork is cited as a 
reference in the reports, 
studies and strategies of 
action developed by 
practitioners and 
professionals
4 Effort Efforts have been m ade to 
adopt the results of the 
research by practitioners 
and professionals
Bax, 2001; 2006 Dutch Interviews, 
N  = 20 and 
N = 15 
respectively
Boer, Grimm ius 
& Schoenmakers, 
2008
Dutch Internet 
survey, group 
discussions,
N = 298
D epartm ent for 
Transport, 2008
International Survey, 
interviews, 
focus groups, 
N  = 582
5 A doption The research results have 
been adopted w ithin the 
choices and decisions of 
practitioners and 
professionals
Elvik & Veisten, 
2005; Rosebud, 
2006
International Survey, 
interviews, 
N  = 83
6 Im plem entation The policy that has 
adopted the research 
findings has been 
im plem ented
Boer, Grimm ius 
& Schoenmakers, 
2008
Dutch Internet 
survey, group 
discussions,
N = 298
Davidse & 
Brouwer, 1998
Dutch Survey, 
workshops, 
N  = 68
Elvik & Veisten, 
2005; Rosebud, 
2006
International Survey, 
interviews, 
N  = 83
7 Im pact The policy that has 
adopted the research 
findings has shown the 
desired effects
Elvik et al., 2009; 
Kolbenstvedt et 
al., 2007
International M ultiple case 
study, N  = 5
Table 5.1. Overview of levels covered on the Knott and Wildavsky knowledge ladder.
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The table reveals that nearly all levels of the knowledge use ladder are 
covered in the studies discussed in this chapter. However, only a few levels 
are investigated in Dutch research and overall, the num ber of studies per 
level is low. Furthermore, none of the studies covered all levels of the ladder 
at the same time, nor did they interpret knowledge use as instrum ental or 
strategic. The table dem onstrates that the 'effort' and 'implementation' level 
are both relatively well-represented by an international study as well as by 
two Dutch studies. The most obvious reason for this m ight be that these two 
levels can be operationalised unambiguously.
This thesis aims to investigate m ultiple levels of the ladder to apply a 
theoretical basis to the results. The reception level is investigated in Chapter 8, 
the cognition level in Chapter 6 and the reference level in Chapter 4. Chapter 6 
to 8 examine the effort and the im plem entation level. Chapter 7 and 8 describe 
knowledge use not only by m eans of the knowledge use ladder, but also in 
terms of instrum ental or strategic use, for instance.
5.4. Studies on barriers to knowledge use
5.4.1. Dutch studies
Three Dutch studies mention barriers to knowledge use in Dutch road safety 
policies. Wijnolst (1995) investigated the process of policy-making, obstacles 
to an effective road safety policy and the preferred forms of knowledge 
exchange. Based on 51 interviews with road authorities, she implies some 
barriers to im plem enting road safety m easures such as a low priority for 
road safety and lack of knowledge of the effects of road safety measures. A 
low priority among politicians, lack of support amongst the general public 
and incident politics are the main institutional reasons for not using road 
safety knowledge on the 'implementation' level.
M ethorst and Hofm an (2001) evaluated the functioning of KEVER, the 
tem porary road safety knowledge infrastructure for regional and local 
governments (1996-2000). A lthough a list of relevant docum ents is given in 
the report, it does not explicitly mention a research method. They focussed 
on institutional barriers by noting a missing link in the organisation of the 
knowledge-policy field. They argued that insufficient contact between 
knowledge centres and im plem enters of road safety policies has complicated 
knowledge exchange, especially about non-infrastructural measures and that 
the various levels of governm ent seem to have different knowledge needs;
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more practical and simple knowledge with concrete examples for local 
governments for instance, as opposed to aggregated information for national 
policy-makers. M ethorst and Hofm an conclude that the knowledge 
production of national knowledge organisations such as CROW, SWOV and 
AVV meets the needs of the national governm ent but not the more practical 
knowledge needs of local governments. From this study it seems that 
knowledge supply takes place on the national level, whereas the knowledge 
request is m ade on a local level. Furthermore, the authors state that 
knowledge exchanges with other policy fields, such as spatial planning and 
urban planning are extremely rare, but they do not identify barriers.
Boer et al. (2008), as m entioned in the previous section, have m ade a more 
extensive study on barriers to using knowledge in CROW guidelines. They 
investigated barriers to the use of guidelines in general and of nine specific 
guidelines in detail. W ith respect to the use of the CROW guidelines in 
general, the respondents in the study m entioned several reasons for not or 
not fully adapting the CROW guidelines. The m ost common responses were 
the impossibility of im plem enting road safety m easures due to local 
circumstances (95%-100% of the respondents, depending on government 
type) and the belief that following the guideline w ould not always lead to the 
m ost safe situation (0%-29% depending on governm ent type). Provinces 
(57%) stated that their organisation did not always agree with the guidelines. 
Viewed in the terms set out in Chapter 2, these reasons qualify as barriers in 
the category the needs o f users. This study therefore, suggests a discrepancy 
between local knowledge need and national knowledge supply.
Furthermore, the respondents mention a num ber of dissem ination barriers. 
Even though three quarters of them  find the guidelines clear, half of them 
required more communication about the contents of the guideline to regional 
and local governments. This includes the status of the guidelines (whether it 
can be considered a law, guideline or recommendation) and the accessibility 
of the guidelines (titles are not always self-explanatory and guidelines are 
not available online). The use of guidelines in non-standard situations is also 
m entioned as a topic on which m ore communication is needed. However, as 
guidelines, by definition, tend to be m ade to cover standard situations, this is 
not a surprising result. These latter barriers can be ranged in the category 
dissemination conditions.
A part from these barriers to the use of the CROW guidelines in general, Boer 
et al. prom pted the respondents to m ention barriers related to nine specific
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measures. The table below shows the barriers experienced per measure. The 
one or two barriers mentioned most often are listed.
Measure Barrier to using the measure Percentage N
Speed humps Complaints from the general 
public
75% 221
Inconvenience to emergency 
services
44%
Roundabouts in built-up areas 
with priority for bicycles
Road safety 61% 125
Road markings on access roads 
and distributor roads in and 
outside build-up areas
Lack of space 47-86%* 7-159
Exit constructions, priority 
regulations (no priority road 
signs or priority road marking)
Road safety 44% 143
Unclear road situation 40%
Exit constructions, raised 
pavement and entry blocks
Complaints from people living 
and working in the area
29% 171
Pedestrian crossing Complaints from people living 
and working in the area
34% 103-132
Road safety 31%
Road signs for urban areas The guideline is too strict 38% 169
* This measure comprised four questions: road marking on access roads outside built-up 
areas, road marking in distributor roads outside build-up areas, road marking in 
distributor roads in build-up areas with a speed limit of 70 km/h and road marking in 
distributor roads in build-up areas with a speed limit of 50 km/h. The number of 
respondents varied between 7 and 159, due to the number of respondents administering 
roads with a certain speed limit.
Table 5.2. Barriers for implementing nine road safety measures in CROW guidelines. Based 
on Boer et al. (2008).
Generally, two types of barriers were mentioned. A number of institutional 
barriers, such as complaints from the general public and the reference to other 
interests than road safety (comfort for emergency services and people living 
and working in the area) were raised. The second type of barrier mentioned 
was the needs o f users. For example, the frequent mentioning of 'road safety' as 
a reason for not implementing a road safety measure indicates a lack of 
confidence in road safety research on these measures: respondents assessed 
the guidelines as not leading to a safe situation.
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5.4.2. Studies outside the Netherlands
Studies conducted outside the Netherlands on barriers to use road safety 
knowledge in policy can be divided into two types of research. The first type 
consists of two studies that investigated barriers to the use of road safety 
knowledge in general. The second contains several studies that focussed 
specifically on cost-effectiveness analyses (CEA) or cost-benefit analysis 
(CBA).
In the first category, the Centre for Research on Utilisation of Scientific 
Knowledge of the University of Michigan, USA, conducted a study on the 
utilisation of research for the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration as early as 1971 (Havelock & Markowitz, 1971). The 
researchers used a survey to question 273 researchers and 244 policy-makers 
in highway safety. Before asking for barriers to knowledge utilisation 
explicitly, the respondents were asked whether they were satisfied with the 
present dissemination and utilisation of research on highway safety. Both 
researchers and policy-makers indicated that they were extremely satisfied 
with dissemination, 48% and 44% respectively being (very) satisfied; 
considerably more than with the utilisation of research, 26% and 17% 
respectively being (very) satisfied. Policy-makers were also asked what role 
research played in policy-making. Only 21% indicated that their decisions 
were mainly research based, while 61% indicated that public opinion played 
the most important role. The study summarized their responses as follows: 
"We weigh the evidence objectively, but research is not the only one source, 
public opinion and what the public and industry will accept are equally 
important factors" (Havelock & Markowitz, 1971, p. 79), thus indicating the 
existence of an institutional barrier.
The respondents were then asked for barriers explicitly, by means of an open 
question. Researchers indicated that the legitimacy of the research was the 
most important barrier to knowledge use (22%). Their term legitimacy of 
research included not only the statement that more research was needed on a 
subject, but also that research conflicted with existing knowledge, Decision­
makers found this much less important: only 10% of them indicated this as a 
barrier. In contrast, while the most important barrier for decision-makers was 
the reaction of the public (38%), only 17% of the researchers shared this view. 
These two barriers can be classified as respectively the needs o f users and 
institutional barrier. The difference between the answers of researchers and 
policy-makers highlights a difference in values. Researchers find correct
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knowledge most important, and consider a lack of it as a main barrier. 
Decision-makers rate public opinion most important and consequently see a 
lack of support as a main barrier. Researchers were also asked what barriers 
they experienced in communicating with policy-makers (policy-makers did 
not receive a similar question). 48% indicated that value differences between 
researchers and policy-makers were a (very) important barrier to 
communication. For 47% a lack of time available to policy-makers was the 
second most indicated barrier. The value differences that researchers 
mentioned as a barrier corresponded closely to Caplan's Two Communities 
metaphor (Caplan, 1979).
More recently, and also mentioned in the previous section, the British 
Department for Transport investigated barriers to the use of general road 
safety knowledge (Department for Transport, 2008). 66% of the respondents 
mention a lack of time and/or capacity to read the research on road safety. In 
addition to that, 58% was unaware of the available knowledge or did not 
know where to find the knowledge (49%). Nearly all respondents 
commented that the number of studies published made it difficult to 
navigate the knowledge, partly due to a lack of co-ordination and online 
search facilities. Besides these barriers, which can be classified as 
dissemination barriers focussing on the use of knowledge in terms of 
'cognition', 'reference' or 'effort', respondents mentioned barriers to 
implementing road safety measures. They stated that issues other than road 
safety knowledge, such as politics, cost, local evidence and the media often 
have more influence. These can be seen as institutional barriers. Lastly, the 
respondents experienced barriers classified as the needs o f users. They found 
the road safety knowledge generally difficult to implement in practice (49%), 
too academic (38%), too detailed (33%) and too technical (29%). A qualitative 
evaluation of a course on the use of road safety research for 22 road safety 
policy professionals in the UK in 2006 found similar, though only anecdotal, 
results (Hewson, 2007a; 2007b).
The second category of research comprises a number of studies addressing 
the use of CBAs or CEAs on road safety topics specifically. Based on both 
Norwegian and Swedish economic studies, Elvik (2001; 2003) developed his 
own categorisation of barriers to road safety CBA use, distinguishing several 
institutional barriers for applying road safety CBAs to policy. Some have to do 
with the different discourses and values of science and policy. In CBA 
studies especially, discourses stress the value of hum an life and weigh this 
up against investments in road safety. Politicians object to this rational-
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economic discourse sometimes. The following barriers to implementing road 
safety measures according to CBA outcomes were distinguished:
• A rejection of the basic principles of cost-benefit analysis
• The existence of policy objectives that cannot be calculated with cost- 
benefit analyses
• The priority given to other policy objectives, in particular regional 
development
• An acknowledgement of social dilemmas, which means that measures 
that are cost-effective from a societal point of view might not be cost- 
effective from the point of view of individual road users
• A lack of formal authority to introduce road safety measures
• A scarcity of resources to take road safety measures
In the European study 'Rosebud' mentioned previously, Elvik and Veisten 
investigated the barrier categorisation listed above (Elvik & Veisten, 2005). 
The questionnaire administered in the study contained open questions about 
barriers to CBA use, whereby respondents could mention barriers 
spontaneously. In addition, by means of a list of pre-selected barriers 
respondents could indicate whether they experienced these. The most 
frequently mentioned barriers, both spontaneously and by means of the pre­
selected list, are listed in the table below.
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Spontaneously mentioned 
barrier
% mentioned 
(more than 1 
barrier could 
be mentioned)
N= 83
Question about pre-selected 
barrier
% of 
respondents 
considering  
this as barrier
N=83
There are ethical and/or 
em otional objections to the 
use of cost-benefit analysis.
6 Do you see any ethical 
objections to evaluation in € of 
reduced risk of injuries and 
deaths on roads, and if so, 
could you please state w hat 
such objections m ight be?
27
In cost-benefit analysis, all 
relevant impacts are valued in 
€. In your opinion, is this 
helpful for road safety, or is it 
better only to estim ate impacts 
in term s of num bers of 
fatalities and injuries?
23
Economic analysis is an 
unknow n/unfam iliar tool 
('obscure').
13 N ot on pre-selected list --
Cost-benefit analysis is not in 
the standard  procedures or 
reasoning in the decision­
m aking of the respondent's 
country.
36 Is a lack of clarity about the 
responsibility for perform ing 
cost-benefit analysis on road 
safety m easures an obstacle to 
carrying out such analyses?
36
Cost-benefit analysis is only 
perform ed if it is im posed by 
the governm ent or by the EU.
17
It is not necessary to perform  
economic analysis (e.g. low 
cost measures).
12 In your opinion, are there 
types of road safety m easures 
that are less suitable for cost- 
benefit analysis than other 
m easures; and, if so, why?
55
Cost-benefit analysis m ay be 
im possible because the effects 
of m easures are not know n or 
no t trusted.
48 Are the impacts of road safety 
m easures sufficiently known 
to perm it an estim ation of 
expected effects during  the 
planning of such measures?
83
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Spontaneously mentioned 
barrier
% mentioned 
(more than 1 
barrier could 
be mentioned)
N= 83
Question about pre-selected 
barrier
% of 
respondents 
considering  
this as barrier
N=83
There is a lack of tools or 
resources to carry out cost- 
benefit analysis.
23 In your opinion, are the 
current tools for perform ing 
cost-benefit analyses on road 
safety m easures adequate? By 
tools, w e m ean the resources 
available in term s of software, 
guidelines, courses, et cetera?
59
There is a lack of confidence 
in cost-benefit analysis; the 
m ethod is disputed and 
uncertain.
8 In your opinion, can we trust 
current economic valuations 
of reduced risk for accidents 
and  injuries on roads, and if 
not, why?
33
If the uncertainty in the results 
from  cost-benefit analyses is 
presented, do you think this 
could lead to a disregard for 
the results from cost-benefit 
analyses?
22
N ot m entioned 
spontaneously
If results from  cost-benefit 
analyses are given lim ited 
w eight in prioritising, do you 
think this w ould change if the 
results were presented in 
another m anner?
41
N ot m entioned 
spontaneously
Will the results from  cost- 
benefit analysis and  cost- 
effectiveness evaluation have 
m ore influence on final 
political decisions if they are 
perform ed at an earlier stage 
of the decision-making 
process?
70
Interests other than the 
results of economic analysis 
are m ore im portant in the 
decision-making.
18 N ot on pre-selected list
Table 5.3. Barriers to the use of CBAs mentioned, both spontaneously and on the basis of a 
pre-selected list. Based on Elvik & Veisten (2005) and on Bax et al. (2009).
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The table reveals a number of institutional barriers, such as ethical objections, 
policy-making in which CBAs do not play a role and the existence of 
interests other than road safety in policy processes. Furthermore, the 
'obscurity' barrier can be interpreted as a dissemination barrier. The table also 
indicates a number of barriers in the category the needs o f users, such as lack of 
confidence in CBAs, and the manner of presentation and the timing of CBAs. 
These last two objections were not mentioned spontaneously, but were 
recognized frequently when presented on the pre-selected list. Also in this 
category, two barriers were mentioned which are not barriers to the use of 
CBAs, but to the production of CBA knowledge. According to this research, 
CBAs might be impossible to perform because the effects of measures are not 
known. Also, the research indicates a lack of tools and resources such as 
software, guidelines and courses to execute CBAs.
Bax et al. (2009) elaborated on the Rosebud study by carrying out an 
additional data-analysis and studying the barriers in detail. The authors 
concluded that two groups of respondents naming different barriers to 
knowledge use could be distinguished. Ethical issues, e.g. objections to some 
of the principles of CBAs, generated a fundamental division here. The first 
group of respondents mentioned ethical objections as a barrier to using 
economic analysis, but indicated that other possible barriers did not form an 
obstacle. A second group of respondents on the other hand did not mention 
ethical objections, but other barriers in the category the needs o f users, such as 
the production of CBAs. Barriers to the production of CBAs that were 
mentioned were the lack of available information about the impacts of 
measures, the lack of tools to perform cost-benefit analyses and the fact that 
some measures are not suitable for such analyses. Other barriers in the 
category the needs o f users were the timing and the presentation of cost- 
benefit analyses.
Veisten et al. (2010) also ran extra analyses on the Rosebud data. They 
focussed on the respondents' assessment of statements about the principles 
and applicability of CBAs regarding road safety as true or false, and their 
indication as to how certain they were about their answer. They found a 
correlation between respondents who answered the statements correctly (i.e. 
in line with the theoretical principles of CBAs) and a background in 
economics. Likewise, a correlation was observed between incorrect answers 
and negative attitudes towards using CBAs for road safety policies. In 
addition, a qualitative analysis of interviewees' responses was performed. 
This analysis indicated that respondents may have perceived the statements
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about CBAs as a question about their opinion of CBAs, thus indicating 
objections to the methodology rather than measuring the understanding of 
the methodology. The responses demonstrate that, although the rules for 
performing a CBA have always been set by economists, policy-makers now 
claim the right to change these rules. Policy-makers, for example, stated that 
regional effects should be included in CBAs and question the equal weight 
given to the different interests concerned, such as travelling times and safety, 
in CBAs. In this, they dispute the traditional division between science and 
politics.
5.5. Institutional analyses
The majority of studies concentrating on the institutional context of road 
safety policy merely provide an inventory of tasks of governmental levels 
and knowledge organisations, for both the Netherlands (Brouwer & Mulder, 
1997; Heijkamp & Kraay, 2001; Wijnolst, 1995) and other countries or the EU 
(Chapelon & Lassarre, 2010; Elvik & Veisten, 2005; Hakkert & Wesemann, 
2005; Havelock & Markowitz, 1971; Johns, 1988; Schulze & Kofimann, 2010). 
Some are predominantly literature based discussions on preferred 
relationships between knowledge and policy (Bax, De Jong & Koppenjan, 
2010; Hauer, 2007). Few actually investigate and analyse the relationship 
between policy and science in the road safety field.
Some early studies focus on the differences between science and policy, 
although none of these are empirical studies, but literature reviews or essays. 
Carlquist (1969), for example, stresses the dissimilarities between the two, in 
line with the ideas of Caplan (1979). Others focus on the growing similarities 
between science and policy since the 1980s (for the USA: Haight, 1994; for the 
Netherlands: Kraay, 1989; for France: Muhlrad, 1994). Kraay also gives a 
useful overview of the development of the interaction between knowledge 
organisations and policy-makers since the 1960s and the effect that changes 
in scientific thinking had on this interaction, referring to Caplan's two worlds 
metaphor by way of explanation, without mentioning it explicitly. He claims 
that policy did not use scientific knowledge at that time, while knowledge 
producers did not ask which knowledge policy-makers wanted. However, 
this claim can be disputed, since in Chapter 4 it was indicated that Dutch 
policy did use scientific knowledge by the explicit use of a SWOV report in 
the first road safety plan (Tweede Kamer, 1962). Kraay further states that, in 
the 1970s, the scientific view on accidents changed from mono-causal to 
multi-causal, transforming road safety into a more complex subject (see also
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Asmussen, 1983). In the early 1980s, the view developed further into a 
dynamic systematic approach (see also OECD, 1997). This same development 
is described in Chapter 4. Kraay argues that this increasing complexity of the 
problem made the exchange of knowledge between science and policy 
problematic. Policy-makers could no longer take simple measures and they 
found the new research difficult to understand (Kraay, 1989, p. 269). Kraay 
thus seems to describe relations between science and policy in terms of 
Caplan's (1979) Two Communities metaphor.
M uhlrad describes a similar development in France (Muhlrad, 1994, p. 48). 
She states that due to the aforementioned increasing complexity, policy­
makers tend to use common sense instead of scientific knowledge to decide 
about road safety measures. Haight (1994) states something similar when he 
stresses the hostility of American road safety policy-makers towards 
research, mentioning different rationalities for scientists and policy-makers. 
Scientists emphasise rational behaviour, using research to solve dangerous 
situations, whereas policy-makers react more emotionally, taking on a 
justified "Crusade" against danger. The difference he observes refers to the 
institutional barrier discussed in Chapter 4 with regard to the different 
rationalities (political versus technical) of policy-makers and scientists. These 
two authors seem to echo the Two Communities metaphor. Like Kraay, their 
argument is not grounded in empirical research, but in their own experiences 
and knowledge of the road safety field.
Apart from these general studies on the relationship between science and 
policy, and more recently, empirical institutional studies have been directed 
at very specific subjects. These comprised an analysis of one knowledge 
organisation such as KEVER (Methorst & Hofman, 2001), for example, or of 
one research subject such as the network of organisations providing 
knowledge of the accident costs (Blaak & Van der Meer, 2007). Other very 
specific topics are the transfer of road safety knowledge from developed to 
less developed countries (Ericson, 2007; 2009), a single case study on the 
engagement of policy-makers on road safety research in Malaysia (Tran et al., 
2009) and the outsourcing of road design by Dutch provinces and 
municipalities (Boer, Grimmius & Schoenmakers, 2008). These studies are 
not discussed further here, since their subjects are not directly relevant to this 
thesis, due to their small scale and the limited transferability of outcomes.
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5.6. Conclusions
To what extent is road safety knowledge used in policy and what are the 
most relevant barriers to this knowledge use? These are the central questions 
addressed in this chapter. This final section summarises the findings of 
previous Dutch and international studies, provides a quantitative and 
qualitative review, points out blind spots in the literature and, from there, 
determines the focus of Chapters 6 to 8.
Several Dutch and international studies have examined knowledge use. The 
most recent and extended Dutch study (Boer, Grimmius & Schoenmakers, 
2008) reveals a wide, instrumental use of applicable and practical road safety 
knowledge, such as guidelines, in policy, an indication of 'effort' and 
'implementation' on the Knott and Wildavsky ladder. British (Department for 
Transport, 2008) and EU (Elvik & Veisten, 2005) studies support this vision 
and extend the knowledge use to other levels of the ladder. All in all, 
although no study mentioned these levels of knowledge use explicitly, 
together they covered nearly all levels of the knowledge use ladder. Few 
levels are covered by Dutch studies however, and just one study covers three 
levels. None of the studies interpret knowledge use in instrumental or 
strategic terms.
A number of studies has investigated barriers to knowledge use. Overall, 
three of the four types of barriers, as mentioned in Chapter 2, were found. The 
first type, dissemination barriers, was found in examples such as the inability 
of users to find the right knowledge on time and the lack of awareness 
among users of available knowledge. The second type of barrier, the needs of 
users, could be seen in studies that displayed a lack of confidence in road 
safety research, impractical research outcomes that could not be 
implemented easily, and road safety measures which could not be taken due 
to local circumstances. The third type of barrier, a lack o f co-production of 
knowledge, was not found in any publication. The fourth type of barrier, 
institutional factors, was mentioned in the majority of the studies. They 
indicated a lack of support for road safety measures and missing links 
between knowledge organisations and governmental bodies. But also the 
different knowledge needs of the various governmental bodies can be 
viewed as an institutional barrier, as can the prevalence of other interests 
over road safety and the differences in general between the scientific and 
policy worlds. Lastly, the studies on the use of CBAs and CEAs indicated 
that the use of these instruments bring with them a specific type of barrier,
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i.e. barriers to performing CBAs, such as a lack of knowledge on effects of 
measures.
Some remarks can be made regarding the quantity and quality of the studies 
mentioned in this chapter. A first and obvious remark on the quantity being 
the existence of a limited number of studies on road safety knowledge use 
and on barriers to road safety knowledge use. Several of these studies deal 
with one subject or organisation only, or focus on a single type of knowledge, 
especially CBAs and CEAs. Furthermore, several studies have a small 
empirical basis, for instance case studies, or do not have an empirical basis at 
all. This provides in some cases a weak internal validity and an overall weak 
external validity. Another remark can be made about the application of 
theories in the reviewed studies. Few of the studies made reference to 
theoretical literature on knowledge use or process related or institutional 
barriers to knowledge use.
A review of the above-mentioned studies reveals several blind spots, theory 
being the most obvious. Not only are results not explained in theoretical 
terms, theories on knowledge use and barriers also do not form the basis for 
the operationalisation of the research questions. As a result, some parts of 
theory, for instance some levels of the knowledge use ladder, are studied 
more often than others. Several levels of this ladder (reception, cognition, 
reference, adoption and impact) have not been studied at all in the 
Netherlands. In addition, studies seldom refer to each other, causing each 
study on road safety knowledge use to stand alone. Another blind spot can 
be found in studies on co-production of knowledge. The phenomenon is not 
described in existing studies on knowledge use in road safety policy. It is 
unclear whether this can be explained by the non-existence of co-production 
of knowledge. Furthermore, although several studies investigate the use of 
various types of knowledge, for example, statistics, costs, effects of measures, 
the studies do not clearly distinguish these types and the kind of use that 
they may lead to, such as instrumental use or strategic use. Lastly, although 
some studies mentioned what can be called institutional barriers, an overall 
institutional analysis of the road safety knowledge and policy field seems to 
be lacking, as are attempts to position knowledge use and barrier to 
knowledge use in the existing institutional relationships.
Is the above an agenda for the remainder of this thesis? Surely not. But it can 
be seen as a list of possibilities for future research on this topic. Furthermore, 
it serves to position this thesis in the range of existing national and
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international studies on knowledge use. Before a connection between the 
institutional analysis of the knowledge-policy arrangement and process 
related barriers for knowledge can be made in Chapter 9, more studies on 
these process-related barriers, preferably theory driven, are necessary. 
Therefore, Chapters 6, 7 and 8 investigate the various stages on the ladder of 
knowledge use in provincial and municipal road safety policies. Chapter 6 
and 7 extend in more detail the research on CROW guidelines, investigated 
by Boer et al., to road safety knowledge in general. In addition, Chapter 7 
examines knowledge use of cost and effect knowledge on road safety 
measures to investigate whether the barriers to the use of CBAs and CEAs as 
mentioned in Chapter 5 are typical for these techniques or whether they apply 
to the use of knowledge of costs and effects in general, or maybe even to 
knowledge of road safety in general. Chapter 8 takes this even further by 
leaving out the focus on costs and effects altogether and focussing on 
knowledge of interests other than road safety.
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6. Use of knowledge by policy-makers in Dutch
provinces
6.1. Introduction
Having investigated the institutional context of road safety in Chapter 4, and 
distinguished three institutional barriers specific to the road safety field, the 
following Chapters 6, 7 and 8 focus on both institutional and process-related 
barriers by studying concrete policy processes. Chapter 5 analysed several 
studies on knowledge use in road safety policy processes. However, these 
studies have some limitations that make it difficult to draw  conclusions 
appropriate to the Dutch situation, where a large part of policy-making and 
implementation takes place at a regional and local level. Some are not based 
on Dutch policy-making while others only consider policy-making at a 
national level. Few of them study more than one case systematically and the 
majority does not consider institutional as well as process-related barriers. 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 provide studies on barriers based on actual policy 
processes in the Netherlands at various policy levels, taking into account the 
given institutional context as sketched in Chapter 4 .
The present chapter investigates whether these institutional and process 
barriers can be identified and understood in multiple case studies in Dutch 
provinces. The study looks at the use of cost and effect knowledge of 
infrastructural measures in provincial road safety policy-making in an 
explorative way. The guiding research questions for this chapter are:
• To what extent do provinces use cost and effect knowledge o f infrastructural 
road safety measures in their policy?
• Which barriers do provinces experience in using knowledge o f cost-effective 
infrastructural road safety measures in their policy?
The following section restates the analytical concepts employed to describe 
and interpret the empirical findings, provides a methodological account of 
the choices made in this investigation. The third section analyses the extent 
to which knowledge is used in provincial policy processes. The fourth section 
inventories and evaluates the barriers to the use of knowledge in road safety 
policy that provinces themselves mention. Section 6.5 concludes on the main 
findings.
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6.2. Concepts and methods
6.2.1. Analytical concepts
As mentioned in Chapter 5, two analytical concepts are used throughout 
Chapters 6 to 8 to describe and understand two types of empirical findings. 
The first concept, the Knott and Wildavsky ladder of knowledge use (Knott 
& Wildavsky, 1980), measures the use of cost and effect knowledge in 
provincial road safety policy. The ladder distinguishes seven ascending 
levels of knowledge use, described in detail in Chapter 2. Section 6.2.3 explains 
which levels are investigated in this study. The second concept, the four 
groups of process-related and institutional barriers mentioned in Chapter 2, is 
used to identify the barriers to using knowledge in policy processes named 
by provinces in the present chapter.
6.2.2. Selection of the cases
In this section, the decision to study cost and effect knowledge, and policy 
processes with respect to infrastructural measures at provincial level is 
explained. The choice stemmed from the observation in Chapter 4 that a large 
part of road safety policy is currently developed at a regional and local level. 
Furthermore, provinces are alleged to be the directors of regional and local 
road safety policy (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2008). In addition 
to this, investigating policies of the provinces provided an opportunity to 
conduct a comparative multiple case study. All twelve provinces were 
investigated.
A second decision made in this study was to investigate the use of cost and 
effect knowledge. There were two reasons for focussing on this specific type 
of knowledge. Firstly, it was a way of limiting and thus managing the 
amount of knowledge to be studied. Secondly, it was expected that studying 
the use of cost and effect knowledge would provide an opportunity to 
observe one of the institutional barriers to knowledge use in optima forma. 
As was reported in Chapters 4 and 5, the technical knowledge provided by 
knowledge organisations in cost-benefit analyses and cost-effectiveness 
analyses have tended not to correspond to the political language and 
thinking of policy-making in governmental bodies (Bax, Elvik & Veisten, 
2009; Elvik, 2003). CEA and CBA related knowledge have seemed thus to be 
an exemplary case for this institutional barrier in knowledge utilisation 
research. However, since CBAs and CEAs for the most part did not target the
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provincial level, the present study looked at cost and effect knowledge in 
general instead of focussing on CBAs and CEAs.
A third decision was to limit the study to infrastructural road safety 
measures, excluding educational and enforcement measures. This followed 
on logically from the second choice, since reliable cost and effect knowledge 
was widely available for infrastructural road safety measures (for example 
Elvik, 2001; Schoon, Wesemann & Roszbach, 2000; Winkelbauer & Stefan, 
2005), but much less so for educational and enforcement measures.
6.2.3. Operationalisation of knowledge use
When investigating the use of knowledge in policy processes, it is important 
to define the word 'use' precisely and clearly. In Chapter 2 this was done 
theoretically (Edelenbos, 2000). It is important to realise that those 
interviewed for the study can be expected to comprehend 'use' in (slightly) 
different ways. This impedes an unequivocal empirical examination of the 
subject. In this chapter, the term 'use' is defined according to the seven level 
ladder developed by Knott & Wildavsky (1980).
Not all of the levels on the Knott & Wildavsky ladder are equally easy to 
operationalise. For example, it is easier to ask respondents whether they have 
read a report than to assess the impact of a report on the number of road 
deaths. The present study investigated three levels in particular: reading and 
understanding knowledge (cognition, level 2), efforts to adopt research 
results in policy (effort, level 4) and the influence of knowledge on the 
implemented policy (implementation, level 6). Although this can be seen as a 
restriction, these three levels are judged to reflect a sufficient spread over the 
original ladder.
The three levels were operationalised in three separate parts of a 
questionnaire. Respondents were asked whether they had used cost and 
effect information in policy-making on infrastructural road safety measures. 
It was assumed that respondents would interpret the word 'use' as a question 
on the effort level, for example, whether they had discussed the information 
or written about it.
Thereafter, respondents were given a short list of relevant publications on 
infrastructural measures containing cost and/or effect information. Three 
criteria determined the selection of the list of relevant publications. The 
publications had to focus on one or more road safety measures for 80
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km/hour-roads. Furthermore, the publications had to be widely available to 
all provinces. Finally, the publications had to have practical relevance for 
road designers. All of the selected publications (see Section 6.3.1) meet these 
criteria. The 'cognition' level was operationalised by asking respondents 
whether they knew these publications, the 'effort' level by asking whether 
they had used them in their policy-making on infrastructural measures.
Furthermore, the 'implementation' level was operationalised by asking 
respondents which infrastructural measures they had and had not 
implemented on the provincial 80km/h roads. A list of all possible cost- 
effective measures on 80km/h roads was provided, based on the expert- 
opinions of SWOV-researchers. If measures had not been implemented, 
respondents were asked the reasons for this. All questionnaires were semi­
structured and are included in Bax and Jagtman (2008, p. 41 and further).
6.2.4. Further on method
The questionnaire consisted of three parts, related to the three levels 
mentioned above. The first part, consisting of a general question about the 
use of cost and effect information, was carried out by telephone and directed 
at policy-makers responsible for, amongst others, road safety (hereafter: road 
safety policy-makers). These respondents were asked to select experts in the 
provincial organisation for the second and third part of the questionnaire, in 
which questions about the use of specific publications and about the 
implementation of measures were asked. In some provinces, one person 
could answer the second and third part of the questionnaire, but sometimes 
it was necessary to speak to a second person. Road safety policy-makers or 
road designers answered the second and third question. In half of the 
provinces, the second and third part of the questionnaire was conducted in a 
semi-structured face-to-face interview, taking one and a half to two hours. 
Due to limited time the rest of the provinces was approached by telephone. 
Both the face-to face and telephone questionnaire were tested in advance by 
means of a pilot study in two provinces.
The respondents were asked for the opinion of the province, not their 
personal opinion. Since the subject of the research was not expected to be 
politically sensitive, and the respondents were stating their professional 
opinion as a provincial official, the answers were not registered 
anonymously. A list of the respondents is given in Bax and Jagtman (2008, p. 
51).
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6.3. Results: use of knowledge in provinces
6.3.1. Use of knowledge: cognition and effort
This section presents the results of the question as to whether those 
responsible at provincial level had read the cost and effect information about 
the pre-selected list of infrastructural measures on 80km/h roads (cognition) 
and whether they had made efforts to adopt this information in their policies 
(effort).
Table 6.1 displays the number of provinces familiar with cost and effects of 
infrastructural road safety measures.
Measure
Costs Effects
Known Not
known*
Known in 
figures
Global impression 
known
Not
known*
Cycle paths 10 2 3 5 4
Roundabout 12 0 11 1 0
Raised intersection 5 7 2 2 8
Driving direction 
separation **
4 7 2 3 6
Obstacle-free zone 7 5 2 5 5
Semi-hard shoulder 7 5 2 3 7
Cycle crossing 10 2 2 6 4
Service road 7 5 2 3 7
Rumble strip 6 6 2 3 7
Roadside safety 
construction
8 4 2 4 6
Overtaking section 3 9 0 2 10
* This includes provinces who do not implement the measure. 
** This question was omitted accidentally in one province.
Table 6.1. The number of provinces that were familiar with the costs and effects of measures 
(N=12).
The obvious conclusion is that provinces had considerably more insight into 
the costs than into the effects of measures. Almost all of the provinces were 
familiar with the costs of three out of a total of 11 measures and more than
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half knew the cost of seven measures. However, they were much less 
familiar with the effects of the measures. The vast majority of provinces had 
a quantitative knowledge of the effect of only one measure. The majority of 
the provinces had a general impression of another three measures. In 
addition, the interviews revealed that a minority of the provinces 
implemented measures of which they did not know the costs and/or the 
effects. In other words: the availability of knowledge on costs and effects was 
decisive for most provinces on whether a measure was implemented or not.
Table 6.2 shows the source of the information provinces use per measure.
Measure Own study or 
accident figures
Other organisation, 
province or consultancy
Not
applicable*
Cycle paths 5 0 7
Roundabout 8 4 0
Raised intersection 3 1 8
Driving direction 
separation **
3 1 7
Obstacle-free zone 2 1 9
Semi-hard shoulder 1 2 9
Cycle crossing 6 1 5
Service road 3 1 8
Rumble strip 0 0 12
Roadside safety 
construction
1 4 7
Overtaking section 1 0 11
* Not applicable = provinces who do not implement the measure. 
** This question was omitted accidentally in one province.
Table 6.2. Source of information used by provinces (N=12).
Most provinces familiar with the effects of measures had derived these from 
their own studies or accident analyses before and after implementing a 
measure on a certain road section. Only a minority of the provinces based 
their knowledge on literature from outside their own organisation. While the 
differences were small, the province of Zeeland stood out clearly, by using 
only knowledge from outside its own organisation.
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Provinces were asked to specify which sources of information they had used 
besides their own studies and accident figures. Studies conducted by other 
provinces were mentioned most frequently, e.g. those carried out by Zeeland 
and Overijssel on road shoulders, and by Gelderland on overtaking lanes for 
agricultural vehicles. Information was exchanged on consultation boards 
such as the Road Safety Trade Council (Vakberaad Verkeersveiligheid), for 
road safety policy-makers and the Building Trade Council (Vakberaad 
Bouw), for road designers of the Association of the Provinces of the 
Netherlands (IPO).
In addition to provincial studies, provinces referred to 'theoretical studies' as 
a source of information. They named few specific publications, but cited 
organisations such as CROW, SWOV and TNO. In addition, private 
consultancies were often mentioned as an important source of knowledge.
The provincial road designers were also asked whether they had read and 
understood certain publications on road safety measures on 80km/h roads 
and whether they had used these publications in their policy-making. The 
following publications were used. Note that the publications were presented 
to the respondents in Dutch,
• Handbook for Road Design (Handboek wegontwerp ) (CROW, 2002a)
• Guidelines for Essential Distinguishing Features (Richtlijnen Essentiële 
Herkenbaarheidskenmerken (EHK)) (CROW, 2004c)
• Uniformity in Roundabouts (Eenheid in rotondes) (CROW, 1998)
• Guidelines for Raised Intersections (Richtlijnen verkeersplateaus) (CROW, 
2007c)
• Handbook for Roadside Safety Design (Handboek veilige inrichting van 
bermen) (CROW, 2004b)
• Advancing Sustainable Safety (Door met Duurzaam Veilig) (Wegman & 
Aarts, 2006; Wegman & Aarts, 2005)
• Fact sheet Bicycle Facilities (Fact sheet Fietsvoorzieningen) (SWOV, 2008a; 
2008c)
• Fact sheet Recognizable Road Design (Fact sheet Herkenbare Vormgeving) 
(SWOV, 2007b; 2008d)
• Fact sheet Regional Road Safety Explorer (Fact sheet 
Verkeersveiligheidsverkenner voor de Regio) (SWOV, 2005)
• Fact sheet Cost-benefit analysis for road safety measures (Fact sheet 
Kosten-batenanalyse) (SWOV, 2008b; 2008e).
All CROW publications were known to most of the provinces and well used. 
All provinces had also read and understood 'Advancing Sustainable Safety',
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but only half of the provinces actually used the book. The SWOV fact sheets 
were less well known: two fact sheets were known to the majority of the 
provinces, the other two were known to one-third to a quarter of the 
provinces. In addition, these fact sheets were used rarely; only a quarter to 
one-third of the provinces familiar with the fact sheets actually used them.
6.3.2. Use of knowledge: implementation
The text below describes the road safety measures that provinces implement 
on their 80km/h roads. Barriers to implementation are discussed in section
6.4.2. As mentioned earlier, a minority of the provinces were found to have 
implemented measures without prior knowledge of costs and/or effects, 
although it is not known whether this knowledge is an explicit (such as a 
specific publication) or an implicit assumption about costs and effectiveness.
Table 6.3 lists the measures provinces implement on their 80km/h roads. It 
does not reveal whether measures were taken incidentally or were the norm.
Measure Implemented Not implemented Still considering
Cycle paths 12 0 0
Roundabout 12 0 0
Raised intersection 5 7 0
Driving direction separation 8 4 0
Obstacle-free zone 11 1 0
Semi-hard shoulder 6 4 2
Cycle crossing 11 1 0
Service road 9 3 0
Rumble strip 7 4 1
Roadside safety construction 10 2 0
Overtaking section 4 8 0
Table 6.3. Number of provinces implemented selected road safety measures (N=12).
The table indicates that virtually all of the provinces implemented some of 
the selected measures, such as cycle paths, roundabouts and obstacle-free 
zones. A minority implemented other measures, such as raised intersections 
and overtaking sections. The following section addresses the question as to 
why provinces implemented certain measures and did not implement others.
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6.4. Results: barriers to knowledge use in provinces
Provinces were asked to state reasons for not or not always using (in terms of 
cognition and effort) knowledge and for not or not always implementing the 
selected road safety measures on their 80km/h roads. The answer to the latter 
was expected to provide information about the problems provinces 
experience when converting knowledge into specific road safety measures.
6.4.1. Barriers to use in terms of cognition and effort
Table 6.4 gives an overview of the reasons given by the provinces for not 
using the selected publications.
Too
abstract
Not vision  
of province
Too old Other
reasons
Total*
CROW: Essential Distinguishing 
Features
0 1 0 0 1
CROW: Roundabouts 0 1 0 0 1
CROW: Raised Intersections 0 3 0 1 4
CROW: Roadsides 0 0 0 2 2
Advancing Sustain. Safety 2 0 2 2 6
FS Bicycles 1 0 1 1 3
FS Recognizable Road Design 1 0 2 2 5
FS RS Explorer 1 1 0 3 5
FS CBA 1 1 0 1 3
Total 6 7 5 12 30
* Number of provinces read and understood but not used the publication. Not included in 
the table are provinces that use the publication or that have not read and understood the 
publications.
Table 6.4. Reasons given by provinces for not using the selected publications.
The answers varied a great deal as is illustrated by Table 6.4. The main reason 
for not using CROW guidelines was that these were not in line with the 
policy and design vision of the province. SWOV publications were not used 
because they were considered too abstract and out of date. Since the reasons 
for non-use were asked in an open question, a number of answers could be 
categorized as 'other reasons'. This category contains answers such as "we do 
not implement the measure at all", "we are familiar with similar knowledge"
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and "we are not always aware of new/current fact sheets". Some provinces 
mentioned that 'Advancing Sustainable Safety' was used by policy-makers, 
but not by road designers. This could be due to the fact that this publication 
is of a more abstract nature than fact sheets and CROW publications.
6.4.2. Barriers to implementation per measure
Knowledge use on an implementation level was also studied. Table 6.5 
demonstrates the reasons for non-implementation per measure, given in 
response to an open question. The various answers were divided into ten 
categories. Two researchers carried out the categorization independently to 
minimize subjectivity. Provinces could name more than one reason per 
measure, or could indicate that there was no barrier to implementation. The 
total number of barriers plus the 'no barrier' option therefore can amount to 
more than twelve (the number of respondents). The first row, for example, 
can be read as follows: nine provinces did not see a barrier to the 
implementation of cycle paths while three provinces encountered five 
barriers in total.
Table 6.5 can be studied at two levels: per measure and per barrier.
Analysis per measure
Three groups of measures can be distinguished. In only a few cases did the 
provinces hardly see any barriers, with cycle paths as an example. For some 
measures, the vast majority of provinces named the same barriers. For 
example: two-thirds of the provinces considered roundabouts in conflict with 
other provincial policies such as traffic flow or landscape policy. Three- 
quarters of the provinces stated the same reason for not implementing raised 
intersections. Rumble strips were considered a fairly undisputed measure in 
technical terms, but almost half of the provinces met with opposition from 
citizens due to noise. Half of the provinces claimed to lack space to 
implement an obstacle-free zone alongside the roads.
For yet other measures, provinces were not unanimous and stated various 
barriers to measures such as driving section separation, semi-hard shoulders, 
cycle crossings and service roads. Examples of barriers mentioned here are a 
conflict with provincial views on traffic policy and the absence of a problem, 
together with the costs of the measures, opposition from the public and not 
being convinced of the effect of the measures.
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Cycle paths 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 9 0
R oundabout 3 0 2 1 2 8 1 0 2 0
Raised
intersection 0 1 0 0 0 9 4 1 0 0
Driving
direction
separation 2 4 2 3 4 2 2 1 0 0
Obstacle- 
free zone 4 0 6 0 1 4 2 2 0 0
Semi-hard
shoulder 4 0 0 3 3 1 0 4 0 0
Cycle
crossing 5 0 2 0 5 2 1 0 1 0
Service road 3 0 5 0 4 3 3 3 0 0
Rumble
strip 1 1 0 1 2 0 5 3 1 0
Roadside
safety
construction 1 0 1 2 3 2 0 5 1 0
Overtaking
section 2 0 2 1 4 3 1 2 0 0
Total 26 6 21 11 29 34 20 22 -- 0
Table 6.5. Number of provinces that mentioned a barrier to implementing road safety 
measures.
Analysis per barrier
Some barriers were scarcely mentioned by any of the provinces. The barrier 
'excessive maintenance' appeared to be relevant only for driving direction 
separation. Few provinces questioned the effectiveness of the measures, and 
only then for measures such as driving direction separation and semi-hard 
shoulders. Only in the case of obstacle-free zones and service roads was 'lack 
of space' relevant, while opposition from the public played the main role in 
the non-implementation rumble strips and raised intersections. These 
findings correspond with the study of Boer et al. (2008, p.21 and 66), who 
reported similar opposition from the public to speed hum ps and found a
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minority of 20% of the respondents to have reservations about the 
effectiveness of measures.
More often, the costs of measures were mentioned as a barrier. Cycle 
crossings especially were considered too expensive, but the same was true 
for obstacle-free zones and semi-hard shoulders. Roundabouts and service 
roads were less frequently considered too expensive.
The barrier 'No problem'
A remarkable reason respondents gave for not implementing road safety 
measures was the absence of a problem. They indicated that the type of 
accident that could be prevented by the measures was rare. To investigate 
whether this line of thought relates to the road traffic accident statistics, lists 
were made of the number of accidents per province on 80km/h roads 
between 2001 and 2006 and the accompanying accident types for each 
measure. Table 6.6 includes only the provinces that mentioned the barrier 
was 'No problem'.
At first sight, Table 6.6 would seem to reveal a contrast between the 
perception of the provinces and the actual accident figures. Accidents that 
could be prevented by the measures did not seem to be as rare as provinces 
claimed. However, on further inspection, provinces might have had good 
reasons for not perceiving these figures as a problem. A possible reason is the 
fact that most of the accident figures in Table 6.6 are material damage only 
(MDO) accidents, which means that implementation of the measures would 
have prevented few or no road deaths or casualties. This might have been a 
reason for provinces to spend their budget on different measures. Another 
reason might be that if, as is probable, provinces had compared their accident 
figures to those of other provinces or to the total number of accidents in the 
province, they might not have perceived this type of accident to be a 
problem. The table does not provide for such a comparison.
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Measure Accident type on 
provincial, 80km/h roads 
in rural areas
Provinces 
indicating to have 
'no problem'
Number of 
accidents 2001 
until 2006*
Driving direction 
separation
Frontal accidents Drenthe 71
Flevoland 62
Gelderland 461
Groningen 83
Semi-hard
shoulder
Shoulder accidents Drenthe 551
Flevoland 562
Gelderland 938
Cycle crossing Bicycle accidents (crossing 
on intersection)
Gelderland 317
Groningen 46
Limburg 123
Overijssel 135
Zuid-Holland 132
Service road Accidents with access 
related traffic 
Accidents with off- 
turning slow traffic and 
motorized traffic
Drenthe 137
Gelderland 675
Groningen 189
Limburg 274
Roadside safety 
construction
Shoulder accidents Drenthe 551
Flevoland 562
Groningen 823
Overtaking
section
Frontal accidents Drenthe 71
Groningen 83
Limburg 141
Noord-Brabant 205
* Source: BRON (Bestand geRegistreerde Ongevallen Nederland). Ministry of 
Infrastructure, including material damage only (MDO) accidents
Table 6.6. Not implemented measures due to an indicated lack of problem.
The barrier 'in conflict with the province's views on traffic policy'
A last barrier to implementation frequently mentioned was a conflict with a 
province's view in traffic policies. Table 6.7 sums up the measures for which 
provinces mentioned this barrier and the conflicting views.
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Measure Conflicting views on traffic policy
Roundabout Hinder traffic flow
Raised intersection Does not fulfil the requirements of distributor roads
Obstacle-free zones Preference for different measure e.g. shoulder measures
Service road Hinder traffic flow
Overtaking sections Preference for different measures e.g. for example service 
roads
Table 6.7. Measures and conflicting views.
The table indicates traffic flow as an important reason for not implementing 
road safety measures such as roundabouts and service roads. However, it is 
remarkable that some provinces implemented service roads precisely for 
traffic flow reasons, while other used this argument to not implement them. 
There would seem to be a lack of agreement on the effects of this measure. 
Another reason for non-implementation was a preference for another 
measure, presumably having the same effect.
6.5. Summary and conclusions
6.5.1. Knowledge use: cognition, effort and implementation
Did provinces read and understand the information on costs and effects of 
road safety measures and thus use the knowledge on the cognition level of 
the Knott and Wildavsky ladder? Approximately half of them claimed to 
have a general idea of the costs and effects of road safety measures on 
80km/h roads. Two-third said to have more insight into the costs than into 
the effects. Their knowledge was mainly based on their own accident 
analyses and to a far lesser extent (around 30% of the respondents) on 
information from outside their own organisation.
Did provinces make efforts to adopt knowledge of the costs and effects of 
road safety measures in their policy? Two-thirds of the provinces stated that 
cost and effect information was decisive in policy-making about road safety 
measures. However, a minority also indicated that they regularly 
implemented measures without being aware of their effect, and to a lesser 
extent of their cost. They scarcely adopted cost and effect knowledge from 
outside their own organisation in policy.
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Did provinces implement road safety measures based on cost and effect 
knowledge? Provinces applied many of the selected road safety measures on 
their roads. These included cycle paths, roundabouts, obstacle free zones, 
cycle crossings and roadside safety constructions. Few provinces also 
constructed raised intersections and overtaking sections. Since the majority 
of the provinces had stated that cost and effect information played a role in 
the policy-making, it can be assumed that the implementation is also based 
on this information, either quantitatively or qualitatively.
6.5.2. Barriers to knowledge use
Provinces were asked the reason for not implementing certain cost-effective 
road safety measures on their 80km/h roads. This question was expected to 
provide information about the barriers provinces faced when converting 
knowledge into specific measures. Three barriers were mentioned most 
often. Provinces stated that the road safety measures were in conflict with 
their views on traffic policy, that the measures would not solve existing 
problems and that they would be too expensive. In addition, the provinces 
were asked for barriers to the use of the pre-selected publication list. For road 
design guidelines, provinces perceived a difference between the publications 
and their own view on traffic policy as the main barrier. Barriers to 
consulting fact sheets were that they were out of date and too abstract. 
Although only a minority of the provinces indicate this barrier, it is still 
somewhat surprising to see that this does not correspond with the general 
opinion in the road safety field. A possible reason for this discrepancy could 
be a difference between the positions of the officials being the source of this 
general opinion and the respondents in this study.
In Chapter 2, barriers found in the literature were divided into four groups. 
The barriers observed in the present chapter can be interpreted within these 
groups.
It is striking that the present study did not encounter dissemination barriers, 
unlike Boer et al. (2008) who did, for example the inaccessibility of 
guidelines. A possible reason for this is the choice of an open question for 
listing the barriers in the present study, whereas Boer et al. used closed 
questions. The dissemination barrier could have arisen in this study if closed 
questions had been used. Another reason could be that the Boer et al. study 
was carried out by a private consultancy firm. The fact that this study and its 
questionnaires were carried out by SWOV, could have given rise to socially 
desirable answers, although some respondents' statements on SWOV fact
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sheets being out of date and too abstract cannot be judged as a socially 
desirable answer.
With respect to the second group of barriers, that of the needs o f users, the 
barrier 'no problem' indicates that knowledge organisations had provided 
knowledge that policy-makers did not request. In this case, policy-makers 
did not perceive a problem that needed solving. Although accident statistics 
would seem to support the presence of types of accident for which certain 
preventative measures were designed, a closer look at the figures reveals 
possible reasons why some provinces did not perceive this as a problem. 
Possible reasons are the relatively high number of 'material damage only' 
accidents, and the fact that a comparison, either with other provinces or with 
the total number of accidents in their province, could put their statistics into 
perspective. The barriers 'out of date' and 'too abstract' could be interpreted 
as the needs o f users. The information, especially in fact sheets, was not recent, 
specific and applicable enough for some users.
The barriers 'in conflict with provincial views on traffic policy' highlights a 
difference between the knowledge and policy worlds. The knowledge world 
provided sectoral information on road safety, for instance the costs and 
effects of road safety measures. However, the policy world included more 
than road safety information in the decision to implement a measure. It 
employed a more integral approach, negotiating between various interests 
within traffic policy and regarding the knowledge world as a supplier of 
ammunition. These, therefore, can be seen as an institutional barrier described 
in Chapter 4, as the difference between a road safety sector oriented 
knowledge world and a policy world whereby road safety is an integral part 
of traffic policy.
The barrier 'too expensive' does not mean literally that provinces did not 
have the funds to implement the measure. Provinces in general had a fairly 
large budget for infrastructure (for example Ministerie van Verkeer en 
Waterstaat, 2005a; 2006a). Here, 'too expensive' means that provinces had 
other priorities than road safety measures. Although not subject to 
investigation in this study, common sense can indicate three reasons for not 
investing in expensive, yet cost-effective measures. Firstly, provinces have to 
invest a large amount of money in infrastructural road safety measures all at 
one time. Secondly, the economic gain resulting from the measures is not 
returned to the provinces, so they do not benefit directly from the measures, 
but the general public and insurance companies do. Thirdly, since the
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number of casualties is relatively low at a provincial level, provinces cannot 
easily see a short-term effect in the casualty statistics. This barrier is an 
example of one of the cultural differences between knowledge and policy 
and can be interpreted as an institutional barrier. In Chapter 4, this is described 
as a difference in discourse. For science, where cost-effectiveness has a 
technical and objective meaning, it is a technical discourse; for policy it is a 
political discourse, stressing individual political assessment and 
responsibility.
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7. Barriers to knowledge use for provincial policy­
makers: an experimental setting
7.1. Introduction
Chapter 6 investigated the extent to which knowledge is used in designing 
provincial road safety policies, and identified barriers to the actual use of 
available knowledge. The focus was on the use of cost and effect knowledge 
of infrastructural road safety measures for 80km/h roads. The present 
chapter investigates these same questions, but with a quite different research 
approach.
So again, the questions addressed in this chapter are:
• To what extent do provincial policy-makers use cost and effect knowledge of 
infrastructural road safety measures in their policy?
• Which barriers do provincial policy-makers experience to use knowledge of 
cost-effective infrastructural road safety measures in policy?
These two questions, however, are now to be answered using an 
experimental setting as a research method. There are two main reasons for 
investigating these same questions in a different way. Firstly, in interviews 
respondents have to rely on their memory while answering questions, which 
is not always reliable (Baddeley, 1999). In an experimental setting the 
researcher is able to observe and to ask questions during the task itself, 
instead of afterwards. In this case, respondents could be asked which 
knowledge they had used in their policy-making immediately after they had 
taken their decision. Secondly, interviewing is an explorative way of 
investigating barriers to knowledge use. In an experimental setting, one can 
test whether and if so, which barriers actually influence knowledge use by 
constructing and comparing a situation with and without specific barriers.
This chapter is set up as follows. Section 7.2 explains the experimental setting 
and discusses the analytical concepts and methods used. Section 7.3 and 7.4 
describe the results of the experiment by discussing respectively the use of 
knowledge and the barriers to knowledge use. Section 7.5 concludes and 
discusses the results.
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7.2. Concepts and methods
7.2.1. Analytical concepts
As this chapter investigates similar questions as did Chapter 6, it also uses the 
same analytical concepts. The use of cost and effect knowledge in the 
experimental setting is measured on the Knott and Wildavsky ladder of 
knowledge use (Knott & Wildavsky, 1980). Seven hierarchical levels of 
knowledge use are distinguished. The levels concerned are reception of 
knowledge, cognition (read and understand), (frame of) reference, effort 
(making efforts to adopt knowledge in policy), adoption of knowledge, 
implementation and the impact of knowledge (effects). Section 7.2.3 explains 
which levels are investigated in this study. Furthermore, this chapter 
investigates different types of knowledge use such as instrumental use, 
conceptual use and strategic knowledge use. Lastly, barriers from the four 
groups of barriers to knowledge use, as discussed in Chapter 2 , are examined. 
The following section sets out which of the four groups (dissemination, needs 
of users, unilateral or co-production o f knowledge, institutional factors) are the 
focus of the experimental setting.
7.2.2. Operationalisation of the analytical concepts
In this section, the analytical concepts used in the experimental setting are 
operationalised. The various levels of knowledge use to be investigated are 
marked out. Then the barriers used in the experimental setting to measure 
knowledge use are discussed.
Levels of knowledge use investigated
As in Chapter 6, this chapter focuses on the 'effort' and the 'implementation' 
level of the Knott and Wildavsky ladder. In the experimental setting the 
respondents were asked to formulate their policy recommendations for the 
implementation of road safety measures. Immediately after deciding, they 
were asked on which criteria their decision was based. The question refers to 
the 'effort' level on the Knott and Wildavsky ladder: did the respondents 
make an effort to incorporate the knowledge presented to them in their 
decision?
Barriers used in the experimental setting
In Chapter 6, two groups of barriers that were mentioned most often as 
reasons for not using knowledge in policy-making were found. The first 
group consisted of institutional barriers, namely the barriers 'conflicts with
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provincial views on traffic policy' and 'too expensive'. The second group 
consisted of the needs o f  users-barriers: the barriers 'too old, too abstract' and 
'no problem'. These two barrier groups were also used in the experimental 
setting.
In the experimental setting, participants received three cases. All of the cases 
consisted of a road safety problem on a road section or intersection. The 
cases, designed by a research team with a background in civil engineering, 
economy and public administration and tested by two provincial policy­
makers not involved in the study, were fictitious, but intended to be realistic. 
Two cases were constructed around institutional barriers, deliberately creating 
situations in which road safety has to compete with other policies or 
interests. Participants received two versions of these first two cases; one 
version with the barrier and one version without. The third case was based 
on the barrier the needs o f users, providing a variety of texts suitable for 
different requests for advice. The three cases are described below (for details 
see Bax & Jagtman, 2009).
In the first case, road safety has to compete with circulation policy. The case 
describes a T-junction on a distributor road where many accidents occur. 
Knowledge is provided that indicates that the most cost-effective and safe 
option is to convert the junction into a roundabout. In the version of the case 
that includes a barrier to knowledge use, knowledge was given that 
indicated a serious decrease in traffic flow if a roundabout was constructed. 
Traffic lights at a raised intersection would be the ideal solution for the traffic 
flow problem, but would be far less safe.
In the second case, road safety has to compete with the wishes of the public. 
The case is constructed around the question of whether agricultural vehicles 
should use the main (distributor) road, or (much safer and cost-effective) use 
service roads. Although studies show that agricultural vehicles on service 
roads are a safer option (Schoon, Wesemann & Roszbach, 2000, p. 24), and 
even though this knowledge was presented to the participants, most citizens 
do not believe this and dislike the combination of agricultural vehicles and 
bicycles on service roads. In the version of the case that includes an 
institutional barrier to knowledge use, citizens are strongly opposed to this 
measure.
In the third case, participants were asked to choose the most appropriate 
knowledge source for formulating their policy recommendations to their
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deputed, given various types of requests for advice. The case was devised 
around the implementation of rumble strips. Three advice requests were 
formulated:
• A general one, to make general recommendations on rumble strips for a 
province with no experience with this measure;
• A strategic one, to advise the deputed strategically not to implement 
rumble strips;
• A specific one, to make recommendations for extra budget for rumble 
strips, while the decision to implement the measure had already been 
taken.
The participants received three texts, (a general, a strategic and a specific 
text) tailored to these three advice requests. In addition to measuring the 
barrier the needs o f users, this question was also expected to reveal which 
types of knowledge use (strategic, instrumental, conceptual) actors favour.
7.2.3. Experimental setting 
Selection of participants
Due to the time consuming nature of the study - a full day per participant - a 
relatively small number of participants was invited to take part. To minimize 
the burden on the provinces, the maximum number of participants was 
limited to two per province. As in Chapter 6, all of the provinces received an 
invitation to take part in the experiment. Both policy-makers and road 
designers were approached. A different use of knowledge was expected; 
policy-makers were expected to focus more on knowledge about the various 
interests involved in the policy-making, while road designers were expected 
to focus more on technical knowledge.
Initially all twelve provinces gave their consent for participation in the study. 
However, at the last moment, the provinces Groningen and Zuid-Holland 
were unable to take part and the provinces of Zeeland and Limburg were 
only able to delegate one participant (Bax & Jagtman, 2009, p. 39). This 
resulted in a total number of 18 participants representing 10 provinces. The 
experiment was spread over two days, each involving about half of the 
participants.
Study design and expectations
As stated above, in the first and second cases, two versions of each case were 
presented to the participants. The participants received a neutral version of 
each case (control case) and a version of the same case with a barrier to 
knowledge use (experimental case), creating a situation in which road safety
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had to compete with other policies or interests. The experimental cases are 
indicated here as case 1A and 2A, the control cases as case 1B and 2B. Each 
case provided several possible road safety measures to solve a road safety 
problem. One of these measures was presented as cost-effective and best 
suited to road safety interest. Another measure was presented as less suitable 
for road safety, but served another interest (of citizens in case 2) or policy 
(traffic flow in case 1) better, and functioned as a barrier to use road safety 
knowledge in the case. It was expected that participants would choose the 
safe, cost-effective measure in case 1B and 2B and the less safe measure 
serving the other interest in case 1A and 2A due to the added barrier in these 
last two cases.
The third case consisted of three versions. No control case was used here. 
The case was presented using three different types of advice requests, a 
request to make general policy recommendations (3A), a request to advise 
the deputed strategically (3B) and a request to write a budget proposal (3C). 
Participants had to choose a knowledge source that matched the request. For 
this purpose three texts were presented: a general policy text, a strategic text 
with a recommendation to abandon the measure and a specific text on costs 
and effects of the measure. It was expected that the participants would 
choose a text that matched the advice request. Each of the three cases was 
followed by a question on the reason for their decision.
In all three cases, participants received extra knowledge. The knowledge 
consisted of accident figures, circulation figures, maps and background 
knowledge with cost and effect knowledge about possible measures 
depending on the case. As mentioned above, policy-makers were expected to 
focus more on knowledge about the various interests, while road designers 
were expected to focus more on technical knowledge. A limited number of 
measures and knowledge sources was given in each case, and participants 
also had the option of putting forward their own solution to the problem. 
After making their choice, participants were asked to clarify their choice and 
their use of knowledge.
A within subjects design, in which each participant is given all versions of 
the cases, was chosen as research design. In this way, optimal use of the 
small number of participants was made. A disadvantage of this approach is 
that answers to the first version of the case could influence the answers to the 
second version (a 'learning' effect). To check for this influence, participants 
were divided into two groups on both days. One group received the
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experimental case A first, and then the control case B. The other group was 
given the cases in reverse order. For the third case (with three versions), one 
group received the cases in the order A, B, and C, while the other group was 
given the cases in the order B, C and A. The two groups consisted of a mix of 
policy-makers and road designers. To adjust the presentation order of the 
cases even further, the participants started with case 1 on the first day and 
with case 2 on the second day. Where the analysis indicated an order of 
presentation influence, a new analysis was conducted, in which only the first 
cases presented were taken. This was done to exclude a learning effect.
Group Decision Room
The experiment was conducted in the Group Decision Room (GDR) of the 
Radboud University Nijmegen. Here the participants sat at their own 
computer, which was part of a network of twelve computers. They received 
questions and could enter their answers into the computer. The cases were 
provided on two A3 sheets of paper. The participants were not allowed to 
confer with each other and had to make their choices individually. Preceding 
the experiment, the participants were asked to type their name, post and 
province into the GDR device, to become acquainted with it.
There were two important reasons for choosing the GDR as research 
instrument. Firstly, the GDR provides a tool to enable a structured discussion 
with a relatively large group of people. It allows discussion and at the same 
time provides an opportunity of eliciting an opinion from every individual. 
Furthermore, the discussion using the GDR takes less time than a verbal 
discussion, because all participants can type at the same time. Secondly, the 
GDR has a very convenient storage function for data. This prevents extra 
work.
7.2.4. External validity of the cases
A criticism that has been made of experiments is their lack of external 
validity (Swanborn, 1987, p. 245). Experimental conditions are per definition 
not 'real' and therefore the outcomes of an experiment are not easily 
convertible to the world outside the laboratory. To overcome this criticism, in 
the afternoon session of the experiment, the participants were asked in an 
open question whether they considered the cases realistic and whether they 
had needed more or other knowledge to reach a sensible decision. First, all 
participants submitted an individual (initially private) statement, and could 
then respond to each other's statements. Not all of the participants' 
statements were formulated in such a way that their judgement was obvious.
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These answers were excluded. Table 7.1 shows the summary of the 
statements.
(Very) realistic Realistic, but insufficient 
knowledge
Unrealistic
Case 1 6 8 2
Case 2 7 9 0
Case 3 7 2 5
Table 7.1. Number of participants who judged the cases to be realistic or unrealistic.
In general, the majority of the participants considered the cases realistic. 
Various participants indicated having experienced similar situations in 
practice, especially in case 2. In case 1, half of the participants indicated a 
need for (extra) knowledge about land ownership, about the traffic network 
and about the physical surrounding . In case 2, various participants indicated 
that the difference between case A and B in relation to safety seemed only 
very slight and that politics played a more important role in the decision 
than the cost and effect knowledge. In case 3, five participants did not 
consider the case realistic. Two of them would have liked to have had more 
knowledge about accident frequency; one was not in favour of rumble strips 
anyway. However, two others stated in their explanation that they wanted to 
give their deputed politically neutral recommendations, while the case 
tempted them to involve the opinion of their deputed in their advice in case 
3B. This point was elaborated upon further in the group discussion. Most 
participants wanted to advise their deputeds as neutrally as possible, 
regardless of the wishes of the deputed. In their view, politicians are 
responsible for justifying an alternative choice. A few participants wanted to 
adapt their advice to the wishes of the deputed, stating that civil servants are 
employed to serve the authorities. This difference in vision on the role of 
officials caused a somewhat heated discussion.
7.3. Results: use of knowledge
7.3.1. Effort and implementation: use of cost and effect knowledge
The first case was constructed around junction measures. Knowledge 
provided showed that the most cost-effective measure was a roundabout. 
When asked to explain their choice ('effort'), most participants indicated that 
their decision was taken on road safety and traffic flow grounds. Both in the
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experimental case and the control case, only a few people mentioned costs 
and effects explicitly as a reason for their decision, although many made 
more implicit remarks such as "safer", "fewer accidents" et cetera. Almost all 
of the participants stated "road safety" as the main reason for their decision, 
possibly implying the expected effect of the road safety measure on accident 
frequencies. The second case was formed around agricultural vehicles on 
main roads or service roads. The most cost-effective measure here was to 
assign agricultural vehicles to service roads. Only one participant stated costs 
as a reason for his decision; no one mentioned safety effects explicitly. This is 
not surprising because the measure is very inexpensive. About half of the 
participants stated "road safety" as an important reason for their choice. This 
might well be an indication that they take the effect of the road safety 
measures into account.
The number of participants who decided to opt for the road safety measure 
was examined to measure the use of knowledge on the 'implementation' 
level. As Section 7.4.1 and 7.4.2 show, a sizeable majority of the participants 
decided to implement this measure in both the experimental and control 
case.
7.3.2. Instrumental, strategic or conceptual use
In the third case, participants received three kinds of policy questions (a 
general advice question, a strategic advice question and a specific advice 
question) on the implementation of rumble strips. At the same time, they 
received a general, a strategic and a specific text with knowledge on rumble 
strips and were asked which text they would use for which type of advice. It 
was expected that they would use the general text for the general advice 
request and so on. Section 7.4.3 discusses whether this expectation was 
correct. The present section describes the choices of the participants for the 
various types of texts. Table 7.2 describes all three advice requests.
The first request for advice is a general one: to write a policy document for a 
province with no prior experience of rumble strips. The accompanying 
general text contains knowledge regarding the necessity of roadside 
measures in general and rumble strips in particular. The second request for 
advice was for a policy document for a deputed who was sceptical about the 
applicability of rumble strips, and had asked for well-founded alternatives. 
The accompanying strategic text contained a report by a neighbouring 
province that is less than enthusiastic about the implementation of rumble 
strips on their roads. The third request for advice was for a policy document
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with the financial consequences of the implementation of rumble strips. The 
accompanying specific text contained knowledge about costs and effects of 
rumble strips.
General advice 
request 3A
Strategic advice 
request 3B
Specific advice 
request 3C
General text 9 3 3
Specific text 7 6 10
Strategic text 0 4 1
Combination of two texts 1 3 2
Other 1 2 2
Table 7.2. Text used in cases 3A, 3B and 3C.
When comparing the use of the three texts in the three cases, the specific text 
is clearly the one used most, whereas the strategic text was used the least. 
This indicates a preference for knowledge that is as specific and applicable as 
possible. The strategic text was chosen the least. The discussion in the 
afternoon session indicated that participants wanted to inform their 
governments neutrally and not strategically. This corresponds to the findings 
above.
7.4. Results: barriers to knowledge use
The three cases not only investigated the use of cost and effect knowledge; 
their aim was also to discover how much influence certain barriers have on 
knowledge use. The institutional barrier 'conflicts with other policies' was 
used in the first two cases in two variations: a road safety measure that 
conflicts with traffic flow policies (case 1), and a road safety measure that 
conflicts with public support (case 2). The barrier the needs o f users was used 
in the third case: it tests the use of specific knowledge sources for parallel 
advice requests. The two cases and their results are discussed in the 
following subsections.
7.4.1. Traffic flow or road safety?
In the first case, participants were required to choose between a given 
number of junction measures. In the control case 1B, a roundabout was the 
most logical option for the road safety problem sketched in the case, as traffic 
flow is guaranteed sufficiently in this option. The roundabout would also be
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a logical solution for the road safety problem in experimental case 1A, but 
here the knowledge provided indicated that the traffic capacity of the 
roundabout is just too small to deal with the (greater) traffic flow. From the 
circulation point of view, traffic lights would therefore be more logical in this 
case, but less safe. Table 7.3 shows the choices of the participants.
Case 1A Case 1B
Single carriageway roundabout, including custom made solutions 13 16
Traffic lights at junction 0 0
Traffic lights and raised intersection 2 0
No changes 0 0
Other 3 2
Table 7.3. Alternatives chosen for case 1A and 1B.
In both cases, the majority of the participants chose a single carriageway 
roundabout with slightly fewer choosing this option in the experimental case 
1A than in the control case 1B. Four (case 1A) and three (case 1B) participants 
respectively devised a custom made version of the single carriageway 
roundabout, by introducing one or more bypasses on the roundabout to 
solve the capacity problems. The possible influence of factors such as the 
presentation order of the cases, the type of participant and the day on which 
the study took place was examined, but no clear differences were found.
7.4.2. Public support or road safety?
In the second case, participants were asked whether to implement an 
agricultural vehicle exclusion ruling on a yet to be constructed distributor 
road. In the control case 2B, the implementation of this ruling, obliging the 
agricultural vehicles to use the adjacent service road, was presented as the 
most cost-effective option for the road safety problem. The same applied to 
experimental case 2A, but here there was insufficient public support for this 
measure. The participants were presented with knowledge indicating that 
objections had been raised against the ruling by an organised group of 
residents and parents of school-aged children who use the service road as 
their school route. Considering the lack of public support, the hypothesis 
was that it would be logical (but less safe) not to implement the agricultural 
vehicle exclusion ruling on the distributor road. The traffic flow in both cases 
was assumed to be equal. Table 7.4 summarises the reactions of the 
participants to this dilemma.
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Case
2A
Case
2B
Agricultural vehicle exclusion ruling including custom made solutions 14 16
No agricultural vehicle exclusion ruling 1 1
Other 3 1
Table 7.4. Alternatives chosen for case 2A and 2B.
In control case 2B the vast majority of participants chose the agricultural 
vehicle exclusion ruling on the distributor road. Despite the lack of public 
support, only slightly fewer participants selected this measure in 
experimental case 2A. As in the first case (1A and B), participants devised 
custom-made solutions to the agricultural vehicle exclusion ruling, for 
example adapting the infrastructure or the network. As in case 1, visual 
inspection of the data indicated that factors such as presentation order, type 
of participant and the day of participation did not influence the results.
7.4.3. General, specific or strategic knowledge corresponding to the 
advice request
In the third case, a choice between three types of knowledge was given, for 
three kinds of advice requests: general, specific and strategic knowledge for a 
general, specific and strategic advice. The goal in this part of the 
experimental setting was to investigate whether the participants used only 
that type of knowledge that corresponded closely to the type of advice 
request. In other words, would the needs o f users be a barrier for knowledge 
use? The road safety measure involved was the rumble strip. It was not 
possible to construct a neutral control case here. The various advice types are 
compared. Whereas Table 7.2 in Section 7.3.2 presented the individual results 
for the three cases, Table 7.5 below shows the total results.
General 
advice request 
3A
Strategic 
advice request 
3B
Specific advice 
request 3C
Total
Expected text 9 4 10 23
Different text 9 14 8 31
Total 18 18 18 54
Table 7.5. Choice of text in relation to the advice request.
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The table illustrates that about half of the participants chose the expected text 
in case 3A and 3C. In case 3B (strategic advice request) a different trend was 
observed; a majority of the participants chose a different text than was 
expected.
Influence of experimental design
As in cases 1 and 2, factors such as the presentation order of the cases, the 
type of participant and the day may have influenced the results of the 
experiment. Contrary to the findings in cases 1 and 2, these factors do seem 
to have influenced the results in case 3.
With regard to the day on which the study was carried out, the results differ 
slightly. The choice of the specific text is more dominant on the second day 
than on the first day (52% on the second day versus 30% on the first day). No 
explanation for this difference could be found, given the fact that the 
composition of the participant groups on both days did not differ 
significantly. The order in which the advice requests 3A, 3B and 3C were 
offered also seem to have had some influence on the results. Each day one 
group received the advice requests in the order 3A-3B-3C, the second group 
in the order 3B-3C-3A. A larger number of participants in the second group 
than in the first group (50% in the second group versus 33% in the first 
group) chose the expected texts in the three advice requests. The difference is 
not substantial and may not have influenced the outcomes as a whole. Lastly, 
the position of the participants was also found to be relevant to their 
answering pattern. Policy-makers chose the specific text in 50% of the 
choices, road designers only in 25%. This is contrary to the aforementioned 
expectation, i.e. policy-makers were expected to focus more on knowledge 
about interests, while road designers were expected to focus more on 
technical knowledge.
7.5. Summary and conclusions
In this chapter, the following questions were investigated:
• To what extent do provincial policy-makers use cost and effect knowledge of 
infrastructural road safety measures in their policy?
• Which barriers do provincial policy-makers experience to use knowledge of 
cost-effective infrastructural road safety measures in policy?
151
The questions were examined in an experimental setting for provincial 
policy-makers and road designers. The questions addressed two levels on the 
Knott and Wildavsky ladder (1980): effort (to adopt knowledge in policy) 
and implementation. They also addressed three types of knowledge use: 
instrumental, strategic and conceptual use. Furthermore, the influence of two 
barriers on knowledge use was tested: the barrier conflicts with other policies 
and the barrier the needs o f users.
7.5.1. Knowledge use: effort and implementation
The first two cases studied the extent to which participants allow cost and 
effect knowledge to play a role in their decision. This question can be seen as 
an operationalisation of the 'effort' level on the Knott and Wildavsky ladder. 
Few participants answered explicitly that knowledge about costs played a 
role in their decision. Many participants answered that road safety was an 
important basis for their choice, possibly implying the effect of the road 
safety measure on road safety. The first two cases also investigated whether 
participants would implement cost-effective road safety measures. A large 
majority chose to implement the measures in both variations of the two 
cases. The third case showed that participants often chose to use a specific 
text to address the advice question, almost regardless of the type of advice 
request. The strategic text was chosen the least.
7.5.2. Barriers to knowledge use
The first two cases tested the influence of the barrier 'conflicts with other 
policies' by setting a road safety problem against negative traffic flow 
consequences and the opposition of the public. These barriers influenced the 
choices of the participants for road safety measures only very slightly. What 
is remarkable here is the participants' preference for tailor-made solutions. 
This preference can be seen as a strategy to overcome the barriers in the 
cases. The third case tested the barrier the needs o f users, permitting 
participants to choose the most appropriate general, specific or strategic text 
for a general, specific or strategic advice request. In the general and specific 
case, half of the participants chose the texts in accordance with the 
expectation. In the strategic case, far fewer people chose the expected text.
Why did participants not react to the barriers in cases 1 and 2 and why did 
they choose mainly the specific text in case 3? There are several possible 
reasons for this. One reason could be that the participants seemed to use 
their knowledge instrumentally rather than strategically. Despite the barriers
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in cases 1 and 2, they chose the safest and most cost-effective option 
rationally. The barriers did not make the problem less structured for them, 
nor did they tempt them to use the knowledge more strategically. This was 
confirmed by the discussion in the afternoon session about how realistic the 
cases were. For case 3, most participants stated that they wanted to advise 
their deputeds neutrally. In their view, politicians are the ones responsible 
for making choices. This means that the participants aim to use their 
knowledge instrumentally, and that they expect their deputeds to use the 
knowledge in a more strategic way. Another possibility is that participants 
answered the questions in a socially desirable way choosing the safest 
option, taking into account that SWOV was conducting the experiment. 
Furthermore, the cases may not have been complex enough. In real life, 
policy questions could include more than one barrier to knowledge use, and 
the pressure of real colleagues could be greater than the barriers in the 
experimental cases.
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8. Municipal road safety policy-making
8.1. Introduction
The two previous chapters investigated knowledge use in road safety policy 
and barriers at provincial level. This chapter studies similar questions, but 
focuses on municipalities. It is interesting to investigate the differences 
between municipal and provincial road safety policies, since municipalities 
may have a closer relationship with their citizens than provinces. It is to be 
expected therefore, that municipalities will give more importance than 
provinces to the interests of their citizens. This chapter thus, more than the 
previous chapters, focuses not only on the use of road safety knowledge, but 
also knowledge concerning other interests. The questions in this chapter are:
• To what extent do municipalities use knowledge on road safety and consider 
other interests in their policy?
• Which barriers are there for municipalities to use knowledge on road safety 
in policy?
This chapter looks into the policy-making process on changing the speed 
limit on rural roads from 80 to 60km/h, and the accompanying infrastructural 
measures, in fourteen municipalities. This type of policy-making processes 
involves balancing road safety interests with other interests such as traffic 
circulation, travelling times, driving comfort et cetera.
The background to this issue can be described as follows. In 1997, the Start­
up Programme Sustainable Safety (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 
1997), a road safety policy covenant between national, regional and local 
road authorities, determined among other things, that local road authorities,
i.e. municipalities, should reduce the speed limit on rural roads from 80 to 60 
km/h. Several infrastructural measures, such as speed hum ps and edge 
marking, were to be taken to ensure the effectiveness of the speed reduction. 
At first sight, this would appear a simple, technocratic kind of decision, for 
which municipalities are not dependent on other actors. However, there are 
many more interests involved besides the apparent road safety interest. For 
instance, speed reducing measures have consequences for emergency 
services (increased response time, discomfort for patient and driver) and for 
public transport (delay, discomfort for driver and passengers). Furthermore, 
the measures may also create inconvenience (discomfort, delays, noise from
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certain speed humps, damage to tractors and cargo) for people living and 
working in the area, such as farmers. It can also be noted that successful 
implementation of measures to provide a consistent road transition between 
their respective roads requires effective coordination with neighbouring 
municipalities. In addition, many municipalities consult with their 
community beforehand in order to forestall objections and legal procedures, 
which can slow down or postpone the implementation.
Some preliminary remarks can be made about the history of this study. The 
present chapter is based on Bax et al. (2008). The initial goal of the study was 
to investigate whether contact with actors in their road safety network 
helped municipalities to achieve safer roads. The assumption was that 
contact with specific, relevant actor groups, such as other municipalities, 
emergency services, public transport, the general public, businesses and 
interest groups, would lead to safer roads. The assumption was based on 
literature in which the outcomes of policy are related to data on network 
structure and network interaction (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Barnard, 1968; 
Daugbjerg, 1998; Dowding, 1995; Katz & Kahn, 1978; Provan & Milward, 
1995; 2001; Voets, Van Dooren & De Rynck, 2008). Other authors have 
elaborated on this approach by stating that interaction between all actors in a 
network might not be necessary. It might be more interesting to study the 
interaction in semi-autonomous parts of the networks. They therefore no 
longer investigated the networks as a whole, but divided the networks into 
smaller subgroups (Chisholm, 1989, p. 53, 63, 199; Provan & Sebastian, 1998; 
Scharpf, 1973, p. 90, 106; Simon, 1962; Weick, 1976).
Bax et al. (2008) adopted this approach. The number and intensity of the 
contacts with the abovementioned actor groups were measured using the 
social network analysis method (Wasserman & Faust, 1994), which resulted 
in network pictures and data. Safe roads were operationalised on various 
levels, such as the road features as a whole, in addition to those features that 
could actually be influenced by actors in the network, such as speed 
measures and the consistency of road transitions. For more details, see Bax et 
al. (2008). Although this study was not designed to measure knowledge use, 
it appeared that several aspects of the study provided insight in this topic. 
Therefore, it was decided to re-analyse the data of the original study to 
enable the use of information on knowledge use relevant to this thesis. The 
present chapter accounts for the choices made in the study and refers to the 
original report when necessary. It indicates explicitly where the original
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study presented limitations for the study on knowledge use, although it 
appeared that these limitations were very slight.
8.2. Concepts and methods
8.2.1. Analytical concepts
The same analytical concepts are used in this chapter as in Chapter 5, 6 and 7. 
Both the Knott and Wildavsky ladder of knowledge use (1980) and the 
barriers from the four groups of barriers to knowledge use (dissemination, 
needs o f users, unilateral or co-production o f knowledge, institutional factors) 
mentioned in Chapter 2 are examined. The following section explains which 
parts of the knowledge ladder and of the four groups of barriers are focussed 
on.
8.2.2. Operationalisation of research questions
To investigate the research questions, three concepts demand further 
clarification. Similar to Chapter 6 and 7, the levels of knowledge use to be 
investigated in this chapter should be determined. Specifically for the present 
study, it should be clear exactly what is meant by 'knowledge on road safety' 
and 'knowledge on other interests' within the context of this chapter.
Operationalisation of knowledge use
The present study refers to two levels of the Knott and Wildavsky ladder of 
knowledge use: the reception of knowledge and the implementation level. 
This choice stems from the available research method and techniques: the 
study contains fourteen cases and uses a telephone survey to interview 
relevant actors in the policy-making process. In addition, an open interview 
was conducted with the road safety official of the policy-making 
municipality. A survey is not the appropriate instrument for asking detailed 
questions about the understanding of knowledge or the efforts to include 
knowledge in policy documents. Therefore, the far simpler level of the 
reception of knowledge was chosen to measure knowledge use. The question 
about the implementation level was possible, there being a large number of 
municipalities in the Netherlands, of which we could choose only those that 
had already reduced the speed from 80 to 60km/h on some or all of their 
rural roads. Therefore it was possible to inspect the roads visually, by driving 
on them and examining the implementation level with the help of a checklist.
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Operationalisation of two kinds of knowledge
Two types of knowledge are investigated in this study: knowledge on road 
safety and knowledge on other interests in the policy-making process. This 
section specifies what is meant by these terms.
Not all knowledge on road safety is relevant to this study. The research 
focuses on knowledge of a safe design for 60km/h roads. In general, it is 
conceived these days that a safe design for a 60km/h road has a maximum 
width of 6.2 metres and broken edge markings, has an obstacle-free shoulder 
measuring at least 4 metres, has no centre line or parking space and has 
junctions without designated priorities or traffic lights, but with speed 
reducing measures (Houwing, 2003; Hummel, 2001; Van der Kooi & Dijkstra, 
2000).
As indicated above, the use of this knowledge is measured on two levels: the 
reception and the implementation level. On the reception level, the 
availability of sources of knowledge of the design of 60km/h roads is not 
asked for explicitly, but the interview gave municipalities the opportunity to 
bring these up themselves. Sources they could mention were, for example, 
handbooks such as the Dutch ASVV (Recommendations for traffic facilities 
in built-up areas) (CROW, 2004a) or CROW publications (CROW, 2002a; 
2002b). The reason for not being explicit is that, as mentioned above, this 
chapter is based on the study by Bax et al. (2008), in which knowledge use 
was not the primary goal of the study. This certainly limits the use of 
knowledge data on the reception level in this chapter. However, after 
reinvestigating the raw data for this chapter it appeared that many 
municipalities mentioned this use spontaneously anyway. Section 8.3 reports 
on this in detail.
On the implementation level, the roads were examined to see whether or not 
the knowledge had been applied. This was done by driving along all 60km/h 
roads involved in the study and examining them with the help of a 
predefined checklist. The checklist contained the four most important 
features of the rural 60km/h roads (Henkens, 2006; Van der Kooi & Dijkstra, 
2000), which had to be present for this type of knowledge to be seen as 
implemented. Two features were related to road sections; two others were 
related to intersections. The road sections should have a correct edge 
marking and there should be no centre lines. Examples are given below.
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Figure 8.1. Examples of 60km/h road sections (Photography: Robert Louwerse).
At intersections, there should be speed reducing measures such as speed 
hum ps and there should be no priority regulation. Examples are given 
below.
Figure 8.2. Examples of 60km/h intersections (Photography: Robert Louwerse).
The various actors involved can have multiple interests, other than road 
safety. Therefore, to specify the concept 'knowledge on other interests', a list 
of possible types of actors assumed to be relevant in the policy-making 
processes was drawn up. This list was based on a pilot research report in 
which the methods and questionnaires were tested on six municipalities and 
their network, four of which also participated in the main study (Bax et al., 
2004; Bax et al., 2007). The list was divided into three main groups of actors 
having more or less comparable interests:
1. Neighbouring municipalities
2. Emergency services (police, fire brigade and ambulance) and public 
transport
3. The general public, businesses and interest groups
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The municipality itself and neighbouring municipalities have a strong 
interest in consistent transitions between the roads they are responsible for, 
especially on continuing 60km/h roads. Emergency services and public 
transport operators are known to have objections to certain speed reducing 
measures (CROW, 2002c). Such measures can lengthen their travel times, 
which may interfere with their response times or timetables and may 
influence the driving comfort of drivers, patients and passengers. The 
general public, businesses and interest groups are a rather mixed group with 
many different interests. Some are in favour of an increase in infrastructural 
measures for speed reduction and safety, others are opposed to these, due to 
sound pollution, for example, or increased travel time, loss of nature, or 
driving comfort for drivers and cargo.
To ensure that this division into three groups of actors and their presumed 
interests are correct, those actors assumed to be relevant in the policy­
making were asked to disclose their main interests in this policy-making in a 
survey, as described in Section 8.2.4. Table 8.1 represents their choices, which 
confirm the set of interests for each group hypothesized above.
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Im proved road safety 100 100 86 85 93 89 92
Public support for road safety 69 55 49 25 43 67 46
Reducing speed 54 50 40 30 48 33 43
Cooperation w ith national policies 62 53 57 33 18 22 38
Less cut-through traffic 46 45 29 18 52 44 38
Consistent road transitions w hen 
crossing m unicipality borders 15 63 49 28 23 22 36
Travel times and driving comfort for 
business and agricultural traffic 8 13 6 43 50 22 28
Efficient combination of road safety 
m easure w ith other m easure 23 33 49 15 23 33 28
Protection of the rural character of 
the area 38 25 20 5 36 22 24
Acceptable response times for 
em ergency services 8 13 3 63 16 33 23
Support for traffic policies from 
political decision m akers 46 23 34 13 16 22 22
Other 8 5 14 10 16 11 11
Financial responsibility 8 8 3 5 4 11 5
Table 8.1. Self reported interests of actors (actors could indicate a maximum of five 
interests).
Whether municipalities use knowledge on the interests of these three 
different groups was measured on the same two levels as was the case with 
safety knowledge. On the reception level, both oral and written contacts 
between the three groups of actors and the municipality were counted. On 
the implementation level, site inspections on the municipal roads were 
executed to see to what extent these interests had been applied in the 
infrastructure. For the interests of the three groups, the following criteria 
were used.
1. To measure the implementation of the interests of neighbouring 
municipalities, the transition sections of roads between two bordering 
municipalities were examined. The transitions between the
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municipalities should be consistent and meet certain requirements to 
prevent them from being confusing for the road user (Brouwer, Aarts & 
Louwerse, 2008; CROW, 2002a). A detailed scheme of requirements is 
given by Bax et al. (2008, p. 58 and further). Transitions that meet these 
requirements are named consistent transitions in the remainder of this 
chapter. The figure below gives an example of a consistent and a not 
consistent transition.
Figure 8.3. Example of consistent (left) and not consistent (right) road transition 
(Photography: Robert Louwerse).
2. For emergency services and public transport, the municipal roads were 
checked for speed reducing measures that do not affect emergency 
services and buses, known as 'driver friendly speed reducing measures'. 
Driver friendly speed measures are defined here as vertical speed 
reducing measures which can be driven over at a speed of at least 
50km/h, both on road sections and intersections. Horizontal speed 
measures such as axis offsets and optical speed reducing measures are 
also classified as driver friendly measures. These criteria are based on 
several CROW-publications (CROW, 2002c; 2002d; 2007b; Goudappel- 
Coffeng, 1999).
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Figures 8.4. Example of driver friendly (left) and not driver friendly (right) speed measure 
according to CROW-publications (CROW, 2002c; 2002d; 2007b; Goudappel-Coffeng, 1999) 
(Photography: Robert Louwerse).
3. The interests of the general public, businesses and interest groups are 
too mixed to formulate a single criterion to examine the implementation 
of knowledge from these groups on the municipal roads beforehand.
In addition to the site inspection, those involved in the policy-making 
process were asked whether their interests had been implemented 
satisfactorily on the municipal roads.
Barriers
This chapter investigates barriers to the use of knowledge in road safety 
policy, as did the previous chapters. Even though these barriers were not 
requested explicitly here, the interviews with the municipalities revealed 
several barriers to the use of road safety knowledge, which are used in this 
chapter.
8.2.3. Selection of cases
The selection of the cases was carried out in three steps. Firstly, a list was 
made of as many municipalities as possible that had implemented 60 km/h 
roads, using information from pilot reports, from websites and from 
telephone inquiries made to provinces. Then, this list was reduced to a 
shorter list of 23 municipalities, using easily accessible information such as 
the number of inhabitants and the size of the rural areas in the 
municipalities. The short list contained municipalities w ith similar 
characteristics to enable comparison of the municipalities and to rule out 
these criteria as possible sources of differences. The two main characteristics 
selected were the number of inhabitants and the size of their rural areas, the
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latter because no statistics are available on the total length of their rural 
roads. Municipalities with 10.000 to 50.000 inhabitants and with 10 to 350 
square kilometre of rural area were selected. The remaining 23 municipalities 
were telephoned, to decide on the final selection of 14 of these for the study. 
The criteria for selection were the presence of 60km/h roads, the existence of 
a finalised decision-making on 60km/h roads, political support, i.e. from the 
responsible alderman and the city council, for this policy, and the absence of 
changes in personnel in the time span of the study. Municipalities in as many 
different regions of the Netherlands as possible were chosen, to exclude the 
region as an explanatory factor for the outcomes. Where the selection list 
contained adjacent municipalities, only one was selected.
8.2.4. Further on methods
Three research techniques were used in this study. Firstly, municipal roads 
were inspected visually. Secondly, the municipalities, represented by their 
policy-makers responsible for, amongst others, road safety, were interviewed 
using a semi-open questionnaire. Thirdly, all actors involved in the policy­
making (or should have been involved on the basis of the above list of actors 
assumed to be relevant) were interviewed by means of a telephone 
questionnaire with closed format questions. The questionnaires are included 
in Bax et al. (2008). The survey response rate averaged 87% (range 71-100%, 
N=229).
8.3. Results
8.3.1. Use of road safety knowledge
Although the municipalities were not asked directly what kind of 
information they had used in the policy-making, they spontaneously 
reported some kind of knowledge use. Eleven municipalities (80%) 
mentioned the use of CROW guidelines (on markings and on the 
combination of speed reducing measures and public transport and 
emergency services) and the ASVV handbook. Some were less precise, 
referring to "general guidelines", "sustainable safety publications" and "the 
theory of sustainable safety". Clearly, municipalities have used knowledge 
on road safety in a 'receptive' way. The use of this type of knowledge in their 
policies indicates knowledge use on the 'effort' level of Knott and 
Wildavsky's ladder.
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To measure the implementation of this knowledge, a visual inspection of all 
60km/h roads in the municipalities was carried out. Four safe road features 
were examined (Henkens, 2006; Van der Kooi & Dijkstra, 2000). For road 
sections, the presence of the correct edge marking and the absence of a centre 
line were inventoried. For intersections, the presence of speed reducing 
measures and the absence of priority regulation were observed. The number 
of road sections and intersections inspected in the 14 municipalities varied; 
18 to 118 road sections with an average of 63 were studied and 10 to 146 
intersections with an average of 55. Per municipality, an average score for the 
two features for road sections and intersections was calculated, both having 
the same weight. The table below lists the average score for the fourteen 
municipalities, again each municipality having the same weight.
Average score (%) R ange(%) Standard deviation (%)
Road sections 89 59-100 10
Intersections 51 37-70 8
Table 8.2. % of 883 60km/h road sections and 768 60km/h intersection in 14 municipalities 
with positive scores on two road safety features for road sections and two road safety 
features for intersections.
The table shows that most roads were designed in accordance with 
knowledge on safe 60km/h roads, but only half of the intersections were. 
Section 8.3.3 discusses the barriers that may underlie this difference between 
road sections and intersections.
8.3.2. Use of knowledge on other interests
The question as to whether the fourteen municipalities used knowledge and 
interests of other municipalities, emergency services, the general public, 
businesses and interest groups on a 'reception' level, was studied by way of 
interviews with the respondents from the municipalities and in telephone 
surveys with other actors assumed to be relevant. All fourteen municipalities 
were asked for their contacts with these other actors and, vice versa, all 
actors who, according to our list of relevant actors, were assumed to have 
participated in the policy-making process received a question about their 
contacts with the municipality. The number of actors varied per 
municipality. One to six neighbouring municipalities were interviewed, with 
3.6 as an average. All three emergency services (police, fire brigade and 
ambulance) were interviewed in the fourteen municipalities. In 10 
municipalities the public transport operator was also interviewed, since the
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roads investigated were also public transport routes. The number of 
respondents in the group 'general public, businesses and interest groups' also 
varied per municipality, from 1 to 6 with an average of 3.8. The results are 
listed in the table below.
Average 
score (%)
Range
(%)
Standard 
deviation (%)
Neighbouring municipalities 67 0-100 34
Emergency services and public transport 81 33-100 23
General public, businesses and interest groups 100* -- --
* score is 100%, because only actors were studied who had contact with municipality
Table 8.3. Average over 14 municipalities of % of actors that had contact with the 
municipality.
The percentage of actors with whom municipalities had contact was 
calculated. The percentages were calculated per municipality and the 
average score over all 14 municipalities is included in Table 8.3.
The table shows high average percentages of contacts between other actors 
and municipalities. This means that the municipalities m ust have been at 
least receptive to knowledge from the three actor groups. However, it also 
shows that the percentages vary greatly per municipality.
To measure the use of knowledge on the 'implementation' level, two road 
characteristics were evaluated on visual inspection. The implementation of 
the interests of neighbouring municipalities was measured by examining 
consistent road transitions between their roads and the roads of the case 
municipality. Table 8.4 shows the amount of roads with a consistent road 
transition in the fourteen municipalities. For this, the percentage of roads 
with a consistent transition was calculated per municipality, then the average 
over the 14 municipalities was included in the table. The municipalities were 
used as the appropriate level for analysis, because the interest of this study 
lies in how municipalities use knowledge in the implementation phase of 
policy-making. Driver friendly speed reducing measures were examined to 
measure the implementation of the interests of emergency services and 
public transport. The table gives an average of the percentages of speed 
reducing measures that are driver friendly in the 14 municipalities. As in the 
first row, the percentage of speed reducing measures that are driver friendly 
was calculated per municipality. Then the average over the 14 municipalities
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was included in the table. The implementation of the interests of citizens, 
businesses and interest groups has not been measured in numbers, because 
their interests are too mixed to define their influence. However, more than 
half of the municipalities indicated that the opinion of people living and 
working in the area is often decisive for making changes in the 
implementation. Based on these arguments, various municipalities indicated, 
for example, that they had abandoned intended speed measures and road 
closures.
Average score 
(%)
Range
(%)
Standard deviation 
(%)
Consistent road transitions 54 0-100 33
'Driver friendly' speed measures 62 33-100 23
Table 8.4. Average over 14 municipalities of % roads with a consistent road transition.
The table above illustrates that, on average, on half of the roads 
municipalities use knowledge and the interests of neighbouring 
municipalities on an implementation level, and on almost two-third of the 
roads, municipalities do this with regard to the interests of emergency 
services and public transport. The table also demonstrates that the 
percentages vary greatly per municipality. Section 8.3.3 discusses possible 
reasons for these differences.
In addition to the visual inspection, the three groups of actors assumed to be 
relevant for the policy-making-process were asked whether their interests 
had been implemented on the municipal roads. As mentioned earlier, the 
number of respondents varied per group and per municipality. The scores 
were first averaged per group per municipality. The table shows an average 
of the percentages in the fourteen municipalities. The respondents could 
score their answer on a 4 point scale, rating from (1) not implemented, (2) 
somewhat implemented, (3) reasonably implemented to (4) fully 
implemented.
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Average
score
Range Standard
deviation
Neighbouring municipalities 3.33 2-4 0.62
Emergency services and public transport 2.95 1-4 0.90
General public, businesses and interest groups 2.65 1-4 0.73
Table 8.5. Implementation of interests (4 point scale).
All actor groups score well above two on the four point scale. This means 
that emergency service/public transport and citizens/businesses/interest 
groups judged their interests to be implemented and neighbouring 
municipalities even to be more implemented on the municipal roads. For the 
first two groups (neighbouring municipalities/other road authorities and 
emergency services/public transport) this is somewhat contradictory to the 
findings in Table 8.4 above (% of roads that have consistent road transitions 
or 'driver friendly' speed measures), in which is drawn that only half to two- 
thirds of the roads were designed according to the interests of these two 
groups. This might indicate that these groups did not expect their 
municipalities to design all of the roads in accordance with their wishes.
8.3.3. Experienced barriers to the use of road safety knowledge
Barriers to the use of road safety knowledge were inventoried in interviews 
with the participating municipalities. Municipalities were asked in an 
implicit way what prevented them using road safety knowledge on the 
'implementation' level when taking effective road safety measures. This 
restriction is the reason for choosing to report the findings in a qualitative 
rather than in a quantitative way. Several municipalities have mentioned the 
following barriers.
Physical barriers
Some municipalities mentioned practical reasons of a physical nature, such 
as soil characteristics that can cause ground collapse or traffic vibration 
nuisance due to weak soil.
Weighing interests
Nearly all municipalities mentioned that they have to weigh the road safety 
interest against several other interests, and that road safety simply does not 
always 'win'. When these other interests are studied in detail, several groups 
of interests can be distinguished, along the lines of the three actor groups
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mentioned above. Neighbouring municipalities do not usually have interests 
that are contradictory to road safety. Emergency services and public 
transport, however, often object to speed measures on 60km/h roads, because 
these slow them down and reduce comfort for driver and passengers. The 
general public, businesses and interest groups such as LTO (the Dutch 
Federation of Agriculture and Horticulture) often object to these speed 
measures for the same reason. They also object to some other measures such 
as road closures for specific vehicles or at specific times.
Municipalities give in to these arguments, especially if they come from the 
general public and businesses. Around two-thirds of the municipalities find 
public support an important consideration in their policy-making. More than 
half of the municipalities indicate that they have decreased the number of 
speed measures and road closures due to contact with the general public. 
Sometimes a road is not even downscaled as planned at all. Interest groups 
such as LTO have been successful too. In half of the municipalities, their 
protests were met with fewer speed related measures and road closures, and 
with wider roads and more exemptions for heavy traffic.
Uniqueness
Some municipalities mention specific or recent accidents that make them 
deviate from the road safety guidelines. The guidelines do not 'feel' logical to 
them and they consider their situation so specific that a deviation from the 
general guidelines is called for. It concerns the preservation of priority 
regulations ("because the general public is used to it"), not adapting the road 
markings ("because it seems safer") and the use of physical separation of 
driving directions (due to motorcycles practising their curve techniques). 
These solutions are based on another kind of knowledge, i.e. 'gut feelings' or 
the intuition of municipalities. However, they are not confirmed by research 
findings, nor are they explicitly mentioned as interests by actors in the policy 
process.
Budget restrictions
All municipalities mention a tight budget as an important barrier to 
implementing road safety measures on rural roads. Rather than abandoning 
certain measures, municipalities tend to temporise measures and prioritise 
them along several lines.
Firstly, municipalities give priority to certain areas, based on accident data or 
on subjective feelings about safety. The most important reason for
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municipalities prioritising an area is a request from the general public for the 
downscaling of rural roads. This can be a justifiable strategy, since public 
support is very important for the observance of the speed limit on 60km/h 
roads. At the same time, prioritising based on accident statistics can be very 
tricky at a local level. Since the number of accidents is so small at this level, 
the role of coincidence is considerable while a statistical analysis is not 
reliable.
Secondly, municipalities prioritise on the argument mentioned above, that 
some road safety guidelines do not appear logical to municipalities. The 
implementation of speed hum ps on road sections and intersections in 
particular was mentioned in this respect. Municipalities delay the removal of 
the priority regulation and maintain the old priority regulations until they 
have enough money to implement a raised junction. Junctions without 
priority regulation and without a speed hum p are, in their opinion, too 
unsafe because the general public has become too accustomed to the priority 
regulation and a raised intersection is needed to change their behaviour. 
Simply removing the priority traffic sign is not sufficient, according to the 
municipalities.
Thirdly, many municipalities prioritise by combining road safety measures 
with other road works such as regular maintenance. The maintenance 
scheme is in all municipalities the guiding principle for the pace of carrying 
out road safety measures. This form of prioritising can be both a curse and a 
blessing, from a road safety point of view. It can be the cause of a protracted 
situation involving a 60km/h road that does not have an ideal design, 
because adapting the design in accordance with the road safety requirements 
m ust wait until the regular road maintenance are carried out. On the other 
hand, since the costs of implementing the road measures decrease when 
combined with regular maintenance, fewer road measures will be 
abandoned due to tight budgets. They are merely temporised.
8.4. Summary and conclusions
In this chapter, two kinds of questions were answered:
• To what extent do municipalities use knowledge on road safety and consider 
other interests?
• Which barriers do municipalities experience when using knowledge on road 
safety?
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The use of knowledge was investigated on the reception and the 
implementation level. Municipalities did use knowledge on road safety and 
on other interests on both levels.
It appeared that 80% of the municipalities spontaneously mentioned the use 
of written sources such as handbooks and guidelines on the effort level of 
their policy-making on 60km/h-roads. Most of the municipalities had contact 
with neighbouring municipalities, other road authorities, emergency 
services, public transport, the general public, businesses and interests group 
and have thus been able to receive knowledge on their respective interests.
On the 'implementation' level, nearly all municipalities used road safety 
knowledge on their road sections and half of them on intersections. On half 
of their roads, municipalities have used knowledge on the interests of 
neighbouring municipalities to implement consistent road transitions and on 
nearly two-third of them municipalities have used knowledge on the 
interests of emergency services and public transport to implement driver 
friendly speed reducing measures. More than half of the municipalities 
stated that the opinion of people living and working in the area had led to 
changes in the implementation. Furthermore, the three groups involved in 
the policy-making judged their interests to be implemented on the municipal 
roads.
This study has investigated several reasons for the non-use of knowledge in 
policy-making on municipal 60km/h-roads. One barrier can be classified as 
needs o f users, as municipalities mentioned practical reasons, partly of a 
physical nature, for not implementing road safety measures, thereby 
questioning the technical applicability of the knowledge in their specific 
context. They weighed the generic knowledge produced by knowledge 
suppliers such as CROW and SWOV against local knowledge about their 
own circumstances, based on municipal data or intuition. This practice seems 
to suggest a need for concrete knowledge applied to specific situations.
The other barriers can be classified as institutional barriers. These do not stress 
the cognitive knowledge or the technical applicability, but rather the political 
feasibility and the moral weighing of knowledge. For example, 
municipalities mentioned weighing road safety against other interests. This 
refers to the difference between sectoral road safety knowledge used in an 
integral policy environment, where road safety is part of traffic and transport 
policy, as mentioned in Chapter 4 . Often, the interests of the general public
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and businesses outweigh road safety measures. Not only did they weigh 
road safety against the interests of emergency services, public transport, the 
general public and businesses such as agriculture, they also had to prioritise 
road safety measures and often chose to include them in maintenance 
schedules.
The answers from the municipalities also indicated the presence of the 
contradiction, discussed in Chapter 4, between the technocratic discourse of 
science versus the political discourse of policy. The study indicated the use of 
knowledge from non-scientific, somewhat 'political' or subjective sources to 
prioritise measures. This 'other' kind of knowledge comprises 'gut feelings' 
and intuition, for example, but also public support and scientifically 
irrelevant accident statistics. This knowledge seems to be highly relevant to 
municipalities. At the same time, it lacks the quality guarantee of scientific 
knowledge.
In conclusion, this chapter has shown that many municipalities implemented 
available road safety knowledge on road sections while half of the 
municipalities did so on intersections. Non-use of knowledge was mainly 
due to a discrepancy between the available knowledge which was often 
solely directed at road safety and focussed on technical aspects of road safety 
policy, whereas the municipal policy is directed at political aspects of road 
safety and to interests other than road safety.
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9. Conclusions and recommendations
9.1. Introduction: looking back onto the questions
When formulating the research question of this thesis initially, in 2005, I 
hypothesised implicitly that there were many discrepancies between 
knowledge supply and knowledge demand in the domain of road safety 
policies. I also believed that knowledge was not used widely by policy­
makers, and that science and policy were often two very distinct worlds. The 
examples given in Chapter 1 illustrate this conviction. These pre-scientific 
convictions led me to the first general research question, formulated in 
Chapter 1:
What are the reasons for possible non-use o f knowledge in Dutch road safety
policy processes?
Phrasing the question in this way presumes a certain amount of non-use of 
knowledge in road safety policy. Based on what I knew and had read about 
the topic, I expected a more or less serious lack of knowledge use in road 
safety policy and a number of concrete barriers to knowledge use. A 
potential barrier was knowledge that was not suited to the needs of users, in 
terms of ease of implementation, addressing the problems experienced in 
practice. Another potential barrier consisted of political arguments for not 
using knowledge, such as a lack of public support or other interests 
prevailing over road safety interests. However, I also expected the 
institutional context to play a role in the non-use of knowledge in policy. I 
expected, for example, the existence of national knowledge organisations 
such as SWOV and TNO providing road safety knowledge and the recent 
decentralisation of road safety policy to be influential.
Of course, before drawing conclusions about non-use, I had to investigate the 
actual use of knowledge use in policy, together with barriers to knowledge 
use and recommendations for improvement. Therefore, the following 
research questions were added:
• To what extent is knowledge used in Dutch road safety policy?
• Which barriers are there to knowledge use in Dutch road safety policy?
• How can knowledge use in this field be increased?
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After exploring the existing scientific literature on knowledge utilisation and 
the institutional context of knowledge and policy in Chapter 2, I expected that 
the Knott and Wildavsky ladder would enable me to distinguish several 
levels of knowledge use. Furthermore, I anticipated finding barriers from all 
four barrier groups in the knowledge utilisation theory. I also expected to 
observe a number of knowledge arrangements associated with the boundary 
theories, such as Mode 2 organisations, Fifth Branch advisory forms and 
relationships between knowledge and policy that could be described using 
the typologies pu t forward by Landry et al. and by Hoppe.
Several studies were carried out to investigate the research questions and to 
enable confirmation or refutation of these expectations. Since the subject of 
this thesis is a well-defined and a relatively small-scale policy field, a 
triangulation of methods was used to increase the overall validity of the 
thesis. Historical studies as well as literature studies, multiple case studies 
and a study within an experimental setting were used. The research methods 
in the various studies were described in Chapter 3.
A long-term institutional analysis was performed in Chapter 4 . It provided an 
overview of the emergence and development of knowledge production and 
policy-making, and of the interaction between these in the Dutch road safety 
field. In Chapter 5, a review of available studies on the use of knowledge in 
road safety policies, in and outside the Netherlands was carried out. It not 
only provided a review of existing knowledge, but was also a guide to 
choosing the course of the subsequent, empirical chapters. In Chapters 6 and 
8, barriers to knowledge use in concrete road safety policies were analysed at 
provincial and municipal level. These explorative studies showed a number 
of barriers to the use of knowledge on infrastructural measures in road safety 
policy. In Chapter 7 some of these barriers were tested in an experimental 
setting at provincial level. The experimental setting made it possible to 
investigate the presence and the meaning of these barriers as well as the 
motives of the respondents.
The long-term institutional analysis, the multiple case studies and the study 
with an experimental set-up were chosen with great care. Since the long-term 
institutional analysis concentrates mainly on the national level, the empirical 
cases were chosen for the regional and local level by studying provinces and 
municipalities. As a result, almost all governmental levels were involved in 
the studies, although the city regions and the (few) road owning regional 
water authorities were not covered. The emphasis on regional and local
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governmental bodies in the empirical studies was also prom pted by the fact 
that currently, regional and local governments are important executors of the 
Dutch road safety policy. Provinces can even be considered directors of the 
regional and local road safety policies.
9.2. Conclusions: looking back onto answers
This section describes the findings on knowledge use in road safety policy, 
on barriers to this knowledge use and on the institutional setting of road 
safety policy-making and knowledge production. The subsections first 
describe the analytical concepts used to address the research question. The 
empirical findings and the analysis are then discussed in more analytical 
terms.
9.2.1. Knowledge use in Dutch road safety policies 
Analytical concepts
The use of knowledge in road safety policy was measured with the Knott 
and Wildavsky ladder of knowledge use (Knott & Wildavsky, 1980). As 
indicated in Chapter 2, they distinguish seven ascending levels of knowledge 
use, shown in the table below.
Stage Name Description
1 Reception Practitioners and professionals concerned have received 
the research results
2 Cognition The research reports are read and understood by the 
practitioners and professionals concerned
3 Reference The work is cited as a reference in the reports, studies and 
strategies of action developed by practitioners and 
professionals
4 Effort Efforts are made to adopt the results of the research by 
practitioners and professionals
5 Adoption The research results are adopted in the choices and 
decisions of practitioners and professionals
6 Implementation The policy that has adopted the research findings is 
implemented
7 Impact The policy that has adopted the research findings shows 
the desired effects
Table 9.1. Stages of the ladder of knowledge utilisations based on Landry et al. (2001a), 
Lester (1993) and Knott and Wildavsky (1980).
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Furthermore, in Chapter 2 four kinds of knowledge use were distinguished, 
based upon Weiss (1977) and others. These are: instrumental use, strategic 
use, pacifying use and conceptual use. The four kinds of knowledge use have 
been paired with four kinds of problems, distinguished by Hoppe (2002a): 
structured problems, unstructured problems and two kinds of moderately 
structured problems, with consensus on goals and means respectively. With 
structured problems, policy-makers tend to use knowledge instrumentally. 
With unstructured problems, they tend to use knowledge conceptually. 
Moderately structured problems with agreement about goals tend to lead to 
a strategic use of knowledge. Finally, with moderately structured problems 
with agreement about means, knowledge tends to be used to pacify. The 
empirical findings are interpreted along these conceptual lines.
Empirical findings
Three general conclusions can be drawn from the previous chapters. Firstly, 
and contrary to my initial expectations, the available knowledge on road 
safety is widely used in Dutch road safety policies. On a national level (see 
Chapter 4), road safety knowledge from SWOV, the Road Safety Board and 
other organisations is often used in national policy plans. Although it was 
impossible to investigate this in-depth due to time and capacity constraints, a 
scan of the national policy plans revealed several examples of knowledge use 
in road safety policy. This ranges from the first Road Safety Memorandum in 
1967 (use of SWOV report) via the Multi-year Road Safety Plan 1 (use of 
quantitative targets suggested by the Road Safety Board) and the Multi-year 
Road Safety Plan 3 (use of the concept Sustainable Safety developed by 
SWOV) to the Mobility Policy Document in 2006 and the Strategic Plan Road 
Safety in 2008 (use of cost-effectiveness rates calculated by SWOV, the 
Advancing Sustainable Safety vision and the adaptation of the road safety 
target for 2020). Furthermore, the above-mentioned policy plans referred 
occasionally to reports from TNO, private consultancies such as McKinsey, 
Traffic Test and Berenschot and international organisations such as the 
World Health Organization (WHO) and the Organisation for Economic Co­
operation and Development (OECD). The wide use of knowledge in (Dutch) 
road safety is supported by other studies, both Dutch and international 
(Boer, Grimmius & Schoenmakers, 2008; Department for Transport, 2008; 
Elvik & Veisten, 2005).
Secondly, on a national level as well as on a provincial level, the use of road 
design guidelines is extensive. The interviews in Chapter 6 revealed that all 
provinces were acquainted with and had read road design guidelines, and
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had implemented many of the road safety measures on their roads. In 
addition, many respondents in the experimental study in Chapter 7 found 
road safety to be an important basis for their choice of road measure, often 
letting the road safety interest prevail over other interests. However, 
although two thirds of the provinces claim that cost and effect information is 
taken into consideration when taking decisions about road safety measures, 
just one third of them reports actually having read publications on it.
Thirdly, Chapter 8 revealed that on a municipal level, although not asked for 
explicitly, 80% of the municipalities studied mention the use of guidelines 
and handbooks when implementing road safety measures spontaneously. 
They also use knowledge regarding other interests than road safety, brought 
in by neighbouring municipalities, emergency services, bus companies or the 
general public. Almost all municipalities use road safety knowledge on road 
sections and half of them on intersections. Nevertheless, on 50% of their 
roads, other interests prevail over road safety when implementing road 
safety measures.
Interpretation of empirical findings in analytical terms
This thesis investigates various levels on the Knott and Wildavsky 
knowledge use ladder. The reception level, the cognition level, the reference 
level, the effort level and the implementation level are all covered 
throughout the various chapters. As a rule of thumb, it can be concluded that 
knowledge use was more extensive on the lower rungs, and more limited 
higher up  the ladder. At the reception level, studied in Chapter 8, 
municipalities had contact with relevant actors and received their comments. 
At the cognition level, investigated in Chapter 6, provinces were all 
acquainted with and had read the road design guidelines. About 30% knew 
of and had read publications on cost and effect information. On the reference 
level, examined in Chapter 4, many examples of reference to knowledge from 
the Road Safety Board, SWOV and occasionally from others were found in 
national policy documents. Chapter 5 to 8 studied the effort level. On the 
provincial level, two-thirds of the provinces stated that cost and effect 
information had played a role in their policy-making on road safety 
measures, and the provinces that took part in the experiment reported in 
Chapter 7 made similar comments. Although not explicitly asked, half of the 
municipalities spontaneously mentioned the use of written sources such as 
handbooks or guidelines. These findings were supported by several national 
(Boer, Grimmius & Schoenmakers, 2008) and international (Department for 
Transport, 2008; Elvik & Veisten, 2005, on CBA and CEA use) studies
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discussed in Chapter 5 . The implementation level was researched in Chapter 5 
to 8. All of the chapters identified a wide implementation of road safety 
measures mentioned in guidelines and studies on provincial and municipal 
roads, both in real life and in an experimental setting. National and 
international studies, examined in Chapter 5 confirmed these findings. 
Municipalities not only implemented knowledge from research; in half of the 
municipalities knowledge and interests from relevant actors in the policy 
process also influenced the measures taken on their roads.
In addition to the ladder of knowledge use, four types of knowledge use and 
their associated four types of problems were investigated in all the empirical 
chapters. Throughout the chapters, but especially in Chapter 4, it appeared 
that the knowledge and policy field agree about the objective of the road 
safety policy: the reduction of the number of fatalities and serious road 
injuries. Although they also agree on the general approach to solve this 
problem, Chapters 4 to 8 gave many examples of different views on specific 
road safety measures. Regarded in terms of the four types of problems, road 
safety thus seems to be a moderately-structured problem with consensus on 
goals, but not (entirely) on means, among both policy-makers and scientists. 
However, policy-makers and scientists seem to use this characterisation for 
different reasons. For scientists road safety is a moderately structured 
problem, because it is not as simple as it seems, in scientific terms. Accidents 
are not mono-causal and the effect of road safety measures is not easily 
demonstrated scientifically. Policy-makers regard road safety as a 
moderately structured problem because although all actors involved in the 
policy-making processes agree about the goal of the policy, they do not agree 
about the measures to be taken. In addition, several interests have to be 
weighed against each other, between the road safety field and other policy 
fields and within the road safety field itself.
The four types of knowledge use were investigated explicitly in the 
experimental study in Chapter 7 and more implicitly studied in the other 
chapters. In general it is safe to say that road safety knowledge seems to be 
used both instrumentally and strategically. In Chapter 7, the experimental 
study showed that the respondents, provincial civil servants, did not wish to 
use their knowledge strategically, but to inform their politicians as neutrally 
as possible. Another argument for labelling the knowledge use as 
instrumental can be found in Chapters 6 and 7, where it was shown that 
policy-makers wanted tailor-made solutions to their policy problems. 
However, the Chapters 6 and 8 also reveal that road safety policy-makers have
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to weigh various interests against each other. Respondents in Chapter 6 
mentioned weighing taking road safety measures against other provincial 
policy objectives, such as landscape policy and traffic flow policy and against 
the interests of other actors, such as noise hindrance for people living and 
working in the area. The study in Chapter 8 shows that the general public, 
businesses and emergency services, but also civil servants in other policy 
areas, often have interests that conflict with road safety. The findings in this 
chapter indicate that policy-makers weigh up these interests and thus use 
knowledge strategically.
Having reflected on the largely instrumental use of knowledge, this study 
did come across some other types of knowledge use occasionally. For 
example, on a national level (see Chapter 4), the use of the Sustainable Safety 
concept in the Multi-year Road Safety Plan 3 and the Strategic Plan Road 
Safety 2008 can be considered a conceptual kind of knowledge use. In the 
experimental setting, a few provincial civil servants mentioned the strategic 
use of knowledge explicitly, to serve their authorities. Studies conducted 
outside the Netherlands have indicated the strategic use of cost-benefit 
analyses in road safety (Elvik & Veisten, 2005, p. 60-61) and in road 
investment (Fridstrom & Elvik, 1997; Nyborg, 1998).
9.2.2. Barriers to knowledge use in Dutch road safety policies
Analytical concepts
Four groups of barriers, derived from a large body of literature (see for an 
overview Chapter 2 and Blake & Ottoson, 2009; Landry, Amara & Lamari, 
2001b), were distinguished in Chapter 2 :
1. Dissemination conditions: This barrier group stresses the dissemination 
efforts of scientists. The assumption is that knowledge is useful to 
policy-makers, and should be distributed and explained properly to 
them. Communication, explanation and popularisation of research for 
policy can be used as strategies for dissemination.
2. The needs of users: Knowledge should meet the needs of users. Criteria 
can involve issues such as timing, presentation, relevance, usefulness 
and implementability. Also, the quality of the research in terms of 
methodological reliability should be guaranteed to provide a basis of 
trust between researcher and user. Policy-makers will not use 
knowledge they do not have confidence in.
3. Unilateral or co-production of knowledge: Frequent interaction 
between researchers and policy-makers will ensure socially robust
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knowledge, which is more likely to be used. Some authors even suggest 
co-production in the knowledge process.
4. Institutional factors: Knowledge should correspond to the knowledge 
needs called for by the type of policy problem. Chapter 4 suggests 
contradictions between a somewhat more decentralised, integral and 
politics orientated policy world and a rather more national, sectoral and 
technical orientated knowledge world.
Empirical findings
In the foregoing chapters, five different types of barriers could be identified 
on various governmental levels. On a national level, barriers to knowledge 
use were not studied explicitly, although institutional settings on a national 
level did seem to influence barriers. These factors are discussed in section
9.2.3. Chapters 5 to 8 revealed five types of barriers. International studies have 
mentioned the mistiming of knowledge provision and poor access to 
knowledge as a barrier, the first barrier also mentioned by provinces in 
Chapter 6. Furthermore, both in Chapter 6 and 7, provinces mentioned a lack of 
specificity and applicability in some of the knowledge provided, and in some 
cases there is not even agreement on certain specific problem definitions of 
knowledge providers. Municipalities and provinces referred to physical 
obstacles to the use of knowledge for implementing road safety measures. A 
lack of space, excessive maintenance or soil conditions prevented them from 
taking certain measures. Both these types of barriers are supported by 
international studies reviewed in Chapter 5 . The difficulty mentioned most 
often by both municipalities and provinces was the weighing of other 
interests against road safety. These other interests may derive from their own 
policy, for instance on traffic flow or landscaping or from opposition by 
citizens to certain road safety measures. Lastly, municipalities and provinces 
mention more elusive reasons for not using knowledge, such as intuition, 
'gut feeling' and not being convinced of the effect of measures despite 
scientific research.
Interpretation of empirical findings in analytical terms
The findings in the different case studies confirm barriers in three of these 
four barrier groups.
The barrier dissemination conditions is only mentioned in the literature review 
in Chapter 5. Studies conducted outside the Netherlands indicate that 
dissemination of road safety knowledge could be a problem, because users 
were not able to find the knowledge easily. From a questionnaire in a British
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study (Department for Transport, 2008), it appeared that users had problems 
finding the right knowledge at the right time, due to inadequate search 
options or to an overload of information. However, the historical analysis in 
Chapter 4 does not, at any stage of the co-development of policy and 
knowledge, point in this direction. More importantly, the respondents in the 
empirical Chapters 6, 7 and 8, do not mention these barriers spontaneously. 
Thus, the results in this thesis do not show dissemination as a serious 
problem in the Netherlands. This may be due to the fact that there are several 
organisations responsible for disseminating research findings, such as KpVV 
and CROW; also SWOV does this in addition to its research tasks. Further 
research to explore this barrier in depth may shed more light on this topic.
The Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 all provided several indications of barriers in the 
group the needs of users. Within this barrier group, the reason mentioned most 
often was that knowledge could not be implemented due to local 
circumstances or that the knowledge provided was too abstract to be suitable 
for implementation. The literature review in Chapter 5, as well as the 
empirical studies in Chapters 6 (on a provincial level) and 8 (on a municipal 
level), all reveal indications of these barriers in the (non) implementation of 
road safety measures. Two other results fall within this barrier group. The 
first was a lack of confidence in researchers or research results. Studies in 
Chapter 5 noted a lack of confidence in cost-benefit analyses as a specific form 
of presentation of decision-supporting knowledge. For example, national and 
provincial respondents in an EU questionnaire (Elvik & Veisten, 2005) 
mentioned ethical objections and unfamiliarity with the type of research 
method. In addition, Chapter 6 pointed out that provincial policy-makers 
were not convinced that national research findings would suit their 
decentralised settings. They questioned the effects of measures found in 
scientific research. Secondly, policy-makers and researchers appeared to 
have a difference of opinion about the existence of policy problems. Chapter 6 
illustrated that researchers sometimes develop measures for policy problems 
that policy-makers consider non-existent in their province. For instance, 
provincial policy-makers regarded the number of some types of accidents, 
frontal, shoulder and bicycle accidents among other things, as too small to 
require road safety measures such as driving direction separation, semi-hard 
shoulders and cycle crossings. The experimental study in Chapter 7 
demonstrated that provincial policy-makers dem anded knowledge that 
corresponded to their needs closely. This was illustrated by the fact that 
respondents asked for tailor made knowledge in the three cases of the 
experimental study.
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What is remarkable is the fact that in none of the studies the barrier group 
unilateral or co-production o f knowledge was encountered. It should be noted 
that this barrier was not explicitly addressed in the Chapters 6 to 8. However, 
the topic was studied explicitly in Chapter 4, where the interaction between 
the knowledge and policy world was examined. Although further research 
on this topic is certainly necessary, some findings indicate that in the 
Netherlands co-production of knowledge exists to some extent. Examples 
which support this are the fact that CROW uses committees consisting of a 
variety of professionals (representatives of the national, provincial and local 
governments, researchers and businesses) to formulate its road design 
guidelines. Furthermore, several research organisations (SWOV, TNO and 
KpVV) are financed by either the national or the regional and local 
governments, granting them some kind of say on the research topics through 
subsidy conditions and through their presence on advisory and supervisory 
boards. In addition, a structural involvement of knowledge organisations in 
policy-making is shown clearly in Chapter 4 . The frequent questions to 
knowledge organisations for facilitating knowledge for policy plans and 
their presence in several advisory groups illustrate this. Given this existing 
institutional framework, policy-makers might not have a need for more 
involvement in knowledge production than they already have.
Institutional factors were seen most often in the various studies. These are 
discussed in Section 9.2.3.
9.2.3. The institutional setting of road safety policy-making and 
knowledge production
Analytical concepts
As mentioned in the section above, institutional barriers to knowledge use 
were mentioned most often in the empirical studies. To gain insight into the 
nature of these institutional barriers, the section below gives a short 
description of the past and present institutional context. This is based on the 
findings in Chapter 4, using the four aspects of the knowledge and policy 
arrangement: actors, rules, resources and discourses. Two kinds of 
discourses are distinguished here. Substantive discourses discuss problem 
definitions and solutions to policy problems. Governance discourses focus on 
the organisation of the policy (and knowledge) field.
The knowledge and policy arrangement can also be described in terms of the 
typologies put forward by Hoppe and Landry et al. Hoppe (2005) mentions
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four types of boundary work, for the relationship between science and 
policy. In Chapter 2, these are summarised in a figure as follows:
Divergent logics
Prim acy 
for science
Enlightenm ent Bureaucracy
model m odel
Convergent logics
Technocracy Engineering
m odel model
Prim acy 
for policy/ 
politics
Figure 9.1. Four models of boundary work (based on Hoppe, 2005).
Landry et al. (2001b) distinguish four models for interaction between science 
and policy: the science push model, the demand pull model, the 
dissemination model and the interaction model. In addition to these two 
typologies, Chapter 4 described three institutional barriers. The barriers are 
based on the three governance trends mentioned in Chapter 2; these are 
multi-actor governance, multi-sector governance and multi-level governance, 
as well as on the Two Communities metaphor of Caplan (1979).
The institutional context: past and present
With respect to actors, governmental bodies have always played an 
important role in road safety policy. Initially, only the national government 
was engaged in road safety policy. Since the 1990s, however, regional and 
local governments have played an increasingly important role in designing 
and implementing regional and local road safety policy. Provinces are even 
referred to as directors of regional and local road safety policy-making 
(Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2008). In addition to governmental 
bodies, interest groups (for example ANWB, VVN and their predecessors, 
Fietsersbond) have also played a major role in road safety in the Netherlands. 
Throughout the development of road safety policy, the ANWB especially has 
played a significant role in its development as an independent policy field 
with associated policy and knowledge organisations. Although interest
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groups currently seem to play a more modest role, they are still involved in 
making and executing policy. There is a relatively small number of 
knowledge organisations, for example TNO, SWOV, KpVV, CROW, most of 
which are organised and oriented nationally. Also, various universities are 
involved in road safety research to some extent. Examples of this 
involvement are the psychological research at the University of Groningen 
and the infrastructural research at the University of Twente and Delft 
University. Regional and local governments can use information from 
knowledge organisations specialised in disseminating road safety knowledge 
to the local level, such as KpVV and CROW.
Many institutional rules in road safety are derived from the traffic and 
transport policies, such as the Mobility Policy Document and the regulation 
of regional finances (BDU). Nationally, consultation on road safety is also 
integrated in traffic and transport consultative bodies, such as the 
Consultative Body Passenger Transport (OPV). Up until a few decades ago, 
rules used to be organised in a more sectoral way, with sector specific 
consultative bodies, sector specific policy divisions and sector specific policy 
documents and finances. In the knowledge field, there are few rules 
governing the specialisation of knowledge organisations on various topics, 
although a de facto division of tasks can be seen. Similarly, there are no rules 
governing the access to the knowledge and policy arrangement by 
knowledge actors. The knowledge field can be characterised as an open, 
inclusive network with frequent contacts amongst knowledge organisations 
and between these organisations and policy-makers.
On a regional and local level, resources for road safety have had to compete 
with traffic and transport policy since the introduction of the Broad Goal- 
oriented Grant. In the recent past, regional and local road safety budgets 
were sector specific. This is still the case for national road safety budgets. 
Resources for research are provided mostly by the national government, 
through subsidies to SWOV and TNO, and by the regional and local 
governments who subsidise KpVV.
Discourses, with respect to both content and governance, play an important 
role in road safety. Policy-makers and knowledge organisations are not 
equally active in the various discussions. Both policy-makers and scientists 
take part in discussions about the substantive discourse on road safety 
measures. Their opinions have not differed greatly throughout history, as 
reconstructed in Chapter 4 . The substantive discourse on the integration of
183
road safety into traffic and transport policy, on the contrary, and the 
governance discourse on the organisation of the policy and knowledge 
production are mostly conducted by policy-makers and to a far lesser extent 
by scientists.
The institutional context in terms of two typologies
According to Hoppe's typology, the first and obvious thing to be noted is 
that no single model of this typology is dominant in the road safety field and 
that dominant models vary over time. Road safety policy and knowledge 
were not developed sufficiently to qualify as a knowledge-policy 
arrangement until 1945. An increase in both knowledge and policy took place 
between 1945 and 1975 approximately. In general, the knowledge world set 
the tone and policy followed on, agreeing to and gradually adopting the 
ideas put forward by science. In Hoppe's typology, this situation can be 
characterised as a technocratic model, which stresses the primacy of science 
over politics and the convergence between their worlds. From roughly 1975 
to 1995, both the knowledge and the policy worlds had grown considerably 
and both wanted to have their say on the content of knowledge. The national 
government took over some of the knowledge activities. Hoppe's 
bureaucracy model describes such a relationship between the knowledge and 
policy worlds, as it presupposes a primacy of politics over sciences and 
stresses the divergence between the two worlds. At the same time, however, 
knowledge organisations developed new strategic visions such as 
Sustainable Safety and their own agendas, and stressed their independent 
position. These actions can be seen as an attempt, conscious or not, by 
knowledge producers to maintain a certain degree of primacy over politics, 
which matches the technocracy model of Hoppe as described above. In the 
last 15 years, the knowledge organisations' behaviour has not changed much 
in this regard. However, although (national) policy-makers have the same 
intention to direct research as in the previous decades, currently knowledge 
activities no longer take place within the national government, but in more or 
less autonomous knowledge organisations outside the government. This 
national need for directing paralleled by a lack of state organisations for 
knowledge production qualify as characteristics of the engineering model. 
However, other characteristics of this model are a lack of agreement about 
research topics and a lack of conviction that the knowledge and policy 
worlds are convergent. These characteristics do not seem to be present in the 
current road safety knowledge and policy field. The relationship between 
regional and local governments and knowledge organisations is slightly 
different. The primacy of science is greater here and steering by regional and
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local governments is virtually non-existent. These are characteristics of 
Hoppe's technocratic model.
The developments in the knowledge-policy arrangement can also be 
described in terms of the typology of Landry et al. Since the 1960s, national 
policy-makers have applied the ideas of road safety knowledge organisations 
to their policies. This development can be characterised by the science-push- 
model of Landry et al. However, since the mid-1970s, policy has tried to 
determine the research agenda for road safety. This situation can be typified 
as the demand-pull-model of Landry et al. At the same time, knowledge 
organisations have tried to retain the possibility of determining their own 
agenda. In Landry's terms and due to this boundary conflict, characteristics 
of the two above-mentioned models coincide. This is similar to the presence 
of characteristics of the bureaucratic and recently the engineering model 
versus the technocratic model of Hoppe outlined above. Since the 1990s, the 
knowledge-policy arrangement can be characterised on a regional and local 
level as a dissemination model. The regional and local governments have 
access to knowledge organisations specialised in dissemination that can 
identify and translate usable knowledge into a practical policy context.
Can any trends in governance be observed in the road safety policy field? 
The previous chapters show evidence of all three main governance trends, 
which means that due to an increase in the number of actors, levels and 
sectors, multi-actor, multi-level as well as multi-sector trends can be 
distinguished. Yet, the road safety policy field has been a multi-actor field 
from the start. Various kinds of actors such as the interests groups ANWB 
and VVN, but also businesses, have been present in the road safety field 
since the 1920s and 1930s, and the number and variety of actors further 
increased in the 1970s. Chapter 4 and 8 provides several examples of their 
considerable influence at certain times.
Multi-level governance is a more recent development and is shown by the 
increasingly important role of the regional and local governments. Until the 
mid-1980s, the national government was the most important governmental 
body involved in road safety policy, whereas regional and local governments 
had a mere implementing role. Since the mid-1980s, and increasingly 
throughout the last 20 years, regional and local governments became 
responsible for their own road safety policies and recently for their own road 
safety budgets. In this thesis, all empirical chapters show examples of topics 
that are the domain of provinces and municipalities.
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Multi-sector governance is a very recent and still emerging development, 
illustrated by the gradual and on-going integration of road safety into other 
policy fields such as the traffic and transport policy. From the 1960s to the 
1990s road safety was seen as a separate policy field. Since the development 
of the National Traffic and Transport Plan in 2001, however, road safety has 
become increasingly a part of traffic and transport policy. Chapter 4 provides 
examples on the national level (the Mobility Paper and the Strategic Plan 
Road Safety), and the Chapters 6, 7 and 8 confirm that this trend is also 
present on regional and local level. This trend is not only a lip service to 
integration in policy documents. Especially on the regional and local level, 
integration of road safety in the traffic and transport field takes place in 
practice, mainly because of two developments. Firstly, there is a need to 
constantly negotiate between road safety interests and other interests, such 
as traffic flow, in policy-making processes. This urges provinces and 
municipalities to operate in both the road safety policy field and the traffic 
and transport policy field when taking infrastructural measures. Chapter 6 
provides examples of this development. Secondly, the integration of road 
safety budgets in traffic and transport budgets in the BDU encourage 
regional and local governments to integrate infrastructural road safety 
measures into road reconstructions. The studies of Goldenbeld et al and of 
Jagtman et al. (Goldenbeld et al., 2010; Jagtman, Wijnen & Bax, 2010) point to 
this development.
It is worth noting that, contrary to the policy world, the knowledge world 
does not have examples of all these three governance trends. Chapter 4 
illustrated that knowledge organisations fall apart in several categories such 
as organisations exclusively focussed on road safety and those with a 
broader orientation, but also consultancies versus not for profit 
organisations. However, a multi-actor trend as seen in policy cannot be 
present, since knowledge organisations by definition can be typified as only 
one kind of actor. In addition, there is less evidence of multiple levels in the 
knowledge world than in the policy world, as most knowledge production is 
organised at national level and much of it, although not all (see for example: 
Mesken, Aarts & Vis, 2010), is targeted at the national level. Only 
dissemination activities are explicitly directed at the local and regional level. 
Lastly, the knowledge world is not as orientated towards sectors other than 
road safety as the policy world is. Some knowledge organisations are sector 
specific for road safety, such as SWOV. Others have a broader orientation, 
but have allocated road safety to a separate part of their organisation, such as 
the Dutch Safety Board and TNO (for transport safety). Yet others such as
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KpVV and CROW do not have a separate division for road safety but they do 
consider road safety as a separate subject, judging by the lay-out of their 
website and publications. This results in a somewhat limited knowledge 
production for regional and local governmental levels and for or about 
sectors other than road safety.
The differences between the knowledge and the policy world with respect to 
these three governance trends may help to understand three institutional 
barriers to knowledge use, as discussed in the section below.
Three institutional barriers
The institutional context of the road safety knowledge-policy field as 
described in Chapter 4, revealed certain differences between the science and 
policy world. These differences comprise for example the governmental 
levels and sectors on which policy and knowledge organisations are 
organised and aimed at and the difference in cultural focus between these 
two worlds. However, the Chapters 5 to 8 have demonstrated that the 
institutional differences do influence the barriers to the use of knowledge in 
road safety policy. Three institutional barriers have been experienced 
throughout this thesis to a greater or lesser extent. All three have their 
origins in the institutional setting described in Chapter 4 . Two differences can 
be described in terms of governance trends, one can be described in terms of 
the classical Two Communities metaphor of Caplan (1979).
Firstly, a difference was observed between multi-level policy and a 
somewhat more single-level knowledge production. Knowledge 
organisations seem to be organised mainly nationally and are aimed mostly 
at national demands. Consequently, their knowledge production is often 
nationally oriented, although some organisations and studies focus on 
adapting national knowledge to regional and local governments (for 
example: Weijermars, Aarts & Schoon, 2009). Policy, on the other hand, has 
become more and more the responsibility of regional and local governments. 
This results in a lack of specific knowledge for the regional and local level, or 
at least a need for even more adaptation of existing national knowledge to a 
regional and local policy level than is currently available. Chapter 6 provides 
a number of examples; national figures on costs and effects of road safety 
measures were not always trusted on the regional level. Furthermore, 
provincial policy-makers found the number of some types of accidents to be 
too small to require road safety measures, indicating a difference in problem 
definition between themselves and scientists. Also, Chapter 7 offers examples
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of this barrier to knowledge use, when respondents state that knowledge is 
not available to their province on a tailor made basis.
Secondly, a difference was observed between a multi-sector policy and 
single-sector knowledge production. Knowledge organisations have a mainly 
sectoral focus by concentrating on road safety as a separate policy field. 
Policy, on the other hand, regards and deals with road safety in discourses as 
well as in rules and resources (for example the BDU) as a facet of other 
policies, such as traffic and transport policies, rather than as a separate policy 
field. This results in a general lack of knowledge, arguments and techniques 
for weighing road safety against other interests and integrating it in a 
broader policy field, such as traffic and transport, although some studies 
exist that make suggestions on this topic (for example: Schermers & 
Wegman, 2009). Several chapters provide examples of this barrier. Chapter 6 
reported that provinces often had to weigh road safety knowledge against 
other policies. In Chapter 8, knowledge about other interests (e.g. those of 
people living and working in the area) sometimes took precedence over 
scientific knowledge on road safety.
Thirdly, a difference was seen between the culture and rationality of policy­
makers versus knowledge organisations. Policy-makers have to take into 
account many different interests, including public opinion. They therefore 
tend to use a political rationality. Knowledge organisations, on the other 
hand, use mainly a technocratic rationality when producing knowledge, 
focussing on measures anticipated to be most effective for road safety, and 
taking public opinion into account to a lesser extent. This difference comes 
close to Caplan's (1979) two worlds metaphor. The contradiction results in a 
lack of knowledge for coping with political arguments in road safety policy 
and creates a need for the application of the existing technocratic knowledge 
to the political reality. Chapter 5 gives examples of national and provincial 
policy-makers in Europe rejecting knowledge from CBAs and CEAs on 
ethical grounds (Elvik & Veisten, 2005), whereas Chapter 6 and Chapter 8 
demonstrate that a considerable number of municipal and provincial policy­
makers allow political arguments such as public support to prevail above 
rational arguments, especially in the implementation of infrastructural road 
safety measures such as raised intersections, rumble strips and service roads.
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9.3. Looking back and forward: reflection and 
recommendations
Reflections on the research
There are three main areas of reflection with respect to this thesis: the general 
purpose of the thesis, its limitations and its theoretical and practical value.
The general purpose of this thesis was to study the utilisation of knowledge 
in road safety policy. The thesis aimed at researching this topic from various 
angles. This means that various methods were used and that three 
governmental levels were studied empirically. Furthermore, both the history 
as well as the present era of the road safety policy field were taken into 
account. Also, various kinds of knowledge were studied, and theories from 
both knowledge utilisation and institutionalisation were used. This resulted 
in a broad overview of knowledge utilisation in Dutch road safety policy. 
Research on this specific topic has not been performed often. Moreover, the 
choice of research methods and the combination of the methods is not 
common practice in public administration studies.
Obviously, this thesis has some limitations. Some stem from conceptual 
choices and were made deliberately; others were inevitable choices because 
of the restricted time available for a thesis. The first two restrictions are 
obvious ones. The scope of the study was deliberately limited to the road 
safety field and the geographical scope was limited to the Netherlands. This 
means that results are valid for the Dutch road safety policy field only. It is 
not the purpose of this thesis to apply the results to other policy fields. 
Furthermore, some issues were not investigated in this study, due to 
restrictions in time and capacity, for instance, the role of private 
consultancies in knowledge use, was not investigated, although they do seem 
to play an important role in applying knowledge to national but especially to 
regional and local governments and fill the gap between available and 
required knowledge. Also, not all levels of the Knott and Wildavsky ladder 
were covered, although the reasons for this were not only time and capacity, 
but rather the feasibility of operationalising the various levels.
This thesis has both a theoretical and a practical value. As far as the 
theoretical value is concerned, an attempt is made to connect the viewpoints 
from the knowledge utilisation and the institutionalisation theories. It shows 
that the 'classical' barriers to knowledge use from the knowledge utilisation 
perspective are embedded in an institutional context. Moreover, the
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institutional context also influences the 'classical' barriers from the 
knowledge utilisation perspective. For example, the absence of the barrier 
dissemination conditions in the results might be due to how the dissemination 
of research findings is organised in the Netherlands. Organisations such as 
KpVV, CROW and SWOV have been responsible for this for several years 
and dissemination, together with scientifically sound research, is one of the 
pillars of their legitimacy. Also the barrier unilateral or co-production of 
knowledge was not mentioned in the various studies and again this could be 
due to the organisation of the knowledge-policy interaction, where co­
production of knowledge seemed to have a place. After all, policy-makers 
have been involved in choosing research topics and researchers have been 
involved in policy-making since the establishment of the road safety 
knowledge and policy field.
In addition to its theoretical value, this thesis has also practical value for 
policy-makers and researchers. It provides some insight into the relationship 
between policy-makers and researchers and might therefore add to the 
understanding of each other's world. Furthermore, for researchers it presents 
knowledge about common barriers to knowledge use and suggestions to try 
to overcome them. In the next section a number of recommendations are 
formulated for additional research and for knowledge organisations and 
policy-makers.
Recommendations for policy and for further research
Two types of recommendations can be formulated. The first are 
recommendations for further research. The second type are 
recommendations on the practice of knowledge-policy interactions and their 
institutional setting. Some findings in this thesis can be used to ease the 
communication between science and policy, and make for a better use of 
knowledge in policy.
With regard to the recommendations for further research, of course, 
additional research can be done by extending this study to research on 
knowledge use in road safety policies outside the Netherlands. Both within 
and outside the Netherlands more research could be carried out to combine 
the detailed process perspective of knowledge use with a thorough 
institutional analysis. Chapter 2 illustrated that both perspectives are covered 
widely in the scientific literature. Although the process perspective does take 
notice of institutional barriers, and the institutional perspective takes notice 
of some kind of knowledge use, few try to integrate these two viewpoints.
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This thesis has made a modest start in combining the two perspectives. In the 
road safety field, this start can be extended by comparing an in-depth 
analysis of a national policy process with an institutional analysis.
Recommendations to improve the relationship between science and policy 
can be made in twofold, based on the observed barriers in this thesis. Two 
barrier groups are prominent: the needs o f users and institutional barriers. The 
recommendations can be divided into two categories: recommendations for 
types of knowledge that can be developed further, and recommendations for 
the organisation of the knowledge production and knowledge use.
The research presented in this thesis makes clear that there is a need for more 
knowledge on at least two topics. The first is knowledge on how to deal with 
contradictory interests of different actors in road safety policy, such as 
travelling time, driving convenience, public support and landscaping 
policies. This relates to the research findings in Chapter 4, 6 and 8, that policies 
appear to be somewhat more integral while knowledge appears to be more 
sectoral in character. It also relates to the findings that knowledge producers 
generally use a more technical language and arguments, whereas policy­
makers use more political language and arguments. For some contradictory 
interests (for example those of the emergency services and public transport), 
guidelines from CROW are available on how to reach a compromise between 
these interests. Many municipalities are already familiar with this knowledge 
and use the guidelines. However, the interests of other actors such as people 
living and working in the area and nature conservation groups are often not 
discussed in road safety knowledge. By considering these interests, road 
safety policy-makers can take important road safety measures without risk of 
being overruled by other policy fields. There has been limited research 
carried out into public support (Goldenbeld, 2002; 2004; Goldenbeld & Bax, 
2001) and a start has been made in this field with research into subjective 
safety (Van Bruggen, 2007; Vlakveld, Goldenbeld & Twisk, 2008). More 
research into these subjects is called for. Methods to balance rational 
scientific knowledge on road safety and the other, possibly equally important 
public support and interests outside the road safety field can help policy­
makers to take decisions that are more consistent and can help knowledge 
providers to get their knowledge used more often. It would be helpful for 
road safety policy-makers if knowledge of these various interests could be 
included in methods of integration and weighing, such as multi-criteria 
analyses or road safety effect reports, analogical to the environmental impact 
reports.
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There also appears to be a need for knowledge aimed at regional and local 
governments. The research findings in Chapter 4 and 6 to 8 support this, in 
that knowledge producers are aimed more at the national level, whereas 
regional and local governments in the Netherlands nowadays have a very 
important role in road safety policy-making. Furthermore, various examples 
in Chapter 6 and 8 illustrated that provinces and municipalities, more than 
once, were unable to implement infrastructural road safety measures due to 
local physical circumstances. Research has been carried out on a small scale 
on local and provincial topics (for example: Aarts, 2008; Weijermars, Aarts & 
Schoon, 2009), yet generally national figures are used, especially for cost and 
effect information. Regional and local governments have already asked for 
criteria to measure road safety other than road deaths and serious road 
injuries (for example: Mesken, Aarts & Vis, 2010). Tailor-made knowledge for 
regional and local governments will help them improve their policies. The 
knowledge that might meet their needs is concrete knowledge that deals 
with road safety in their own local circumstances.
Finally, a number of recommendations for the organisation of the knowledge 
production and knowledge use can be made. Firstly, with respect to the 
slight difference between the knowledge and policy world on considering 
road safety a separate sector or not, it might be desirable to encourage a 
certain am ount of integration of road safety knowledge into the area of traffic 
and transport. Such an integration does not need to be physical. Orientation 
of road safety knowledge organisations towards the traffic and transport 
policy field and cooperation with traffic and transport knowledge 
organisations could provide knowledge for integrating road safety policy 
into traffic and transport policy without neglecting the road safety topic or 
changing road safety in a simple tick-off list of road design requirements. 
Research into the organisational aspects of considering road safety in an 
early stage of the policy-making on traffic and transport policy would 
improve the integration of road safety in traffic and transport policy.
Secondly, with respect to the difference between the knowledge and policy 
world on the attention they give to different kinds of actors, more contact 
between knowledge organisations and actors with different interests in road 
safety policy may result in a method to weigh these interests in road safety 
policy. Regular meetings with the general public, interest groups and 
businesses such as farmers may provide new insights and new research 
topics. National, regional and local governments regularly include these 
groups in the policy-making process. Contacts between governments and
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interest groups, the general public and businesses are therefore common. 
However, contacts between these groups and knowledge organisations are 
less common or sometimes non-existent. Including interest groups on topics 
other than road safety, businesses and members of the general public in 
advisory boards, organising hearings or allowing them to comment on 
research proposals, could help understand their opinions and interests.
Thirdly and lastly, regarding the gradual difference in focus between the 
knowledge and policy world on the level of governance, a dialogue between 
regional and local governments and knowledge organisations may help to 
identify knowledge gaps and to improve the connection between available 
knowledge and policies. This may help to provide more knowledge aimed at 
the regional and local governments as mentioned earlier. On a provincial 
level, this dialogue frequently takes place in the Road Safety Trade Council 
(Vakberaad Verkeersveiligheid). However, on a local level, no such platform 
for dialogue exists. Such a platform would contribute to a better 
understanding between knowledge organisations and policy-makers. The 
Association of Netherlands Municipalities VNG could fulfil an important 
role in this, as it always has done in policy fields such as social security, 
welfare and spatial planning.
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List of abbreviations
* No authorised translation
Dutch meaning Abbreviation English meaning
Geen afkorting, voorheen: Algemene 
Nederlandse Bond van Ouderen
ANBO No abbreviation, Dutch 
association representing 
seniors*
Koninklijke Nederlandse 
Toeristenbond ANWB
ANWB Royal Dutch Tourist Club 
ANWB
Aanbevelingen Stedelijke 
Verkeersvoorzieningen
ASVV Recommendations for traffic 
facilities in built-up areas*
Adviesdienst Verkeer en Vervoer AVV Transport Research Centre
Brede Doeluitkering BDU Broad Goal-oriented Grant*
Bond van Autohandelaren en 
Garagehouders
BOVAG Dutch Alliance of Garage 
Owners*
Bureau Verkeershandhaving 
Openbaar Ministerie
BVOM Bureau Traffic Enforcement of 
the Public Prosecution Service
Centraal Bureau 
Rijvaardigheidsbewijzen
CBR The Dutch Driving Test 
Organisation
Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek CBS Statistics Netherlands
Centrale Commissie voor de 
Verkeersveiligheid
CCVV Central Commission for Road 
Safety*
Kennisplatform voor infrastructuur, 
verkeer, vervoer en openbare ruimte
CROW Information and Technology 
Platform for Infrastructure, 
Traffic, Transport and Public 
Space*
Democraten 66 D66 Democrats 66
Dienst Verkeer en Scheepvaart DVS Centre for Transport and 
Navigation
Dienst Verkeerskunde -- Centre for Traffic Studies*
Dienst Verkeersongevallen -- Centre for Traffic Accidents*
Directie Verkeersveiligheid DVV Directorate-General for Road 
Safety*
Essentiële
Herkenbaarheidskenmerken
EHK Essential Recognisability 
Characteristics
Europese Unie EU European Union
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Dutch meaning Abbreviation English meaning
Geen afkorting, voorheen:Eigen 
Vervoerders Organisatie
EVO No abbreviation, lobbyist and 
adviser for businesses 
concerning logistical 
activities*
Fietsberaad -- Centre of expertise on bicycle 
policy
Fietsersbond -- Dutch Cyclists' Union
Geen eenduidige Nederlandse 
vertaling, soms wordt het word 
versnellingskamer gebruikt
GDR Group Decision Room
Gebundelde Doeluitkering GDU Combined Goal-oriented 
Grant*
Ministerie van Infrastructuur en 
Milieu
IenM Ministry of Infrastructure and 
the Environment
Interprovinciaal Overleg IPO Association of the Provinces 
of the Netherlands
Interdepartementale Stuurgroep 
verkeersveiligheidsbeleid
ISVV Interdepartmental Steering 
Committee on Road Safety*
Kennisinfrastructuur
Verkeersveiligheid
KEVER Road Safety Knowledge 
Infrastructure *
Koninklijke Nederlandse Automobiel 
Club
KNAC Royal Dutch Motoring Club*
Kennisplatform Verkeer en Vervoer KpVV Transport Knowledge 
Resource Centre
Land- en Tuinbouworganisatie LTO Dutch Federation of 
Agriculture and Horticulture
Uitsluitend materiële schade MDO Material damage only
Meerjarenprogramma
Verkeersveiligheid
MPV Multi-year Programme Road 
Safety*
Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken 
en Koninkrijksrelaties
-- Ministry of the Interior and 
Kingdom Relations
Nationaal Plan Verkeersveiligheid NPV Road Safety National Plan *
Nationaal Verkeers- en Vervoerplan NVVP National Traffic and 
Transport Plan
Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid -- Dutch Safety Board
Overlegorgaan Personenvervoer OPV Consultative Body for 
Passenger Transport*
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Dutch meaning Abbreviation English meaning
Overlegorgaan Verkeersveiligheid OVV Consultative Body for Road 
Safety*
Overlegorganen Verkeer en 
Waterstaat
OVW Consultative Bodies for 
Transport, Public Works and 
Water Management*
Permanente Contactgroep 
Verkeersveiligheid
PCGV Permanent Road Safety 
Contact Group *
Partij van de Arbeid PvdA Dutch Labour Party
Provinciaal Verkeers- en Vervoerplan PVVP Provincial Traffic and 
Transport Plan
RAI Vereniging, geen afkorting, 
voorheen: Rijwiel en Automobiel 
Industrie
RAI RAI Association, no 
abbreviation, Dutch Bicycle 
and Automobile Industry*
Regionaal Orgaan Verkeersveiligheid ROV Regional Road Traffic Safety 
Authority*
Raad voor de Verkeersveiligheid RVV Dutch Road Safety Board*
Raad voor Verkeer en Waterstaat ““ Advisory Council for 
Transport, Public Works and 
Water Management
Regionaal Verkeers- en Vervoerplan RVVP Regional Traffic and 
Transport Plan
Structuurschema Verkeer en Vervoer SVV Traffic and Transport 
Structure Plan
Stichting Wetenschappelijk 
Onderzoek Verkeersveiligheid
SWOV Institute for Road Safety 
Research
Technische Hogeschool TH Technical College*
Transport en Logistiek Nederland TLN Dutch Employers 
Organisation on Transport 
and Logistics
Transportongevallenraad TOR Transport Safety Board*
Toegepast Natuurwetenschappelijk 
Onderzoek
TNO Netherlands Organization for 
Applied Scientific Research 
TNO
Technische Universiteit TU University of Technology
Convenant Verkeer en Vervoer, 
Regionaal, Decentraal en Integraal
VERDI Covenant for Regional, 
Decentralised and Integral 
Traffic and Transport *
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Dutch meaning Abbreviation English meaning
Verkeerskundig Studiecentrum VSC The Traffic Research Centre 
VSC
Vereniging van Nederlandse 
Gemeenten
VNG Association of Netherlands 
Municipalities
Veilig Verkeer Nederland VVN Dutch Traffic Safety 
Association
Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat VenW Dutch Ministry of Transport, 
Public Works and Water 
Management
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Samenvatting
Tijdens tien jaar onderzoek op het terrein van de verkeersveiligheid heb ik 
verschillende voorbeelden gezien van niet-gebruik van wetenschappelijke 
kennis in verkeersveiligheidsbeleid. Deze voorbeelden maakten mij nieuws­
gierig naar het onderwerp 'gebruik van kennis in verkeersveiligheidsbeleid', 
en naar de vraag of achter dat al of niet gebruik van kennis wellicht bepaalde 
processen en patronen schuilgingen. Literatuurstudie liet zien dat dit 
onderwerp nog weinig onderzocht is en dat de wel beschikbare studies vaak 
niet systematisch zijn uitgevoerd of een theoretische onderbouwing 
ontberen. Deze dissertatie wil ertoe bijdragen om die beide manco's te 
verhelpen. De hoofdvraag luidt daarom als volgt:
Welke redenen zijn er voor mogelijk niet-gebruik van kennis in het
Nederlandse verkeersveiligheidsbeleid?
Voordat conclusies over niet-gebruik getrokken kunnen worden, moet 
natuurlijk eerst het gebruik van kennis in verkeersveiligheidsbeleid worden 
onderzocht. Daarnaast worden barrières voor kennisgebruik bekeken, en 
worden aanbevelingen voor verbeteringen gedaan.
De hoofdvraag is daarom uitgewerkt in de volgende subvragen:
• In welke mate wordt kennis gebruikt in het Nederlandse 
verkeersveiligheidsbeleid?
• Welke barrières bestaan er voor kennisgebruik in het Nederlandse 
verkeersveiligheidsbeleid?
• Hoe kan het kennisgebruik in dit veld worden verbeterd?
De bestaande wetenschappelijke literatuur over het gebruik van kennis, de 
processen daarachter en de institutionele patronen tussen kennis en beleid 
zijn onderzocht in Hoofdstuk 2. Daarin w ordt ook de ladder van Knott en 
Wildavsky (1980) gepresenteerd, die in de verschillende hoofdstukken w ordt 
gebruikt om de empirische resultaten te duiden. Verder komen verschillende 
soorten barrières voor kennisgebruik aan bod, en typologieën die de 
verhouding tussen kennis en beleid beschrijven. Hoofdstuk 3 geeft een 
verantwoording van de methodische benaderingen en technieken die in de 
empirische Hoofdstukken 4 tot en met 8 gebruikt worden. Het gaat om vier 
verschillende methoden: een historische reconstructie, een kritisch
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literatuuroverzicht, twee meervoudige casestudy's en een experimentele 
setting. Deze triangulatie van onderzoeksmethoden maakt het mogelijk het 
onderwerp van verschillende kanten te onderzoeken en zo een breed beeld te 
krijgen van de verschillende aspecten van kennisgebruik.
In Hoofdstuk 4 is een historisch-institutionele analyse uitgevoerd van de 
opkomst en ontwikkeling van het Nederlandse verkeersveiligheidsveld, 
toegespitst op het beleid, op de kennisproductie ten behoeve daarvan, en op 
de relatie tussen deze twee. Een kritische review van beschikbaar onderzoek 
op het terrein van kennisgebruik in verkeersveiligheidsbeleid, zowel binnen 
als buiten Nederland, is het onderwerp van Hoofdstuk 5. Dit hoofdstuk 
ordent niet alleen de bestaande literatuur, die kritische ordening heeft ook 
gefunctioneerd als gids voor de daaropvolgende hoofdstukken. Na de 
historisch-institutionele patronen die uit Hoofdstuk 4 naar voren komen, zijn 
in de Hoofdstukken 6 en 8 processen van kennisgebruik bij het verkeers- 
veiligheidsbeleid op provinciaal en gemeentelijk niveau geanalyseerd. Deze 
exploratieve onderzoeken laten een aantal barrières zien voor het gebruik 
van kennis over infrastructurele maatregelen in verkeersveiligheidsbeleid. In 
Hoofdstuk 7 zijn enkele van deze barrières getoetst in een experimentele 
setting op provinciaal niveau. De experimentele setting maakte het mogelijk 
om naast het bestaan en de betekenis van deze barrières, ook de motieven 
van de respondenten in hun omgang met kennis te onderzoeken.
Kennisgebruik in Nederlands verkeersveiligheidsbeleid
Om de mate van kennisgebruik in verkeersveiligheidsbeleid vast te stellen, is 
gebruikgemaakt van de ladder van Knott en Wildavsky (1980; Landry, 
Amara & Lamari, 2001a; Lester, 1993). Zij onderscheiden zeven niveaus van 
kennisgebruik: van het ontvangen van kennis ('reception'), via het lezen en 
begrijpen ervan ('cognition'), het refereren aan die kennis ('reference'), de 
inspanningen die kennis in beleid om te zetten ('effort'), tot het 
daadwerkelijk adopteren van kennis in beleid ('adoption'), het implemen­
teren daarvan ('implement') en het meten van de effecten van het beleid 
(impact).
Geïnspireerd door Weiss (1977) en anderen zijn vier soorten gebruik van 
kennis onderscheiden: instrumenteel gebruik, strategisch gebruik, pacifi­
cerend gebruik en conceptueel gebruik. De vier soorten gebruik zijn 
gekoppeld aan vier soorten beleidsproblemen, zoals onderscheiden door 
Hoppe (2002a; 2008). Bij getemde (ook wel gedomesticeerde of 
gestructureerde) problemen bestaat consensus over het doel van het
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beleidsprobleem en over de kennis en de middelen die nodig zijn voor het 
oplossen van het beleidsprobleem. Ongetemde of ongestructureerde 
problemen kennen juist een grote onzekerheid of onenigheid over het doel 
en de waarden van het beleidsprobleem en ook de kennis over deze 
beleidsproblemen is onzeker. Daartussenin bestaan twee soorten gedeeltelijk 
getemde of gestructureerde problemen: degene waarover wel consensus 
bestaat over de doelen maar niet over de beschikbare kennis en middelen, en 
degene waarbij het omgekeerde het geval is. Bij gedomesticeerde problemen 
zijn beleidsmakers geneigd kennis instrumenteel te gebruiken. Ongetemde 
problemen leiden juist vaak tot conceptueel gebruik van kennis. Bij 
gedeeltelijk getemde problemen met consensus over de doelen neigen 
beleidsmakers naar strategisch kennisgebruik. Ten slotte leiden gedeeltelijk 
getemde problemen met consensus over de middelen vaak tot pacificerend 
kennisgebruik.
Uit dit onderzoek kunnen drie algemene conclusies over kennisgebruik in 
het Nederlandse verkeersveiligheidsbeleid getrokken worden. De eerste is 
dat, anders dan mijn intuïtieve aanvoelen, de beschikbare kennis over 
verkeersveiligheid breed gebruikt wordt. Op nationaal niveau (Hoofdstuk 4) 
w ordt kennis over verkeersveiligheid, zoals geproduceerd door de SWOV, 
het CROW, de toenmalige Raad voor de Verkeersveiligheid en andere 
organisaties, vaak gebruikt in nationale beleidsplannen. De tweede conclusie 
is dat op nationaal en provinciaal niveau veelvuldig gebruik w ordt gemaakt 
van de door kennisproducenten aangeleverde richtlijnen voor infrastructuur. 
Alle provincies bleken bekend met de richtlijnen en hadden deze gelezen. 
Bovendien hadden vele deze verkeersveiligheidsmaatregelen geïmplemen­
teerd op hun wegen. Ook veel respondenten in de experimentele studie in 
Hoofdstuk 7 gaven aan dat verkeersveiligheid een belangrijke basis is voor 
hun beslissingen over infrastructurele maatregelen. Ten derde laat Hoofdstuk 
8 zien dat 80% van de bestudeerde gemeenten het gebruik van richtlijnen en 
handboeken bij beslissingen over het implementeren van verkeersveilig- 
heidsmaatregelen spontaan noemde. Tegelijkertijd echter lieten gemeenten 
bij deze implementatie op 50% van hun wegen andere belangen prevaleren 
boven verkeersveiligheid.
Bovenstaande opsomming illustreert dat in de diverse hoofdstukken veel 
van de volgens Knott en Wildawsky denkbare niveaus van kennisgebruik 
ook zijn aangetroffen, zoals het reception-niveau, het cognition-niveau, het 
reference-niveau, het effort-niveau en het implementation-niveau. De hoofd­
lijn is: kennisgebruik op de lagere niveaus van de ladder van Knott en
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Wildavsky (1980) is vaker geconstateerd dan kennisgebruik op de hogere 
niveaus.
De vier typen kennisgebruik en de vier typen beleidsproblemen die daarmee 
geassocieerd worden, zijn in alle empirische hoofdstukken onderzocht. Alle 
hoofdstukken, maar vooral Hoofdstuk 4, geven aanwijzingen dat het kennis- 
en het beleidsveld het eigenlijk wel ongeveer eens zijn over het hoofddoel 
van het verkeersveiligheidsbeleid: de reductie van het aantal doden en 
ernstig verkeersgewonden. Terwijl de empirie aangeeft dat de kennis- en de 
beleidswereld het ook eens zijn over de algemene aanpak van dit probleem, 
geven de Hoofdstukken 4 tot en met 8 veel voorbeelden van verschillende 
zienswijzen op specifieke verkeersveiligheidsmaatregelen. In termen van de 
vier typen beleidsproblemen, kan verkeersveiligheid worden beschreven als 
een gedeeltelijk getemd probleem met consensus tussen beleidsmakers en 
onderzoekers over de doelen, maar niet (geheel) over de middelen. De typen 
beleidsproblemen zijn in Hoofdstuk 7 expliciet bestudeerd en in de andere 
hoofdstukken meer impliciet. Deze bevindingen laten zien dat verkeers- 
veiligheidskennis zowel instrumenteel als strategisch gebruikt wordt. In 
Hoofdstuk 7 gaven provinciale ambtenaren aan dat zij hun gedeputeerden zo 
neutraal mogelijk willen informeren en kennis niet strategisch willen 
gebruiken en in zowel in Hoofdstuk 6 als 7 wilden provinciale beleidsmakers 
maatoplossingen voor hun beleidsproblemen. Echter, Hoofdstuk 6 en 8 laten 
duidelijk zien dat beleidsmakers verschillende, vaak tegenstrijdige, belangen 
tegen elkaar moeten afwegen bij het vormgeven van verkeersveiligheids- 
beleid. Deze bevindingen wijzen erop dat beleidsmakers kennis strategisch 
gebruiken.
Barrières voor kennisgebruik in Nederlands verkeersveiligheidsbeleid
Op basis van de literatuur kunnen vier groepen barrières voor het gebruik 
van kennis in beleid onderscheiden worden (zie het overzicht in Hoofdstuk 2 
en bijvoorbeeld Blake & Ottoson, 2009; Landry, Amara & Lamari, 2001b):
1. Disseminatiecondities: in deze barrièregroep is de aanname dat kennis 
nuttig is voor beleidsmakers en dat de verspreiding van en de 
toelichting bij deze kennis belangrijk is.
2. De behoeften van kennisgebruikers: de wensen van gebruikers ten 
aanzien van timing, presentatie, relevantie, bruikbaarheid en 
implementeerbaarheid, maar ook de kwaliteit van het onderzoek en het 
vertrouwen van beleidsmakers daarin staan hier centraal.
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3. Unilaterale productie of coproductie van kennis: in deze barrièregroep 
is de aanname dat frequente interactie tussen onderzoekers en 
beleidsmakers of coproductie van kennis maatschappelijk robuuste 
kennis zal opleveren. Deze robuuste kennis zal, naar verwachting, 
vaker gebruikt worden dan kennis die unilateraal geproduceerd wordt.
4. Institutionele factoren: centraal hier staat dat kennis moet aansluiten bij 
het type beleidsprobleem en bij de institutionele context van het 
beleidsveld.
Op nationaal niveau zijn de barrières voor kennisgebruik niet expliciet 
bestudeerd. De historische reconstructie in Hoofdstuk 4 geeft echter 
aanwijzingen dat de nationale institutionele context wel invloed heeft op 
deze barrières (groep 4). De volgende paragraaf gaat daarop in. 
Internationale studies geven aan dat een verkeerde timing van kennisaanbod 
(groep 2) en een slechte toegang tot kennis (groep 1), barrières zijn voor 
kennisgebruik. De barrière verkeerde timing is ook in Hoofdstuk 6 genoemd 
door respondenten, slechte toegang werd echter niet of nauwelijks genoemd. 
Verder noemen provincies, zowel in Hoofdstuk 6 als 7, het gebrek aan 
specificiteit en toepasbaarheid van sommige kennis als een barrière (groep 2). 
Gemeenten en provincies noemen ook fysieke obstakels voor het 
implementeren van verkeersveiligheidsmaatregelen: gebrek aan ruimte, te 
hoge onderhoudskosten of lastige bodemcondities weerhouden hen ervan 
bepaalde maatregelen te nemen. Deze barrières zijn ook terug te vinden in de 
internationale studies besproken in Hoofdstuk 5 .
Het probleem dat echter het meest genoemd werd, door zowel gemeenten als 
provincies, was de afweging van verkeersveiligheid tegen andere belangen. 
Deze andere belangen kwamen voort uit eigen beleid, bijvoorbeeld over 
doorstroming en landschappelijke inrichting, of uit oppositie van burgers 
tegen bepaalde verkeersveiligheidsmaatregelen. Ten slotte noemden 
gemeenten en provincies meer ongrijpbare redenen voor het niet-gebruik 
van kennis, zoals intuïtie, en het niet overtuigd zijn van het effect van 
maatregelen, soms ook ondanks wetenschappelijk onderzoek hiernaar.
Niet alle vier de barrièregroepen uit de literatuur bleken evenveel voor te 
komen in het empirisch onderzoek. De barrièregroep disseminatiecondities 
(groep 1) kwam alleen naar voren uit het literatuuroverzicht in Hoofdstuk 5, 
terwijl de historische analyse in Hoofdstuk 4 in geen enkele van de beschreven 
periodes in deze richting wijst. Ook de respondenten in de Hoofdstukken 6, 7 
en 8 noemden deze groep barrières niet. De Hoofdstukken 5 tot en met 8 geven
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wel verschillende aanwijzingen voor barrières in de groep behoeften van 
kennisgebruikers. Binnen deze groep 2 waren de meest voorkomende redenen 
voor het niet-gebruik van kennis de onmogelijkheid om maatregelen te 
implementeren door lokale omstandigheden en de abstractheid van de 
beschikbare kennis. Voorts ging het in deze groep om een gebrek aan 
vertrouwen in onderzoekers en/of in onderzoeksresultaten, en bleken 
beleidsmakers en onderzoekers verschillende opvattingen te hebben over het 
bestaan van beleidsproblemen. Provinciale beleidsmakers zagen bijvoorbeeld 
het aantal frontale ongevallen, flankongevallen en fietsongevallen als te klein 
om maatregelen zoals rijbaanscheiding, verharde bermen en fietsoversteek- 
plaatsen te nemen. Opmerkelijk is dat in geen van de studies in dit proef­
schrift barrières in de groep unilaterale productie o f coproductie van kennis 
(groep 3) zijn gevonden. Deze barrièregroep is niet expliciet aan de orde 
gekomen in de Hoofdstukken 6 tot en met 8, maar het onderwerp is uitgebreid 
behandeld in Hoofdstuk 4, met betrekking tot de interactie tussen de kennis- 
en de beleidswereld. Diverse bevindingen wijzen erop dat in Nederland 
feitelijk een vorm van coproductie van kennis bestaat: zo worden veel 
richtlijnen voor verkeersveiligheidsmaatregelen gezamenlijk ontworpen door 
beleidsmakers en onderzoekers, en hebben overheidsorganisaties via de 
financiering van onderzoeksinstellingen zeggenschap over kennisonder- 
werpen. Hoofdstuk 4 laat een langdurige en structurele betrokkenheid van 
kennisorganisaties in het beleid zien.
De barrières die het meest genoemd zijn, zijn de institutionele barrières. De 
volgende alinea gaat hierop in.
De institutionele context van het Nederlandse verkeersveiligheidbeleid en 
de kennisproductie
De ontwikkeling van de institutionele context van verkeersveiligheidsbeleid 
en -kennis w ordt hier kort geschetst aan de hand van de vier aspecten van 
het beleidsarrangementenconcept (Arts & Leroy, 2006a; Van Tatenhove, Arts 
& Leroy, 2000): actoren, regels, hulpmiddelen en discoursen.
Van oudsher hebben overheidsorganen een belangrijke rol gespeeld in het 
Nederlandse verkeersveiligheidsbeleid. In eerste instantie was alleen de 
nationale overheid betrokken bij verkeersveiligheid. Sinds ongeveer 1990 
echter, spelen regionale en lokale overheden in toenemende mate een rol in 
het ontwerpen en implementeren van het regionaal en lokaal verkeersveilig- 
heidsbeleid. Naast overheidsorganen hebben ook belangengroeperingen 
(bijvoorbeeld de ANWB, VVN en haar voorlopers, en de Fietsersbond) een
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belangrijke rol gespeeld in de verkeersveiligheid in Nederland. Met name de 
ANWB heeft een significante rol gespeeld in de ontwikkeling van 
verkeersveiligheid tot een onafhankelijk beleidsveld met bijbehorende 
beleids- en kennisorganisaties. Binnen het veld bestaat een relatief klein 
aantal kennisproducerende organisaties, zoals TNO, SWOV, KpVV en 
CROW, die meestal nationaal georganiseerd en vaak ook nationaal 
georiënteerd zijn. Tevens zijn verschillende universiteiten betrokken bij het 
verkeersveiligheidsonderzoek.
Veel institutionele regels in het verkeersveiligheidsveld zijn ontleend aan 
verkeers- en vervoerbeleid zoals de participatieregels rondom de besluit­
vorming over de Nota Mobiliteit en de regels voor regionale financiering via 
de Brede Doeluitkering (BDU). Op regionaal en lokaal niveau moeten 
budgetten voor verkeersveiligheid sinds de invoering van de BDU 
concurreren met andere belangen in het verkeers- en vervoerbeleid. In het 
recente verleden waren deze regionale en lokale verkeersveiligheids- 
budgetten sectorspecifiek. In het verkeersveiligheidsveld zijn enkele 
belangrijke debatten te signaleren die het denken over verkeersveiligheid 
structureren, ook wel discoursen genoemd. Deze debatten gaan bijvoorbeeld 
over concrete verkeersveiligheidsmaatregelen en hun kosten en effecten, 
over de afbakening tussen verkeersveiligheid en andere beleidsonderwerpen 
en over de organisatie van het verkeersveiligheidsbeleid.
Met behulp van de typologieën van Hoppe (2005) enerzijds en Landry et al. 
(Landry, Amara & Lamari, 2001b) anderzijds is de relatie tussen kennis en 
beleid inzake verkeersveiligheid in dit proefschrift beschreven. Zonder hier 
nader op deze typologieën in te gaan, helpen zij de historische afwisselende 
dominantie te laten zien: terwijl tot 1945 kennis- en beleidsorganisaties nog 
onvoldoende ontwikkeld waren om van een kennis-beleidsarrangement te 
gewagen, zette tussen 1945 en 1975 vooral de kenniswereld de toon. Het 
beleid stemde in met de onderzoeksbevindingen en nam  deze geleidelijk aan 
over. Vanaf ongeveer 1975 tot 1995 groeiden zowel de kennis- als de 
beleidswereld aanzienlijk en beide drukten hun stempel op de inhoud van de 
kennis over verkeersveiligheid. In de laatste 15 jaar vonden kennis- 
activiteiten in mindere mate plaats binnen de nationale overheid, maar meer 
dan voorheen in min of meer autonome kennisorganisaties buiten de 
overheid. Sinds de jaren 90 heeft het kennis-beleidsarrangement ook een 
expliciete regionale component gekregen.
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Governance trends
In recente bestuurskundige literatuur is sprake van een ontwikkeling van 
'government' naar 'governance'. In het kort: op meerdere beleidsterreinen 
zou een mon(opol)istisch optredende overheid, die beleid voert per beleids­
sector, plaats maken voor een overheid tussen andere actoren, zou ruimte 
komen voor meer integrale beleidsvoering en voor beleidsvoering op 
meerdere niveaus. Deze ontwikkelingen worden wel samengevat als de 
trend naar een multi-actor-, multi-sector- en multi-levelbeleidsvoering 
(Wiering & Crabbé, 2006, p. 103-104). Interessant is dan de vraag of die 
trends ook op het beleids- én kennisveld verkeersveiligheid te zien zijn.
De empirische hoofdstukken geven aanwijzingen voor alle drie deze 
governance-trends. Toch moet de multi-actortrend gerelativeerd worden: 
verkeersveiligheid is, door de aanwezigheid van overheids-, kennis- en 
maatschappelijke organisaties, al vanaf de start een multi-actorveld. De 
steeds belangrijkere rol van regionale en lokale overheden duidt op een trend 
richting 'multi-level governance'. 'Multi-sector governance' is een zeer 
recente trend, die geïllustreerd w ordt door de geleidelijke en nog 
voortgaande integratie van verkeersveiligheid in het bredere verkeers- en 
vervoerbeleid.
In de kenniswereld ziet het beeld er minder uitgesproken uit. Van een multi- 
actortrend, zoals in de beleidswereld, is in het kennisveld geen sprake. 
Kennisorganisaties, hoewel onderling soms erg verschillend, zijn per 
definitie één type actor. Ook zijn er minder aanwijzingen voor 
kennisproductie op meerdere niveaus: de meeste kennisproductie is 
georganiseerd op het nationale niveau en veel, maar niet alle kennis is ook 
gericht op het nationale niveau. Activiteiten gericht op het lokale en 
regionale niveau bestaan voornamelijk uit disseminatie van kennis. 
Daarnaast illustreren de empirische hoofdstukken dat de kenniswereld 
minder gericht is op beleidssectoren buiten de verkeersveiligheid dan de 
beleidswereld.
Ten slotte, terwijl de diverse hoofdstukken een verregaande consensus en 
samenwerking tussen kenniswereld en beleidswereld laten zien, bevestigen 
zij ook een bekend cultuurverschil tussen beide werelden. Beleidsmakers 
moeten rekening houden met veel verschillende belangen, waaronder de 
publieke opinie, en neigen dus naar een politieke rationaliteit. Onderzoekers 
daarentegen neigen vooral naar een technocratische rationaliteit. Zij richten 
zich op maatregelen waarvan het meeste effect w ordt verwacht op de
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verkeersveiligheid en hoeven minder rekening te houden met de publieke 
opinie. Hoezeer Caplan's (1979) two-communities-metafoor ook gedateerd 
lijkt, beleid en wetenschap zijn ook op het veld van de verkeersveiligheid 
twee werelden met een verschillende cultuur, rationaliteit en andere 
waarden en normen.
Drie institutionele barrières
Uit de beschrijving van de institutionele context van het kennis- 
beleidsarrangement en uit de andere empirische hoofdstukken komen vooral 
drie institutionele barrières voor kennisgebruik naar voren. Twee daarvan 
berusten op de verschillen in governance trends tussen de kennis- en de 
beleidswereld en één barrière kan beschreven worden in termen van de two- 
communities-metafoor van Caplan (1979).
Het verschil tussen beleid met meer multi-levelkarakteristieken en kennis­
productie die meer single-levelkenmerken vertoont, resulteert in een grotere 
behoefte aan specifieke kennis voor het regionaal en lokaal niveau dan nu 
beschikbaar is. Hoofdstuk 6 geeft hiervan een aantal voorbeelden. Zo werden 
nationale getallen over kosten en effecten van maatregelen op regionaal 
niveau niet altijd vertrouwd. Ook Hoofdstuk 7 geeft voorbeelden van deze 
barrière: respondenten geven aan dat er geen kennis op maat voor hun 
provincies beschikbaar is.
Het verschil tussen beleid met meer multi-sectorkenmerken en kennis­
productie met meer single-sectorkarakteristieken zorgt voor een algemeen 
gebrek aan kennis, argumenten en technieken om verkeersveiligheid af te 
wegen tegen andere belangen en om verkeersveiligheid te integreren in een 
breder beleidsveld. Verschillende hoofdstukken geven hier voorbeelden van: 
Hoofdstuk 6 laat zien dat provincies vaak kennis over verkeersveiligheid 
afwegen tegen andere belangen. In Hoofdstuk 8 w ordt duidelijk dat kennis 
over die andere belangen, bijvoorbeeld van burgers uit de omgeving, 
regelmatig prevaleert boven wetenschappelijke kennis over verkeers­
veiligheid.
Het geobserveerde verschil tussen de cultuur en de rationaliteit van 
beleidsmakers enerzijds en die van kennisorganisaties anderzijds leidt tot 
een gebrek aan kennis over het omgaan met politieke argumenten in 
verkeersveiligheidsbeleid. Hoofdstuk 5 geeft voorbeelden van nationale en 
provinciale beleidsmakers in Europa die op ethische gronden kennis uit 
kosten-baten- en uit kosteneffectiviteitsanalyses verwerpen. Hoofdstuk 6 en 8
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demonstreren dat een aanzienlijk aantal gemeentelijke en provinciale 
beleidsmakers politiek-rationele argumenten, zoals 'draagvlak', lieten 
prevaleren boven technisch-rationele argumenten bij de implementatie van 
infrastructurele verkeersveiligheidsmaatregelen.
Reflectie en aanbevelingen
Deze dissertatie geeft een breed overzicht van kennisgebruik in het 
Nederlandse verkeersveiligheidsbeleid. Onderzoek naar dit specifieke 
onderwerp is nog weinig uitgevoerd. Bovendien is de keuze voor en de 
combinatie van meerdere onderzoeksmethoden uitzonderlijk in bestuurs­
kundig onderzoek.
Het proefschrift heeft zowel theoretische als praktische waarde. De 
theoretische waarde ligt in de verbinding tussen de gezichtspunten uit de 
meer procesmatige benaderingen uit theorieën over kennisgebruik en meer 
institutionele theorieën over kennis en beleid. Die verbinding, bovendien 
toegepast op het nog redelijk onontgonnen terrein van de verkeersveiligheid, 
laat zien dat klassieke, procesmatige barrières voor kennisgebruik ingebed 
zijn in institutionele patronen. Bovendien beïnvloeden de processen de 
patronen en andersom.
Naast haar theoretische waarde heeft deze dissertatie ook een praktische 
w aarde voor beleidsmakers en onderzoekers. Zij verschaft enkele inzichten 
in de relatie tussen beleidsmakers en onderzoekers, en draagt bij aan het 
begrip van elkaars werelden. Verder kunnen onderzoekers aan dit 
proefschrift kennis ontlenen over veelvoorkomende barrières voor kennis- 
gebruik en over suggesties om deze te slechten.
Twee typen aanbevelingen kunnen worden geformuleerd: aanbevelingen 
voor verder onderzoek en aanbevelingen over de praktijk van kennis- 
beleidsinteracties en hun institutionele setting.
Aanvullend onderzoek kan gedaan worden door deze studie uit te breiden 
naar kennisgebruik in verkeersveiligheidsbeleid buiten Nederland. Zowel 
binnen als buiten Nederland kunnen gedetailleerde onderzoeken naar het 
proces van kennisgebruik gecombineerd worden met gedegen institutionele 
analyses. Hoofdstuk 2 illustreert dat beide perspectieven uitgebreid behandeld 
worden in de wetenschappelijke literatuur. Hoewel het procesperspectief 
aandacht besteedt aan institutionele barrières en het institutionele perspectief 
in een zekere mate aan kennisgebruik, proberen weinige onderzoekers deze
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twee gezichtspunten te integreren. Deze dissertatie heeft hiermee een 
bescheiden start gemaakt. In het verkeersveiligheidsveld kan dit bijvoorbeeld 
worden uitgebreid door een diepgaande analyse van een nationaal 
beleidsproces te paren aan een institutionele analyse.
Aanbevelingen om de relatie tussen wetenschap en beleid te verbeteren zijn 
gebaseerd op de waargenomen barrières in deze dissertatie en vallen in twee 
soorten uiteen: aanbevelingen voor typen kennis die verder ontwikkeld 
kunnen worden en aanbevelingen voor de organisatie van de kennis­
productie en het kennisgebruik.
Het onderzoek in deze dissertatie maakt duidelijk dat er behoefte bestaat aan 
meer kennis over ten minste twee onderwerpen. Het eerste is kennis over de 
omgang met tegenstrijdige belangen van verschillende actoren in het 
verkeersveiligheidsbeleid, zoals reistijd, rijcomfort, draagvlak en 
landschappelijke inrichting. Het tweede onderwerp betreft kennis specifiek 
gericht op regionale en lokale overheden. Meer kennis over deze 
onderwerpen is nodig. Methoden om technisch-rationele wetenschappelijke 
kennis in balans te brengen met andere, meer politiek-rationele kennis over 
publiek draagvlak en over andere belangen dan verkeersveiligheid, kunnen 
beleidsmakers helpen om beslissingen te nemen die consistenter zijn en 
kennisproducenten helpen om hun kennis meer gebruikt te laten worden. 
Kennis over deze verschillende belangen zou kunnen worden opgenomen in 
afwegings- en integratiemethoden zoals multi-criteria-analyses of verkeers- 
veiligheidseffectrapportages, analoog aan de milieueffectrapportages.
Ten slotte kan een aantal aanbevelingen voor de organisatie van de 
kennisproductie en het kennisgebruik worden gegeven. Ten eerste kan het 
verschil tussen de meer multi-sectorbeleidswereld en de meer single-sector- 
kenniswereld wellicht overbrugd worden door een bepaalde mate van, niet 
noodzakelijkerwijs fysieke, integratie van verkeersveiligheidskennis in het 
verkeers- en vervoerveld te stimuleren. Ten tweede, om het verschil tussen 
de kennis- en beleidswereld op het gebied van aandacht voor verschillende 
actoren te verkleinen, zou meer contact tussen kennisorganisaties en actoren 
met andere dan verkeersveiligheidsbelangen kunnen resulteren in een 
methode om deze belangen mee te wegen in het verkeersveiligheidsbeleid. 
Ten derde, bij het verschil in focus tussen de kennis- en beleidswereld op het 
nationale versus het regionale/lokale niveau, zou een dialoog tussen 
regionale en lokale overheden en kennisorganisaties kunnen helpen
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kennislacunes te identificeren, die nieuwe kennis te ontwikkelen, en de 
verbinding tussen de al beschikbare kennis en het beleid te verbeteren.
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Nawoord
It takes a village to raise a child, en zo is er een wetenschappelijke gemeenschap 
nodig om een proefschrift tot stand te brengen. Ik had  het geluk twee 
wetenschappelijke gem eenschappen tot mijn beschikking te hebben: de 
collega's bij de SWOV en bij de vakgroep Milieu en Beleid van de Radboud 
Universiteit. Veel m ensen in deze gem eenschappen hebben mij hulp 
geboden bij het schrijven van het proefschrift.
Allereerst Pieter Leroy en Marjan Hagenzieker, in de w andelgangen 'prof en 
co'. Pieter, je verm ogen om moeilijke zaken eenvoudig u it te leggen en 
opbouw ende en m otiverende kritiek te geven, m aakte het schrijven van het 
proefschrift niet alleen tot een draaglijke, m aar meestal zelfs tot een 
aangenam e opgave. Bij je vriendelijkheid en voorkom endheid heb ik me 
altijd prettig gevoeld. Marjan, je kritische blik vanuit 'd a t andere vakgebied' 
maakte dit proefschrift een echte symbiose tussen de beleidskundew ereld en 
de verkeersveiligheidswereld. Je rotsvaste vertrouw en in mij en het 
proefschrift heeft me veel steun en rust gegeven bij het schrijven. Ook 
Kathleen Gallager heeft als taalcoach veel bijgedragen aan dit proefschrift. 
H aar snelheid, flexibiliteit en bereidheid mee te denken m aakten haar een 
fantastisch online steun. De SWOV en de Radboud Universiteit bedank ik 
voor hun  ruim hartige bijdragen die mij tijd verschaften het proefschrift af te 
ronden.
Mijn SWOV-collega's dank ik voor de prettige sam enwerking aan alle 
projecten die verw erkt zijn in het proefschrift. Zonder iem and te kort te 
willen doen wil ik speciaal Robert Louwerse, Wim Wijnen en Paul 
W esemann noemen, m et wie ik veel onderzoeken uitvoerde, m aar ook 
Ragnhild Davidse m et wie ik zo vaak proefschrift-lief-en-leed deelde. Niet 
alleen onderzoekers, m aar ook de ondersteunende afdelingen hebben veel 
bijgedragen aan het proefschrift, in het bijzonder bibliothecarissen Dennis 
van den Braak en Ineke Fijan (binnenkort krijgen jullie de halve SWOV- 
bibliotheek weer terug) en wetenschappelijk redacteur Marijke Tros. Een 
speciale verm elding verdient Ellen Jagtman, oud-collega, vakgenoot, 
sparringpartner en mede-buffelaar. Als collega had  je aan een half w oord 
voldoende. W at hebben w e hard  gewerkt samen, m aar w at hebben w e ook 
een hoop lol beleefd.
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Mijn collega's van de vakgroep Milieu en Beleid hebben mij gastvrij een jaar 
lang in hun  m idden opgenomen. Als buitenprom ovendus w ilde ik graag de 
vakgroep leren kennen, en ik heb m e vanaf de allereerste dag welkom 
gevoeld bij lunches en koffiekwartiertjes en me vrij gevoeld om zomaar 
binnen te lopen. Ron W underink heeft vriendelijk en geduldig tijd 
vrijgemaakt om mij te assisteren bij het gebruik van de Group Decision 
Room en het secretariaat heeft ruim hartig mijn eindeloze stroom praktische 
vragen beantwoord.
Mijn vrienden Linda, Liesbeth en Marieke, dank voor jullie luisterend oor en 
(muzikale) afleiding. Voor de toekom st beloof ik m inder thee te drinken en 
meer viool te spelen. M ohini en Annemarieke, mijn paranim fen, jullie steun 
en de strategische bloemetjes hielpen m e door de echt moeilijke tijden. Lieve 
familie en schoonfamilie, jullie morele en zeker ook praktische hulp  w as van 
grote w aarde. Lieve, lieve Olaf, w at kan ik nog veel leren van je 
relativeringsvermogen. Dank je wel voor je onvoorwaardelijke steun en je 
geduld. Tot slot wil ik Catootje bedanken voor haar bem oedigende kopjes en 
haar w andelingen over het toetsenbord. Alle tikfouten komen daarm ee 
vanzelfsprekend voor haar rekening.
236
Curriculum Vitae
Charlotte Bax was born on February 5th 1973 in Deurne. After obtaining her 
A theneum  diplom a from the Peelland College in Deurne in 1991, she started 
her study in General Social Sciences (Algemene Sociale W etenschappen) at 
Utrecht University. She specialised in Public Sector Policy and Organisation 
and received her m aster's degree in 1996.
While working as a social security policy m aker in Lopik municipality, she 
explored the public sector from within. She began as a researcher at SWOV 
Institute for Road Safety Research in 1999 w here she specialised in road 
safety research in public administration. Here she also had  the opportunity 
of studying national, provincial and municipal road safety decision-making 
processes as well as cooperation between policy actors in road safety policy 
implementation. Furtherm ore, she initiated a SWOV project on knowledge 
utilisation in provincial road safety policy and w orked in the European 
project Rosebud, an acronym for research on the use of cost-benefit and cost- 
effectiveness analyses in decision-making on road safety policy. These last 
two projects inspired her to make this the subject of her PhD thesis.
237

SWOV-Dissertatiereeks
In deze reeks zijn eerder verschenen:
Jolieke M esken (2006). D eterminants and consequences o f drivers' emotions.
Ragnhild Davidse (2007). A ssisting  the older driver: Intersection design and in-car 
devices to improve the safety o f the older driver.
M aura Houtenbos (2008). Expecting the unexpected: A  study o f interaction 
behaviour at intersections.
Frits Bijleveld (2008). Time series analysis in road safety research using state space 
methods.
Saskia de Craen (2010). The X-factor; A  longitudinal study o f calibration in young  
novice drivers.
Atze Dijkstra (2011). En route to safer roads; How road structure and road 
classification can affect road safety.
239
Radboud University Nijmegen SW flV
INSTITUTE FOK
ISBN
: 978-90-73946-00-2
